نزاع بحر إيجة

صورة ساتلية لبحر إيجة.
خريطة بحر إيجة.
6 ميل بحري: المياه الإقليمية الحالية المعترف بها من قبل اليونان وتركي ، والمجال الجوي كما تعترف به تركيا.
10 ميل بحري: المجال الجوي الوطني الذي تطالب به اليونان حالياً.
12 ميلبحري: مدى المياه الإقليمية والمجال الجوي الوطني المحدد كحق قانوني بموجب اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار، والذي لم توقع عليه تركيا.


نزاع بحر إيجة، هو مجموعة من الخلافات المترابطة بين اليونان وتركيا حول السيادة والحقوق المجاورة في منطقة بحر إيجة. أثرت هذه المجموعة من النزاعات بشدة على العلاقات اليونانية التركية منذ السبعينيات، وأدت مرتين إلى اقتراب أزمات من اندلاع الأعمال العدائية العسكرية، عام 1987 وفي أوائل عام 1996. وتنقسم القضايا في بحر إيجة إلى عدة فئات:

يتمثل أحد جوانب النزاع في التفسيرات المختلفة للقانون البحري: لم توقع تركيا على اتفاقية الرصيف القاري ولا على اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار، اعتبارًا من مايو 2022 تم التوقيع عليها من قبل 168 طرفًا، بما في ذلك اليونان؛ على هذا النحو، لا تعترف تركيا بالرصيف القاري القانوني والمنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة حول الجزر اليونانية.

بين عام 1998 وأوائل عام 2010، اقترب البلدان من التغلب على التوترات من خلال سلسلة من الإجراءات الدبلوماسية، لا سيما بهدف تخفيف انضمام تركيا إلى الاتحاد الأوروپي. ومع ذلك، ظلت الخلافات حول المسارات الدبلوماسية المناسبة للتوصل إلى حل جوهري دون حل، واعتبارًا من عام 2022، ظلت التوترات قائمة.

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مناطق النفوذ البحرية والجوية

تتناول العديد من قضايا بحر إيجة ترسيم حدود مناطق نفوذ البلدين في الجو والبحر حول أراضي كل منهما. تدين هذه القضايا في ضراوتها بالخصوصية الجغرافية لبحر إيجة وأراضيها. في حين أن سواحل البر الرئيسي لليونان وتركيا المتاخمة لبحر إيجة على كلا الجانبين تمثل حصصًا متساوية تقريبًا من إجمالي ساحلها، فإن العدد الهائل للعديد من جزر بحر إيجة تنتمي إلى اليونان. على وجه الخصوص، هناك سلسلة من الجزر اليونانية التي تصطف على طول الساحل الغربي التركي (لسبوس، خيوس، ساموس، جزر دوديكانيز)، بعضها منها على مقربة شديدة من البر الرئيسى. تمنع تركيا اليونان توسيع أي منطقة من مناطق نفوذها إلى ما بعد بضعة أميال بحرية قبالة سواحلها. نظرًا لأن اتساع مناطق النفوذ البحرية والجوية، مثل المياه الإقليمية والمجال الجوي الوطني، يتم قياسه من أقرب إقليم للدولة المعنية، بما في ذلك جزرها، فإن أي امتداد محتمل لهذه المناطق سيفيد اليونان بالضرورة أكثر بكثير من تركيا نسبيًا.

وفقًا للتصور الشائع [مطلوب توضيح] لهذه القضايا في البلدين، فإن تركيا قلقة من أن اليونان ربما تحاول توسيع مناطق نفوذها إلى درجة تجعل بحر إيجة فعليًا "بحيرة يونانية". على العكس من ذلك، تشعر اليونان بالقلق من أن تركيا قد تحاول "احتلال نصف بحر إيجة"، أي إقامة مناطق نفوذ تركية باتجاه وسط بحر إيجة، وراء سلسلة الجزر اليونانية البعيدة، وتحويلها إلى نوع من المعزل المحاط بالمياه التركية، وبالتالي عزلها عن وطنها الأم.[1]


المياه الإقليمية

تمنح المياه الإقليمية للدولة الساحلية سيطرة كاملة على الملاحة الجوية في المجال الجوي أعلاه، والسيطرة الجزئية على الشحن، على الرغم من أن السفن الأجنبية (المدنية والعسكرية) مضمونة عادةً مرور بريء عبرها. زاد العرض القياسي للمياه الإقليمية التي يحق للبلدان الحصول عليها عادةً بشكل مطرد خلال القرن العشرين: من 3 كم في البداية إلى 6 كم وحالياً 12 من. تم تكريس القيمة الحالية في قانون المعاهدات بواسطة اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار لعام 1982 (المادة 3). في بحر إيجة، لا تزال المياه الإقليمية التي يطالب بها الجانبان على بعد 6 أميال. أثار احتمال التمديد إلى 12 ميلاً مخاوف تركية بشأن زيادة محتملة غير متناسبة في المساحة التي تسيطر عليها اليونان. رفضت تركيا أن تصبح عضوا في الاتفاقية ولا تعتبر نفسها ملزمة بها. تعتبر تركيا الاتفاقية "res inter alios acta،" أي معاهدة يمكن أن تكون ملزمة للأطراف الموقعة فقط وليس للآخرين. صرحت اليونان، وهي طرف في الاتفاقية، بأنها تحتفظ بالحق في تطبيق هذه القاعدة وتمديد مياهها إلى 12 ميلاً في وقت ما في المستقبل في بحر إيجة (فعلت ذلك بالفعل في البحر الأيوني إلى الغرب). تعتقد اليونان أن قاعدة الـ 12 ميلاً ليست فقط قانون المعاهدات ولكن أيضًا القانون العرفي، وفقًا لتوافق الآراء الواسع بين المجتمع الدولي. في مقابل ذلك، تجادل تركيا بأن الخصائص الجغرافية الخاصة لبحر إيجة تجعل تطبيقًا صارمًا لقاعدة 12 ميلًا في هذه الحالة غير مشروع لصالح حقوق الملكية.[2] طبقت تركيا حد 12 ميلًا المعتاد على سواحلها خارج بحر إيجه.

تصاعدت التوترات حول مسألة الـ 12 ميلًا بين البلدين في أوائل التسعينيات، عندما كان قانون البحار على وشك أن يدخل حيز التنفيذ. في 8 يونيو 1995، أعلن البرلمان التركي رسميًا أن الإجراء الأحادي من جانب اليونان سيشكل "سبباً للحرب"، أي سببًا لشن الحرب. أدانت اليونان هذا الإعلان باعتباره انتهاكًا لميثاق الأمم المتحدة، الذي يحظر "التهديد باستخدام القوة أو استخدامها ضد السلامة الإقليمية أو الاستقلال السياسي لأية دولة".[1]

المجال الجوي الوطني

يُعرَّف المجال الجوي الوطني عادةً بأنه المجال الجوي الذي يغطي الأراضي البرية للدولة والمياه الإقليمية المجاورة لها. يمنح المجال الجوي الوطني للدولة ذات السيادة درجة كبيرة من السيطرة على الحركة الجوية الأجنبية. بينما يُسمح عادة للطيران المدني بالمرور بموجب المعاهدات الدولية، إلا أن الطائرات العسكرية الأجنبية وطائرات الدولة الأخرى (على عكس السفن العسكرية في المياه الإقليمية) لا يحق لها المرور بحرية عبر المجال الجوي الوطني لدولة أخرى.[3] إن تحديد المجال الجوي الوطني الذي تطالب به اليونان فريد من نوعه، لأنه لا يتطابق مع حدود المياه الإقليمية. تطالب اليونان بـ10 ميل بحري (19 كم) من المجال الجوي، مقابل 6 أميال حاليًا من المياه الإقليمية. منذ عام 1974، رفضت تركيا الاعتراف بصلاحية الحزام الجوي الخارجي البالغ طوله 4 أميال والذي يمتد إلى ما وراء المياه الإقليمية اليونانية. تستشهد تركيا بالقوانين الخاصة بمنظمة الطيران المدني الدولي لعام 1948، على أنها تحتوي على تعريف ملزم بأن كلا المنطقتين يجب أن تتطابق.[4] ضد هذا، اليونان تجادل بأن:

  • مطالبتها البالغة 10 أميال بحرية (19 كم) تسبق قانون منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي، بعد تحديدها عام 1931، والاعتراف بها من قبل جميع جيرانها، بما في ذلك تركيا، قبل وبعد عام 1948، وبالتالي تشكل حقًا ثابتًا؛[5]
  • يمكن أيضًا تفسير مطالبتها البالغة 10 أميال على أنها مجرد استخدام جزئي وانتقائي للحقوق الأوسع نطاقًا التي يكفلها قانون البحار، أي الحق في منطقة 12 ميلاً في الجو والبحر؛
  • تم تعيين المياه الإقليمية اليونانية عند حدود 6 أميال فقط لأنها سبباً للحرب من وجهة نظر تركيا.

أدى الصراع على أنشطة الطيران العسكرية إلى ممارسة الاستفزازات العسكرية التكتيكية المستمرة، حيث كانت الطائرات التركية تحلق في المنطقة الخارجية التي يبلغ طولها 4 أميال من المجال الجوي المثير للجدل، بينما اعترضتها الطائرات اليونانية. غالبًا ما تؤدي هذه المواجهات إلى ما يسمى "معارك الكلاب"، وهي مناورات طيران خطيرة انتهت مرارًا وتكرارًا بسقوط ضحايا من كلا الجانبين. في إحدى الحالات عام 1996، زُعم أن طائرة تركية أسقطتها طائرة يونانية بطريق الخطأ.[6]

الرصيف القاري

المطالبات المتضاربة على الرصيف القاري ومناطق المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة في شرق البحر المتوسط. الأزرق: المناطق التي تطالب بها اليونان وقبرص؛ الأحمر: المناطق التي تطالب بها تركيا. قسم بعنوان "A-B": الترسيم المزعوم بين تركيا وليبيا وفقًا لاتفاقية نوفمبر 2019. قسم بعنوان "C-D": الترسيم المتفق عليه بين اليونان ومصر وفقًا لاتفاقية أغسطس 2020.

في سياق نزاع بحر إيجة، يشير المصطلح الرصيف القاري إلى الحق الحصري للدولة الساحلية في الاستغلال الاقتصادي للموارد في قاع البحر وتحته، على سبيل المثال التنقيب عن النفط، في منطقة بجوار المياه الإقليمية وامتدادًا إلى أعالي البحار. يتم تعريف عرض الرصيف القاري بشكل عام لأغراض القانون الدولي على أنه لا يتجاوز 200 ميل بحري. عندما تقع أراضي الدولتين على مقربة من بعضها البعض أكثر من ضعف تلك المسافة، يتم التقسيم بواسطة خط الوسط.

يرتبط مفهوم الرصيف القاري ارتباطًا وثيقًا بمفهوم المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة، والذي يشير إلى سيطرة الدولة الساحلية على مصايد الأسماك وحقوق مماثلة. تم تطوير كلا المفهومين في القانون الدولي منذ منتصف القرن العشرين وتم تدوينهما في اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار عام 1982.

الخلاف بين تركيا واليونان هو إلى أي درجة ينبغي أن تؤخذ الجزر اليونانية قبالة الساحل التركي في الاعتبار عند تحديد المنطقتين الاقتصاديتين اليونانية والتركية. تجادل تركيا بأن مفهوم "الرصيف القاري"، بتعريفه ذاته، يعني ضمناً أنه ينبغي قياس المسافات من البر الرئيسي القاري، مدعيةً أن قاع البحر في بحر إيجه يشكل جغرافياً الإطالة الطبيعية لكتلة ياباسة الأناضول. وهذا يعني أن تركيا يحق لها الحصول على مناطق اقتصادية تصل إلى الخط المتوسط لبحر إيجة (باستثناء المياه الإقليمية حول الجزر اليونانية في النصف الشرقي، والتي ستبقى كمناطق يونانية). من ناحية أخرى، تدعي أن جميع الجزر يجب أن تؤخذ في الاعتبار على قدم المساواة. وهذا يعني أن اليونان ستحصل على الحقوق الاقتصادية لبحر إيجة بأكمله تقريبًا.[2]

في هذا الصدد، يوجد لدى اليونان قانون الأمم المتحدة للبحار إلى جانبها، لكن الاتفاقية نفسها تقيد تطبيق هذه القاعدة[7] إلى الجزر ذات الحجم الملحوظ، على عكس الجزر والصخور الصغيرة غير الصالحة للسكن. إن التحديد الدقيق لحدود المناطق الاقتصادية هو القضية الوحيدة من بين جميع قضايا بحر إيجة حيث أقرت اليونان رسميًا بأن لتركيا مصالح مشروعة قد تتطلب بعض الإجراءات الدولية للتحكيم أو التسوية بين الجانبين.[5] تستشهد تركيا بحل بعض قضايا محكمة العدل الدولية مثل النزاع الإقليمي والبحري (نيكاراگوا ضد كولومبيا) ،[8] تعيين الحدود البحرية في قضية البحر الأسود، قضية الحدود البحرية بين كندا وفرنسا حيث استخدمت المحكمة نهجًا منصفًا وقيدت اأرصفة القارية للجزر.[بحاجة لمصدر]

كانت التوترات حول الرصيف القاري عالية بشكل خاص خلال منتصف السبعينيات ومرة أخرى في أواخر الثمانينيات، عندما كان يعتقد أن بحر إيجة قد يكون غنيًا باحتياطات النفط. أجرت تركيا في ذلك الوقت بعثات بحثية استكشافية علمية في أجزاء من المنطقة المتنازع عليها. وقد اعتبرتها اليونان استفزازًا خطيرًا، مما أدى إلى تراكم التهديدات العسكرية المتبادلة عام 1976 ومرة أخرى عام 1987.[5]

مناطق معلومات الطيران

على عكس القضايا التي تم وصفها حتى الآن، فإن مسألة مناطق معلومات الطيران (FIR) لا تؤثر على حقوق السيادة للدولتين بالمعنى الضيق. منطقة معلومات الطيران هي منطقة مسؤولية مخصصة لدولة ما في إطار منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي (إيكاو). يتعلق بالمسؤولية عن تنظيم الطيران المدني. قد تمتد منطقة معلومات الطيران إلى ما وراء المجال الجوي الوطني لبلد ما، أي فوق مناطق أعالي البحار، أو في بعض الحالات حتى فوق المجال الجوي لبلد آخر. لا يمنح الدولة المسؤولة الحق في حظر الرحلات الجوية بطائرات أجنبية؛ ومع ذلك، فإن الطائرات الأجنبية ملزمة بتقديم خطط الطيران إلى السلطات التي تدير منطقة معلومات الطيران. نشأ نزاعان منفصلان حول السيطرة على الطيران في بحر إيجه: مسألة المراجعة المقترحة من جانب واحد لترسيم حدود منطقة معلومات الطيران، ومسألة ماهية الحقوق والالتزامات الناشئة عن منطقة معلومات الطيران فيما يتعلق بالرحلات الجوية العسكرية مقابل الرحلات المدنية.[بحاجة لمصدر]

ترسيم الحدود

بموجب اتفاقية موقعة عام 1952، تم تخصيص المجال الجوي بأكمله فوق بحر إيجة، حتى حدود المجال الجوي الوطني لتركيا، لمعلومات الطيران بأثينا، التي تديرها اليونان. بعد فترة وجيزة من أزمة قبرص لعام 1974، حاولت تركيا من جانب واحد تغيير هذا الترتيب، وأصدرت إشعارًا للطيارين (NOTAM) يفيد بأنها ستتولى إدارة النصف الشرقي من بحر إيجة بما في ذلك المجال الجوي الوطني للجزر اليونانية في تلك المنطقة. وردت اليونان بإعلان رفض هذه الخطوة، وإعلان المنطقة المتنازع عليها غير آمنة للطيران بسبب المطالبات المتضاربة للسلطة. أدى ذلك إلى حدوث بعض الانقطاع في الطيران المدني في المنطقة. غيرت تركيا موقفها في وقت لاحق، ومنذ عام 1980 عادت إلى الاعتراف بمعلومات الطيران في أثينا في ترسيمها الأصلي.[5] من الناحية العملية، لم يعد ترسيم حدود منطقة معلومات الطيران حاليًا موضوعًا متنازعًا عليه.


التحليقات العسكرية التركية

{{اعتبارًا من 2009، يتعلق الجدل الحالي حول منطقة معلومات الطيران بمسألة ما إذا كان للسلطات اليونانية الحق في الإشراف ليس فقط على أنشطة الطيران المدنية ولكن أيضًا العسكرية في الأجزاء الدولية من المجال الجوي لبحر إيجة. وفقًا للممارسات الدولية الشائعة، عادةً ما تقدم الطائرات العسكرية خطط رحلاتها إلى سلطات منطقة معلومات الطيران عند تحركها في المجال الجوي الدولي، تمامًا كما تفعل الطائرات المدنية. ترفض تركيا القيام بذلك، مستشهدة بميثاق منظمة الطيران المدني الدولي لعام 1948، الذي يقيد صراحة نطاق لوائحها على الطائرات المدنية، بحجة أن ممارسة إدراج الطائرات العسكرية في نفس النظام أمر اختياري. وعلى النقيض من ذلك، تقول اليونان إنها إلزامية على أساس اللوائح اللاحقة لمنظمة الطيران المدني الدولي، والتي تدعي أنها أعطت الدول سلطة إصدار قيود أوسع نطاقاً لصالح سلامة الطيران المدني.

أدى هذا الخلاف إلى عواقب عملية مماثلة لمسألة 6 مقابل 10 أميال من المجال الجوي الوطني، حيث تعتبر اليونان جميع الرحلات الجوية العسكرية التركية غير المسجلة لدى سلطات منطقة معلومات الطيران التابعة لها بمثابة تجاوزات لأنظمة الحركة الجوية الدولية، ولديها بشكل روتيني طائرات تابعة لسلاحها الجوي تعترض التركية. في التصور الشائع في اليونان، غالبًا ما يتم الخلط بين قضية الرحلات الجوية التركية في الجزء الدولي من منطقة معلومات الطيران بأثينا مع تلك المتعلقة بالتدخلات التركية في الحزام الخارجي المتنازع عليه البالغ 4 أميال من المجال الجوي اليوناني. ومع ذلك، في الاستخدام الرسمي الدقيق، تميز السلطات ووسائل الإعلام اليونانية بين "الانتهاكات" (παραβιάσεις) للمجال الجوي الوطني و"التجاوزات" (παραβάσεις) لأنظمة المرور، أي منطقة معلومات الطيران.

أدت إحدى مناورات الاعتراض الروتينية إلى وقوع حادث مميت في 23 مايو 2006. كانت طائرتان تركيتان طراز إف-16 وطائرة استطلاع طراز إف-4 تحلقان في المجال الجوي الدولي فوق جنوب بحر إيجة على ارتفاع 8.200 متر دون تقديم خطط الطيران إلى سلطات منطقة معلومات الطيران اليونانية. تم اعتراضهم من قبل طائرتين يونانيتين من طراز إف-16 قبالة ساحل جزيرة كارباثوس اليونانية. أثناء معركة الكلاب الوهمية التي تلت ذلك، اصطدمت طائرة تركية من طراز إف-16 وطائرة يونانية من طراز إف-16 في الجو وتحطمت بعد ذلك. ونجا قائد الطائرة التركية من الحادث لكن الطيار اليوناني توفي. سلط الحادث الضوء أيضًا على جانب آخر من قضية معلومات الطيران ، وهو الخلاف حول المطالبات المتضاربة بالمسؤولية عن عمليات البحث والإنقاذ البحرية. وبحسب ما ورد رفض الطيار التركي أن تنقذه القوات اليونانية التي تم إرسالها إلى المنطقة. بعد الحادث ، أعربت الحكومتان عن اهتمامهما بإحياء خطة سابقة لإنشاء خط ساخن مباشر بين قيادات القوات الجوية في كلا البلدين من أجل منع تصعيد مواقف مماثلة في المستقبل.

التطورات الأخيرة: مزاعم الوطن الأزرق التركية وردود الفعل

تصوير لمفهوم "الوطن الأزرق" الوحدوي والتوسعي الذي أنشأه جهاد يايجي.

On 2 September 2019, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appeared in a photograph with a map that depicted nearly half of the Aegean Sea and an area up to the eastern coast of Crete as belonging to Turkey. The map was displayed during an official ceremony at the National Defense University of Turkey in Istanbul[9] and shows an area labelled as "Turkey's Blue Homeland" stretching up to the median line of the Aegean,[10] enclosing the Greek islands in that part of the sea without any indication of the Greek territorial waters around them. The Blue Homeland is an irredentist and expansionist concept and doctrine,[أ] created by the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy Commander Cihat Yaycı, and developed with Admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006.[20][21][22][12] The Greek side expressed its regret, with the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias stating that Turkey's tactics are "communication campaigns that cannot change international legitimacy, merely establishing Turkey's image as a perpetrator".[23]


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Lodging claims in UN

On 13 November 2019, Turkey submitted to the United Nations a series of claims to Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean that are in conflict with Greek claims to the same areas – including a sea zone extending west of the southeastern Aegean island of Rhodes and south of Crete. The Turkish claims were made in an official letter by Turkey's Permanent Representative to the UN Feridun Sinirlioglu, which reflect Ankara's notion of a "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan). Greece condemned these claims as legally unfounded, incorrect and arbitrary, and an outright violation of Greece's sovereignty.[24]

Turkey's view

Turkey holds the view, unlike most other states,[25][26][27][28][29][30] that no islands can have a full Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)[31][32] and should only be entitled to a 12 nautical mile reduced EEZ or no EEZ at all rather than the usual 200 miles that Turkey and every other country are entitled to. In this context, Turkey, for the first time on 1 December 2019, claimed that the Greek island of Kastellorizo shouldn't have any EEZ at all, because, from the equity-based[33][34] Turkish viewpoint, it is a small island immediately across the Turkish mainland (which, according to Turkey, has the longest coastline), and isn't supposed to generate a maritime jurisdiction area four thousand times larger than its own surface. Furthermore, according to Turkey's Foreign Ministry, an EEZ has to be coextensive with the continental shelf, based on the relative lengths of adjacent coastlines[30] and described any opposing views supporting the right of islands to their EEZ as "maximalist and uncompromising Greek and Greek Cypriot claims".[34][33][35] On 20 January 2020, the Turkish President Erdogan challenged even the rights of Crete, Greece's largest island and 5th largest in the Mediterranean, stating that "They talk about a continental shelf around Crete. There is no continental shelf around the islands, there is no such thing, there, it is only sovereign waters."[36]

Turkey's view, however, is a 'unique' interpretation[37][30] not shared by any other country and not in accordance to the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, which as of May 2022 it has been signed by 168 parties (including Greece), but not Turkey.[38] Turkey has refused to ratify the UNCLOS, and argues that it is not bound by its provisions that award islands maritime zones. The UNCLOS, and particularly Article 121 clearly states that the islands can have exclusive economic zones and continental shelf just like every other land territory.[39] The Ambassadors of the United States and Russia to Athens, Geoffrey Pyatt and Andrey Maslov respectively, while commenting on Turkey's view, stated that all the islands have the same rights to EEZ and continental shelf as the mainlands do.[40][41][42] The then US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Aaron Wess Mitchell, criticized the Turkish view, stating that it "is a minority of one versus the rest of the world."[43]

Turkey-GNA maritime agreement

المقالة الرئيسية: Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal

On 28 November 2019, President Erdoğan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Istanbul with the Prime Minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord of Libya (GNA), Fayez al-Sarraj, to demarcate maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean on an area between Turkey and Libya, appearing to "write [the Greek island of] Crete off the map entirely" in the words of Foreign Policy's Keith Johnson.[44]

This agreement was controversial[45][46][47] and drew condemnation by Greece and the international community, including the rival Tobruk-based government led by the Libyan House of Representatives and Khalifa Haftar, the European Union, United States, Russia, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Serbia, Israel, Syria, Bahrein, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the Arab League, as a violation of the International Law of the Sea and the article 8 of the Skhirat Agreement which prohibits the Libyan Prime Minister from solely clinching international deals without consent of all the cabinet members.[ب] The Libyan House of Representatives consequently started a bid to suspend the GNA from the Arab League, but did not succeed.[76] The United States stated that it was "provocative" and a threat to the stability of the region.[77][78] Acting foreign minister Israel Katz announced Israel's opposition to the maritime border accord between Ankara and Tripoli, and confirmed that the deal was "illegal" according to the Israeli official position, while at the same time noting that Israel does not want a conflict with Turkey.[79]

On 18 October 2020, the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag)'s research service reviewed the Turkey-GNA maritime deal and found it to be illegal under international law, and detrimental to third parties.[80]

Post-agreement developments

In response to these developments, the GNA Ambassador to Greece Mohamed Younis Menfi was summoned to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens, where he was given an ultimatum of seven days, to disclose until 5 December the agreement his country signed with Turkey on maritime boundaries, or will be considered "persona non-grata" and be expelled from Greece.[81] The authorities of the European Union also urged for the disclosure of the deal's details.[60] Also, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met with the Turkish President on the sidelines of the 2019 London summit to discuss about it.[82] Greek Foreign Minister Dendias revealed that, earlier this year, in September, his GNA counterpart, foreign minister Mohamed Taher Siala had reassured the Greek side that Libya would never sign any illegal agreements with Turkey that would violate the Greek sovereign rights.[83][84] On 6 December, the GNA Ambassador to Athens was expelled from Greece,[85] prompting strong reactions in both the GNA and Turkey.[86][47] Furthermore, the President of the Tobruk-based Libyan Parliament, Agila Saleh Issa Gwaider, who condemned and opposed the GNA-Turkey deal, was invited to Athens by the President of the Greek Parliament Konstantinos Tasoulas for talks.[87]

Ankara asked for the agreement on maritime boundaries from the Government of National Accord (GNA) in the Libyan Civil War, in exchange for Turkey's long-time support against the rival Tobruk-based House of Representatives.[88]

It is believed, according to multiple sources, that Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is exploiting the weakness of the GNA headed by Fayez al-Sarraj to force it to sign "illegal" agreements which are a serious breach of international laws that disregards the lawful rights of other eastern Mediterranean countries; and that through these exploitations, Turkey is trying to assert its regional power and its control of the Mediterranean sea, at the expense of the rights of the other Mediterranean nations and undermining the peace-making efforts to resolve the Libyan Civil War and the curb of migrant influx to Europe.[89][90][91][92][93][94][95][96]

On 4 December 2019, the Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Fatih Dönmez, announced Turkey's intentions to start awarding licences to drills for natural gas in Greek waters which Ankara claimed through the Turkey-GNA deal, once it is approved by the two countries' parliaments.[97] The same day, Turkish President Erdogan stated that he is "ready" to start negotiations with Athens for the delimitation of maritime borders between Turkey and Greece, under the condition that the negotiations are based on Turkey's peculiar perception which is stripping the Greek islands of their sovereign rights, and is violating the UNCLOS treaty.[98] The intentions for drills in Greek waters, was confirmed by President Erdogan on a public broadcast of the Mavi Vatan map and the Turkey-GNA deal.[99] On 5 December 2019, the Turkish Parliament ratified the contentious GNA-Turkey maritime borders deal, where it had a strong backing by four of Turkey's five major political parties - with the exception of the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP).[100][101] The Libyan Parliament however blocked the ratification and rejected the deal unanimously, with the President of the Parliament, Aguila Saleh Issa, sending a letter to the United Nations declaring it as null and void.[102][103][104][105] Even though the ratification by the Libyan Parliament failed, GNA deposited the maritime agreement to the United Nations on 27 December,[106] with Turkey following on 2 March of the next year.[107] On 14 July 2020, it is revealed that five countries sent a joint note verbale to the UN Secretariat calling for the agreement to not be registered and accepted, noting that, per UN procedures, its ratification by the Libyan Parliament is a prerequisite.[74] On 1 October, the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, registered the Turkey-GNA deal on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean. The agreement "has been registered with the Secretariat, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations," said the certificate of registration.[108][109] On 27 January 2021, a court of appeals in Al-Bayda ruled in favour of a lawsuit filed by the House of Representatives, declaring the Memorandum invalid.[110][111][112]

According to multiple sources, there is a fear of destabilization in the East Mediterranean and NATO due to Turkey's assertive moves and that an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece draws closer.[113][114][115][116][117][118][119][120][121] On 9 December, the vessels of the Libyan Navy which are under the control of the Libyan National Army, announced that they received mandate to sink any Turkish research vessels or drillships that may attempt to conduct researches south of Crete, as part of the Turkey-GNA deal.[122] France also signaled its intention to send French frigates and ships to the south of Crete, in coordination with Athens, while Italy sent its frigate "Martinengo" to monitor, patrol and safeguard the sea around Cyprus, which has been the subject of claims by Turkey.[123][124]

On 30 May 2020, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) applied to the Turkish Ministry of Energy for exploration permits on the Greek continental shelf, just 6 miles off Crete, Karpathos and Rhodes.[125][126] TPAO's applications were published to the Turkey's Government Gazette, with a map showing the 24 blocks that Ankara has demarcated from Turkey's shores to the point where its claimed sea borders meet these of Libya, based on the Turkey-GNA maritime agreement. This prompted strong reactions both in Greece and abroad, with the Turkish Ambassador to Athens, Burak Özügergin, being summoned to the Greek Foreign Ministry, and the European Union's High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell warning Ankara that the good EU-Turkey relations "will depend critically on the respect of the sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece on the waters under dispute".[127][128][129] Furthermore, the United States criticized Turkey, with the US Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Francis R. Fannon stating, during a quadrilateral conference organized by both the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce and the Atlantic Council with the participation of USA, Greece, Israel and Cyprus, that such "provocative actions" must end and that the Turkey-GNA agreement "cannot as a legal matter affect the rights or obligations of third states" such as Greece.[130][131][132]

EastMed Pipeline

On 2 January 2020, the leaders of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed an accord to build the EastMed pipeline. The planned pipeline will transport natural gas from the Levantine Basin to Greece and from there to Italy and the rest of Europe.[133][134][135] Energy expert Brenda Schaffer interprets the EastMed pipeline (forecasted to be able to cater to 10% of Europe's gas needs, and decrease reliance on Russia) as a joint attempt to exclude Turkey from the "Club Med" gas club,[44] and the decision to sign the pipeline accord was taken in response to the Turkish-GNA deal.[136]


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Greece - Italy EEZ agreement

On 9 June 2020, and in response to Turkey's moves in the region, Greece and Italy signed through their Foreign Ministers Nikos Dendias and Luigi Di Maio a "historic" agreement for the demarcation of the EEZ between the two countries. The agreement confirms the full rights of islands to their continental shelf and EEZ, in line with the UNCLOS. It uses the median line that was used for the 1977 Italy-Greece continental shelf demarcation agreement as the basis of the EEZ boundary.[137][138] In the mutually agreed minor adjustments, part of the EEZ of the small Greek islands of Strofades, Othoni, and Mathraki was traded off for an equal area elsewhere (i.e. part of the EEZ of Italy's Calabria).[139][140][141] According to Dendias, this creates an extremely favorable legal precedent for Greece in its dispute with Turkey.[141] The United States, the Libyan House of Representatives, and the LNA led by Halifa Haftar, welcomed the EEZ agreement between Greece and Italy, with the US calling it "exemplary" and "an example of how these things should be done [in the region]", while reiterating their opposition to the Turkey-GNA EEZ agreement.[142] Following the agreement, the Libyan House of Representatives sent an official invitation to the Hellenic Parliament for a similar EEZ agreement to be reached between Libya and Greece too,[143] with talks beginning on 1 July.[144] Dendias stated that Libyan-Greek talks are "not within the arbitrariness that so-called Sarraj-Turkey memorandum is constituting", but within the framework of UNCLOS and in continuation of the 2010 talks between the two countries.[144] In this context, a committee of experts is formed by the President of the Libyan Parliament, Aguila Saleh.[145] The LNA published a map with the proposed EEZ boundaries between Libya and Greece, in which Libya fully acknowledges the Greek islands' rights to their continental shelf and EEZ.[146] Furthermore, on 18 June, a high-level delegation from Greece visited Egypt to negotiate and sign an agreement demarcating the Egyptian-Greek EEZ as well.[147]

In July 2020, France and Austria have called for sanctions against Turkey, such as the termination of the Turkey's EU accession talks. In the same context the EU's Foreign Affairs Council convened and agreed for a framework of sanctions to be prepared for use in the event Turkey attempts any violations of Greece's sovereign rights. The Greek FM Dendias expressed his country's readiness to activate the Mutual Defence Clause (Article 42) of the EU's Lisbon Treaty for military assistance.[148][149][150]

On 21 July, Turkey announced plans for a seismic survey south and east of the Greek island of Kastellorizo with the research vessel "Oruç Reis", and for this purpose it issued a Navtex covering parts of the Greek, Egyptian and Cypriot waters,[151] prompting strong reactions both in Greece[152] and abroad. The Greek embassy in Ankara sent a complaint to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Egypt considers the move as an encroachment of its waters,[153] and Germany's Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warned Turkey with consequences.[154][155][156][157] Turkey dispatched its naval forces to the region around Kastellorizo, and Turkish armed jets conducted low overflights and dogfights with their Greek counterparts above the island, causing the tourists to evacuate it,[158] and the Greek Armed Forces to be placed on high alert.[159] The Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, Ali Kemal Aydın, was summoned to the German Foreign Ministry[160] and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel held phone calls with the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and the Turkish President Tayip Erdogan in a bid to de-escalate the situation.[161][162] According to the German tabloid newspaper Bild, it was Merkel's last-minute intervention that prevented a crisis between Greece and Turkey.[163] This was later confirmed by the German Defence Minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.[164] Along with Germany, France, Spain and the United States also backed Greece, with the French President Emmanuel Macron calling for sanctions against Turkey for the violation of Greece's sovereignty, the US envoy to Athens acknowledging Kastellorizo's "exactly the same" rights to EEZ and Continental Shelf as mainlands, and the State Department urging Turkey to halt its plans for surveys in the area around the island.[165][166][167][168][169] A few days later, Turkey announced the suspension of its oil and gas exploration around Kastellorizo.[170]

Greece - Egypt EEZ agreement

المقالة الرئيسية: Egypt-Greece maritime deal

Several days later, on 6 August, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Greece, Sameh Shoukry and Nikos Dendias respectively, signed a maritime agreement partially demarcating the EEZs between the two countries, in line with the UNCLOS which recognizes the right of the islands to their continental shelf and EEZ.[171][172][173] According to the Greek side, the Egyptian-Greek agreement cancels in practice the Turkish-GNA memorandum.[174] Turkey opposed the agreement and considers it "null and void", claiming that "there is no mutual sea border between Egypt and Greece". Similarly, the Tripoli-based GNA government led by Al-Sarraj condemned it as a "violation of Libya's maritime rights".[175] On the other hand, the Tobruk-based LNA government led by Haftar,[176] Saudi Arabia and the United States, supported and welcomed it, with the LNA stating that Greece "should solidify a EEZ with the only democratically elected legislative body in Libya, the House of Representatives" and the State Department stating that it encourages the peaceful settlement of disputes.[177][178][179][180] Also, Manfred Weber, head of the European People's Party, the largest party in the European Parliament, welcomed the Egypt-Greece agreement as a positive development that "strengthens stability in the East Mediterranean," and urged for the European Union to "stand firmly with Greece" against what he called as Turkish attempts that "undermine international law in the region".[181] In response to this, Turkey announced the next day that it resumed its seismic surveys south of Kastellorizo.[182][183] Τhe US, the EU, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, North Macedonia, Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Sweden and Armenia expressed their opposition to Turkey's renewed explorations in the East Mediterranean,[184][185][186][187][188][189][190][191][192][193][194][71][195] while Azerbaijan counteracted to Armenia's position by lending its support for Turkey's moves.[196][197] On 14 August 2020, Greece's and Turkey's ships collided and suffered minor damages[198] and France intervened by sending its naval forces to the East Mediterranean, to Greece's aid,[199][200][201] followed by the United Arab Emirates whose Fighter Jets are stationed at the Souda Bay Naval Base, in Crete.[202][203] Also, the United States beefed up their military presence in the East Med by assigning the USS Hershel "Woody" Williams to the Souda Bay as its new permanent home,[204][205] and talks on moving US assets from the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, to Souda Bay opened.[206] Josep Borrell announced that the European Union is preparing a list of sanctions against Turkey, including tough economic measures,[207] and the former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu criticized openly his own country's "power projection" in the East Mediterranean, which, according to him, risks causing a military conflict.[208] On 18 August, the Egyptian Parliament ratified the Greece - Egypt EEZ Agreement[209] and, 9 days later, the Greek Parliament followed suit,[210] before it would be registered at the United Nations on 24 December 2020.[211] Greece announced that reaching EEZ agreements with Albania and Cyprus are among its next priorities.[212][213] On 17 September, the European Parliament condemned Turkey for its violations of the Greek and Cypriot EEZs and called on the European Council to prepare further sanctions.[214]

Due to Turkey's diplomatic isolation,[204][215][216][192][217] and just a week ahead of the EU Summit where sanctions against the EU-candidate country for its drilling activities were to be evaluated, Oruç Reis withdrew from Kastellorizo and the Turkish surveys on Greek continental shelf were halted. Turkey agreed to resort to diplomatic means for resolving its maritime disputes with Greece.[218][219][220] Turkey's economy is dependent on foreign markets and especially the European Union, for exports, imports, short-term finance and technology, and thus, the EU's tough economic sanctions could have a "fatal" impact on the Turkish economy and the Turkish President Erdogan's political survival.[221] The prospect of EU sanctions also have contributed to the Turkish Lira's de-evaluation to record-low levels, and thus complicating the economic situation in the country.[222][223][224][225] The United States, which criticized Turkey's assertive policies in the region, welcomed Ankara's decision to adopt a more diplomatic stance over its maritime dispute with Greece, with the head of the American foreign policy, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stating that "the way conflict is resolved is not through shows of force, it's not through demonstrations of power, it's through dialogue. It’s through international systems, agreement, conversations, dialogue. That's how these maritime disputes ought to be resolved. We’ve watched the Greeks move in that direction trying to achieve that. We hope the Turkish Government will see it the same way". Additionally, Pompeo sided with the Greek side on the dispute, by asking for a solution that is "reflective of the fundamental rights of the citizens of Greece".[226][227][217]

Further developments

On 8 October 2020, Turkey and Greece agreed, under Germany's mediation and with the United States' full consultation, to resume exploratory talks for resolving their maritime disputes. However, a few days later, on 11 October, Turkey withdrew from the talks and resumed its gunboat diplomacy by releasing a NAVTEX announcing that it will be conducting surveys on the waters just 6.5 nautical miles off Kastellorizo[228][229] and redeployed its research vessel Oruç Reis, escorted by Turkish frigates, for this purpose.[230] These Turkish moves drew the International community's condemnation, with Berlin decrying them as a "serious blow" to efforts at easing tensions in the East Mediterranean and accusing Ankara for "interplay between detente and provocation",[71][231][232] the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas cancelling his planned visit to Ankara,[233] and along with France, warning Turkey with consequences,[234] Greece's Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias declaring that "the Turkish leadership has shown it is not a credible interlocutor. Its calls for dialogue are only a pretext. The international community must judge [Ankara] on the basis of actions, not words. We must all face reality before it is too late",[235] the United States "deploring" Ankara for its moves, which the State Department described as "calculated provocations",[236][237] Austria's Chancellor Sebastian Kurz condemning Oruc Reis' redeployment and warning Turkey of sanctions,[238][239] Egypt's Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry rejecting Turkey's gunboat diplomacy and policy of territorial expansion in the region,[240] Sweden's Foreign Minister Ann Linde warning that the Oruç Reis' redeployment is leading to new tensions instead of contributing to de-escalation,[71] Israel expressing its concerns over Turkey's destabilizing role in the East Med,[241] and Russia backing Greece's right to expand its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and reaffirming that the UNCLOS is a "cornerstone" of the international law and applies to the Mediterranean Sea.[242] Manfred Weber of the EPP reiterated his call for EU sanctions against Turkey, stating that these initial de-escalation moves by Erdogan were purposeful only, with the aim of avoiding sanctions against his country at the recent European Council.[243] Turkey however rebuffed international criticism of its research vessel's redeployment, insisting that the Oruç Reis is operating in what it claims as "Turkish waters".[71]

On 17 October, Turkey passed a law expanding its search and rescue (SAR) area to cover all the new territories it claims in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas as part of its Blue Homeland theory.[244][245][246] Greece condemned this extension of Turkish SAR as illegal under international law which does not permit any deliberateral expansions of SAR areas without prior agreements with the relevant neighboring states, and protested strongly due to this expansion overlapping with Greece's Athens SAR and the sovereign rights of Greek islands and their surrounding waters. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs filed a complaint against it at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).[247][248] Turkey described the Greek protests as "groundless", insisting that the expansion was done "to ensure the safety of the activities" within the Greek continental shelf which Ankara claims as "Turkish".[249] ICAO's Secretary General Fang Liu, however, responded by rejecting Turkey's unilateral expansion of SAR and reaffirming the Greek position on the matter. According to Liu, no changes may be done to the SAR boundaries between the two countries without Greece's prior consent.[250][251]

On 20 October, Greece and Albania agreed to resume negotiations for the demarcation of their maritime boundaries and that, in the event of no resolution, the two parties may jointly submit the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.[252][253][254] The two countries had already reached an agreement on the demarcation of their maritime boundaries in 2009. Although ratified by the Greek side, the Albanian one took it to the Albanian Supreme Court where it was deemed unconstitutional. According to Cihat Yaycı, a Turkish general and author of the Turkey's "Blue Homeland" theory, it was due to Ankara's pressure on Tirana that the agreement's ratification failed. For Turkey, an agreement between Albania and Greece based on the UNCLOS, would have had set a negative legal precedent against Turkey's positions in its maritime disputes with Greece.[255][256][257][258]

On 18 November, Greece and the United Arab Emirates formed a military alliance by signing a mutual defense pact, which calls for each to help the other in case of an attack. The pact which is regarded as historic, marking the first of its kind in Greece's modern history, aims at countering Turkey's policies in the region.[259][260][261][262]

Turkey was criticized at a NATO meeting on 3 December by the then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, for what he regarded as undermining NATO's security and cohesion and destabilizing the eastern Mediterranean by stoking tensions with fellow ally Greece, whilst according to Reuters, Turkish sources with knowledge of the meeting saw Pompeo's approach as "unjust" as Turkey was "open to talks with Greece".[263][264] On 5 December, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs tweeted that "No sanctions will ever make Turkey compromise its sovereign rights, be it in Meis/Kastellorizo or 10 nm airspace."[265][266][267] On 9 December, the US House of Representatives adopted the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA), a defense legislation which includes sanctionary measures against Turkey because of several international disagreements between Washington and Ankara, including the purchase of the Russian defence system S-400 and the Turkish activities in the Eastern Mediterranean region.[268] Three days after its approval by the US Congress, the Donald Trump administration imposed the sanctions as part of the CAATSA.[269] According to Senator Robert Menendez, a member of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and rapporteur of the NDAA amendment for US sanctions, Turkey's behavior in the East Med was one of the reasons contributing to the decision.[270][271] The European Union's 27 leaders, also decided in the 10 December summit to impose sanctions on Turkey for its activities against Greece and Cyprus in the East Med. The EU sanctions include travel bans into the EU territories and asset freezes on Turkish companies and individuals.[272][273]

On 18 September 2021, new diplomatic tensions sparked after an incident between Greece and Turkey where the latter's frigates prevented France's research vessel Nautical Geo from conducting surveys on Greece's behalf at the Greek EEZ, just 6 miles off the Greek island of Crete, whose waters Turkey claims as Turkish, citing its contentious maritime deal with the former Government of National Accord of Libya.[274] The tensions come just a day after a high-level EUMed 9 Summit at Athens, where the heads of governments from 9 Mediterranean countries, including Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, as well as the head of EU's Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, released a joint statement regarding the security and stability in the Mediterranean Sea, urging Turkey to “abstain, in a consistent and permanent manner, from provocations or unilateral actions in breach of international law”.[275][276][277] Turkey's Foreign Ministry rejected the summit's declaration, calling it "biased".[278]

On 19 September, the main opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People's Party (CHP), opposed the Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) doctrine as aggressive and expansionist.[279][280][281][282]

France - Greece and Greece - US defense pacts

On 28 September 2021, Greece and France signed the Franco-Greek defense agreement whereby either country is obliged to defend the other in the case of attack by a third party. France will supply Greece with navy frigates worth around €3 billion and is committed to help defend Greece if Turkey attacks.[283] The pact is considered to be a landmark and the first of its kind ever signed between NATO allies, and is believed to be the first step in Europe's strategic autonomy and the creation of a European army.[284][285] The deal was welcomed positively by other NATO allies such as the United States[286] Germany,[287] and the EU's Commission,[288] however it is opposed by Turkey as "harmful".[289] According to experts, the deal aims to become the basis for the creation of a European defense structure with its own autonomous dynamics and priorities, and part of Greece's efforts in deterring Turkey's neo-Ottoman expansionist policies in the region.[290][291][292][293][294][295][296]

On 14 October, Greece and the United States expanded and indefinitely extended their defense pact amid tensions with Turkey. The agreement, known as the US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, promotes a strategic partnership between the two countries and grants the American forces a broader use of Greek bases, including a military base near the Greece-Turkey border. According to the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, it aims at advancing "security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond".[297][298][299] Furthermore, in his letter accompanying the deal, Blinken vowed "to mutually safeguard and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries against actions threatening peace, including armed attacks".[300][301]

On 15 December 2021, Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu hinged Greece's sovereignty over the Aegean islands to their demilitarized status, claiming for the first time that Greece loses its sovereign rights even over the major Greek islands (such as Chios, Lesvos, and Lemnos), from the moment it has militarized them. According to him, this claim of sovereignty over islands being dependent to their demilitarization, was reiterated in Turkey's October 2021 letter to the United Nations as well.[302][303][304][305] The international community however rejected Çavuşoğlu's positions. The Israeli ambassador to Athens, Yossi Amrani, when commenting about Çavuşoğlu's statements, pointed to the joint Israel, Cyprus and Greece declaration at the tripartite Jerusalem Summit earlier this month, which stressed the need for all countries to respect the sovereign rights of their neighbors in the region.[306] Besides Israel and Cyprus, also the United States,[307][308] the United Kingdom,[309][310] France,[311][312] Germany,[313][314] the European Union,[315][316] and China[317] lend their support to Greece, with the State Department stating that "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected and protected. The sovereignty of Greece οn these islands is not in question," and the European Union expressing its disapproval, stating that "the sovereignty of Greece in these islands is indisputable" and that "the international agreements must be respected." The US ambassador to Athens Geoffrey Pyatt also affirmed his country's solidarity with Greece against the Turkish claims.[318] A few days later, however, the Turkish President Erdogan, reiterated Çavuşoğlu's statements, insisting that their militarization is a "violation of [international] treaties" and that "the issue of the islands is always controversial".[319] Greece's Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias expressed his regret for Erdogan's remarks, stating that they go against the spirit of the United Nations's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and raises questions about Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO).[320]

Status of Islands

Islands by date of accession to Greece
Islands by demilitarization status

There have been a number of disputes related to the territories of the Greek islands themselves. These have related to the demilitarized status of some of the main islands in the area; to Turkish concerns over alleged endeavours by Greece to artificially expand settlements to previously uninhabited islets; and to the existence of alleged "grey zones", an undetermined number of small islands of undetermined sovereignty.[بحاجة لمصدر]

Demilitarized status

The question of the demilitarized status of some major Greek islands is complicated by a number of facts. Several of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean as well as the Turkish straits region were placed under various regimes of demilitarization in different international treaties. The regimes developed over time, resulting in difficulties of treaty-interpretation. However, the military status of the islands in question did not constitute a serious problem in the bilateral relations until the Cyprus crisis of 1974, after which both Greece and Turkey re-interpreted the stipulations of the treaties. Greece, claiming an inalienable right to defend itself against Turkish aggression, reinforced its military and National Guard forces in the region. Furthermore, Greece maintains the position that it has the right to militarize its islands in the same context as the rest of Europe, where the appliance of demilitarization statute on islands and territories ceased with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact; i.e. the cessation of demilitarization of Italy's Panteleria, Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa islands, and West Germany from the NATO side, and the cessation of demilitarization of Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, and Hungary from the Warsaw Pact's side, and the cessation of demilitarization of Finland.[321] Turkey, on the other hand, denounces this as an aggressive act by Greece and as a breach of international treaties.[4] From a legal perspective, three groups of islands may be distinguished: (a) the islands right off the Turkish Dardanelles straits, i.e. Lemnos and Samothrace; (b) the Dodecanese islands in the southeast Aegean; and (c) the remaining northeast Aegean islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria).

Lemnos and Samothrace

These islands were placed under a demilitarization statute by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, to counterbalance the simultaneous demilitarization of the Turkish straits area (the Dardanelles and Bosphorus), Imbros and Tenedos. The demilitarization on the Turkish side was later abolished through the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits in 1936. Greece holds that, by superseding the relevant sections of the earlier treaty, the convention simultaneously lifted also the Greek obligations with respect to these islands. Against this, Turkey argues that the Montreux treaty did not mention the islands and has not changed their status.[4] Greece, on the other hand, cites Turkish official declarations, by the then Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rustu Aras, to that effect made in 1936,[322] assuring the Greek side that Turkey would consider the Greek obligations lifted.[5]

Dodecanese

These islands were placed under a demilitarization statute after the Second World War by the Treaty of peace with Italy (1947), when Italy ceded them to Greece. Italy had previously not been under any obligation towards Turkey in this respect. Turkey, in turn, was not a party to the 1947 treaty, having been neutral during WWII. Greece therefore holds that the obligations it incurred towards Italy and the other parties in 1947 are res inter alios acta for Turkey in the sense of Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that a treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third country, and that Turkey thus cannot base any claims on them. Turkey argues that the demilitarization agreement constitutes a status treaty (an objective régime), where according to general rules of treaty law such an exclusion does not hold.

Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria

The remaining islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria) were placed under a partial demilitarization statute by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. It prohibited the establishment of naval bases and fortifications, but allowed Greece to maintain a limited military contingent recruited from the local population, as well as police forces. With respect to these islands, Greece has not claimed that the treaty obligations have been formally superseded. However, in recent years it has argued that it is entitled to discount them, invoking Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. It argues that after the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus and the Turkish threat of war over the 12 miles issue, re-armament is an act of legitimate self-defence.[5]

"Grey zones"

Imia

المقالة الرئيسية: Imia
Imia

The first time a dispute between the two countries in the Aegean touched on questions of actual sovereignty over territories was in early 1996 at the tiny barren islets of Imia (known as Kardak in Turkey), situated between the Dodecanese island chain and the Turkish mainland.[323] The conflict, triggered by the stranding of a Turkish merchant ship on the islets, was originally caused by factual inconsistencies between maps of the area, some of which assigned these islets to Greece, others to Turkey. The media of the two countries took up the issue and gave it a nationalistic turn, before the two governments even had the time to come to a full technical understanding of the true legal and geographical situation. Both governments finally adopted an intransigent stance, publicly asserting their own claims of sovereignty over the islets. The result was military escalation, which was perceived abroad as quite out of proportion with the size and significance of the rocks in question. The two countries were at the brink of war for a few days, until the crisis was defused with the help of foreign mediation.[324]

During the crisis and in the months following it, both governments elaborated legal arguments to support their claims to sovereignty. The arguments exchanged concerned the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which forms the principal basis for the legal status of territories in most of the region, as well as certain later diplomatic dealings between Turkey, Greece and Italy.

Other "grey zones"

In the wake of the Imia crisis, the Turkish government widened its argumentation to include not only Imia but also a possibly large number of other islands and small formations across the Aegean. Since then, Turkish authorities have spoken of "grey zones" of undetermined sovereignty. According to the Turkish argument, these islets, while not explicitly retained under Turkish sovereignty in 1923, were also not explicitly ceded to any other country, and their sovereignty has therefore remained objectively undecided.

The Turkish government has avoided stating exactly which islets it wishes to include in this category. On various occasions, Turkish government sources have indicated that islands such as Pserimos, Agathonisi, Fournoi and Gavdos[325] (situated south of Crete) might be included. Most of them, unlike Imia, had undeniably been in factual Greek possession, which had never previously been challenged by Turkey, and all but the final two listed below have Greek residents and infrastructure. Furthermore, the islands are covered by previous treaties such as the Treaty of Lausanne, which defines Turkish sovereignty as limited to within 3 miles of the Anatolian mainland in the majority of cases.[325] In a 2004 publication by Turkish authors close to the Turkish military leadership[326] the following (among other, even smaller ones) were listed as potentially "grey" areas:

Military overflights over Greek islands

While Turkey has not attempted to challenge Greek sovereignty on the ground, its claims about "grey area" islands add to the number of minor military incidents, already numerous due to the 10-mile airspace and the FIR issues. Greek authorities routinely report that the Turkish Air Force ignores their national airspace. According to Greek press reports, the number of airspace violations rose sharply in 2006, as did the number of unauthorized Turkish military flights directly over Greek islands themselves.[327] Renewed reports of systematic Turkish military flights directly over Greek islands like Pharmakonisi and Agathonisi were made in late 2008 and early 2009.[328]

During the late 2010s, tensions rose again as Turkish fighter aircraft increased the number of direct armed overflights above inhabited Greek islands. While most overflights continue to occur above small islands that Turkey considers "grey areas", such as Agathonisi or Oinousses, some incidents have also repeatedly been reported involving major and undisputed islands such as Rhodes, Lesbos, Chios or Leros.[329][330][331][332] Flying over the territory of a country is considered a serious violation of its sovereignty[333] and one of the most provocative acts by Turkey, directly challenging Greek territorial sovereignty.[334]

In 2020, Turkish fighter aircraft also begun overflights above the Greek mainland, on Evros.[335][336]

A regional Foreign Minister conference held on 11 May 2020 with the participation of Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece and the United Arab Emirates, concluded with a joint declaration condemning Turkey for its practice of conducting armed overflights above the inhabited Greek islands.[337][338]

Turkish incidents with Frontex

In September 2009, a Turkish military radar issued a warning to a Latvian helicopter patrolling in the eastern Aegean—part of the EU's Frontex programme to combat illegal immigration—to leave the area. The Turkish General Staff reported that the Latvian Frontex aircraft had violated Turkish airspace west of Didim.[339] According to a Hellenic Air Force announcement, the incident occurred as the Frontex helicopter—identified as an Italian-made Agusta A109—was patrolling in Greek air space near the small isle of Farmakonisi, which lies on a favorite route used by migrant smugglers ferrying mostly illegal migrants into Greece and the EU from the opposite Turkish coastline.[340] Frontex officials stated that they simply ignored the Turkish warnings as they did not recognise their being in Turkish airspace and continued their duties.

Another incident took place in October 2009 in the aerial area above the eastern Aegean sea, off the island of Lesbos.[341] On 20 November 2009, the Turkish General Staff issued a press note alleging that an Estonian Border Guard aircraft Let L-410 UVP taking off from Kos on a Frontex mission had violated Turkish airspace west of Söke.[339]

Strategies of conflict resolution

The decades since the 1970s have seen a repeated heightening and abating of political and military tensions over the Aegean. Thus, the crisis of 1987 was followed by a series of negotiations and agreements in Davos and Brussels in 1988. Again, after the Imia crisis of 1996, there came an agreement over peaceful neighbourly relations reached at a meeting in Madrid in 1997. The period since about 1999 has been marked by a steady improvement of bilateral relations.

For years, the Aegean dispute has been a matter not only about conflicting claims of substance. Rather, proposed strategies of how to resolve the substantial differences have themselves constituted a matter of heated dispute. Whereas Turkey has traditionally preferred to regard the whole set of topics as a political issue, requiring bilateral political negotiation,[1] Greece views them as separate and purely legal issues,[342] requiring only the application of existing principles of international law. Turkey has advocated direct negotiation, with a view to establishing what it would regard as an equitable compromise. Greece refuses to accept any process that would put it under pressure to engage in a give-and-take over what it perceives as inalienable and unnegotiable sovereign rights. Up to the late 1990s, the only avenue of conflict resolution that Greece deemed acceptable was to submit the issues separately to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

The resulting stalemate between both sides over process was partially changed after 1999, when the European summit of Helsinki opened up a path towards Turkey's accession to the EU. In the summit agreement, Turkey accepted an obligation to solve its bilateral disputes with Greece before actual accession talks would start. This was perceived as giving Greece a new tactical advantage over Turkey in determining which paths of conflict resolution to choose. During the following years, both countries held regular bilateral talks on the level of technical specialists, trying to determine possible future procedures. According to press reports,[343] both sides seemed close to an agreement about how to submit the dispute to the court at The Hague, a step which would have fulfilled many of the old demands of Greece. However, a newly elected Greek government under Kostas Karamanlis, soon after it took office in March 2004, opted out of this plan, because Ankara was insisting that all the issues, including Imia and the "grey zones", belonged to a single negotiating item. Athens saw them as separate. However,[343] Greek policy remained at the forefront in advocating closer links between Ankara and the EU. This resulted in the European Union finally opening accession talks with Turkey without its previous demands having been fulfilled.

According to some commentators, the 2020 fall of energy prices, combined with the discovery of gas within the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea means there is enough energy in Turkey that further exploration for gas is unnecessary.[344]

According to Greece's Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, the disputes which are plaguing the Greek-Turkish relations for decades, can easily be resolved once Turkey accepts the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To this, Dendias opined that the United States, due to their position and influence in the region, are an "ideal partner" in persuading Turkey to do so.[345][346] Furthermore, he noted that the UNCLOS has been ratified by all the member states of the European Union, is part of the EU's acquis communautaire, and therefore Greece's talks with EU-candidate member Turkey on the delimitation of maritime zones are bound by it.[347] Ronald Meinardus, head of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, analyst and author in Deutsche Welle, while commenting on the statements Dendias made during his official visit to Ankara in April 2021 about the UNCLOS being a prerequisite for joining the EU, he confirmed that the Law of the Sea is a precondition for Turkey's EU membership.[348]

الرئيس أردوغان في ختام التدريبات العسكرية بأزمير، 9 يونيو 2022.

في 9 يونيو 2022، حذر الرئيس التركي رجب طيب أردوغان اليونان من نزع السلاح من الجزر في بحر إيجه، قائلاً إنه "لا يمزح" بهذا التحذير. وتقول تركيا إن اليونان تبني وجودًا عسكريًا في انتهاك للمعاهدات التي تضمن الوضع غير المسلح لجزر بحر إيجة. وتقول إنه تم التنازل عن الجزر لليونان بشرط أن تظل منزوعة السلاح.[349]

وقال أردوغان في اليوم الأخير من التدريبات العسكرية التي تجري بالقرب من إزمير على ساحل بحر إيجة التركي "ندعو اليونان لوقف تسليح الجزر التي ليس لها وضع عسكري والعمل وفقًا للاتفاقيات الدولية". "أنا لا أمزح، أنا أتحدث بجدية. هذه الأمة عاقدة العزم".

اليونان وتركيا حليفان في الناتو، لكن الدول المجاورة لها تاريخ من الخلافات حول مجموعة من القضايا، بما في ذلك التنقيب عن المعادن في شرق المتوسط والمطالبات المتنافسة في بحر إيجه.

وتابع الزعيم التركي: "نحذر اليونان من الابتعاد عن الأحلام والأفعال التي ستندم عليها، وأن تعود إلى رشدها". لن تتخلى تركيا عن حقوقها في بحر إيجه بنفس الطريقة التي لن تتراجع فيها عن استخدام حقوقها الناشئة عن اتفاق دولي. وتصر اليونان على أن تركيا أساءت تفسير المعاهدات عمداً وتقول إن لديها أسباباً قانونية للدفاع عن نفسها في أعقاب الأعمال العدائية من جانب أنقرة، بما في ذلك التهديد بالحرب منذ فترة طويلة إذا وسعت اليونان مياهها الإقليمية.

في أثينا، قال المتحدث باسم الحكومة اليونانية جيانيس أوكونومو إن اليونان تتعامل مع "الاستفزازات" التركية "بهدوء وتصميم". وقال: "من الواضح للجميع أن بلادنا طورت بصمتها الجيوستراتيجية والجيوسياسية وكذلك قدرتها الرادعة لتكون قادرة في أي وقت على الدفاع عن سيادتها الوطنية وحقوقها السيادية".

في غضون ذلك، كرر أردوغان أيضًا تصميم تركيا على شن هجوم جديد عبر الحدود في سوريا بهدف صد الميليشيات الكردية السورية وإنشاء منطقة عازلة بطول 30 كيلومترًا (19 ميلًا). وتعتبر تركيا المليشيا امتداداً لحزب العمال الكردستاني المحظور.

وقال الزعيم التركي "لن نسمح أبدا بإنشاء ممرات إرهابية على طول حدود بلادنا، وسنكمل بالتأكيد الأجزاء المفقودة من منطقتنا الأمنية". وتابع أردوغان: "نأمل ألا يعارض أي من حلفائنا وأصدقائنا الحقيقيين مخاوفنا الأمنية المشروعة". قال أردوغان إن الهجوم التركي الجديد في سوريا سيستهدف بلدتي تل رفعت ومنبج، الواقعة غربي نهر الفرات ومن حيث يشن المقاتلون الأكراد السوريون هجمات على أهداف تركية.



See also

References

  1. ^ See:[11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19]
  2. ^ See:[48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70][71][72][73][74][75]
  1. ^ أ ب ت Kemal Başlar (2001): Two facets of the Aegean Sea dispute: 'de lege lata' and 'de lege ferenda'. In: K. Başlar (ed.), Turkey and international law. Ankara. [1] Archived 22 أغسطس 2006 at the Wayback Machine
  2. ^ أ ب Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg (1989): Der Ägäis-Konflikt: Die Abgrenzung des Festlandsockels zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei und das Problem der Inseln im Seevölkerrecht. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. (in ألمانية)
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  5. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Unilateral Turkish claims in the Aegean Archived 5 مارس 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
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  27. ^ "Κυπριακή ΑΟΖ και Καστελλόριζο - Το γεωστρατηγικό διακύβευμα του Ερντογάν" [Cypriot EEZ and Kastellorizo - Erdogan's geostrategic stakes]. SLPress. 4 August 2019. Retrieved 5 August 2019.
  28. ^ "Turkey-Libya maritime agreement draws Greek ire". ArabNews. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019. Last year, Wess Mitchell, US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, sent a message to Ankara over the drilling activities for hydrocarbons underway in Cyprus's exclusive economic zone. He said that "Turkey's view is a minority of one versus the rest of the world."
  29. ^ "US official sends clear message to Turkey over Cyprus drilling". Kathimerini. 16 December 2018. Retrieved 16 December 2018. Turkey's view "is a minority of one versus the rest of the world," he said. "The rest of the world has a very clear, straightforward view that the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus is grounded in international law."
  30. ^ أ ب ت "Turkey, Libya delimitation deal raises geopolitical tensions". New Europe. 1 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. Turkey defines its 'EEZ' to be coextensive with its continental shelf, based the relative lengths of adjacent coastlines, which completely disadvantages islands. It is a 'unique' interpretation not shared by any other country and not in accordance to the United Nations UNCLOS treaty, ratified by 167 countries but not Turkey,"
  31. ^ "Turkey sends non-paper to EU, warning to stay away from Cyprus EEZ". KeepTalkingGreece. 23 June 2019. Retrieved 11 July 2019.
  32. ^ "Greece's maritime claims 'maximalist,' violate international boundaries law". Daily Sabah. 13 June 2019. Retrieved 11 July 2019.
  33. ^ أ ب "QA-73, 1 December 2019, Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Statements Made by Greece and Egypt on the Agreement Signed With Libya on the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas". Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 1 December 2019. Retrieved 12 December 2020.
  34. ^ أ ب "Turkey defends maritime deal with Libya". Kathimerini. 1 December 2019. Retrieved 5 December 2019.
  35. ^ "Νέα πρόκληση της Τουρκίας: Αμφισβητεί ανοιχτά την υφαλοκρηπίδα στο Καστελόριζο" [New provocation by Turkey: disputes openly the continental shelf in Kastellorizo]. in.gr. 1 December 2019. Retrieved 1 December 2019.
  36. ^ "Erdogan claims that Crete, islands have no continental shelf". Kathimerini. 20 January 2020. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  37. ^ "The Turkish-Greek deadlock in the Aegean Sea". IBDMAR. June 2021. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  38. ^ "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: CHAPTER XXI (LAW OF THE SEA)". treaties.un.org (in الإنجليزية). Retrieved 2022-05-31.
  39. ^ "Turkey flexes muscle as Greece and EU stick to international law". Al-Jazeera. 13 December 2019. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  40. ^ "US envoy: Islands are entitled to EEZ, continental shelf". Kathimerini. 8 February 2020. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  41. ^ "Geoffrey Pyatt: All Greek islands have EEZ". Ethnos. 20 February 2020. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  42. ^ "Ρώσος πρέσβης στην Αθήνα: Τα νησιά έχουν υφαλοκρηπίδα και ΑΟΖ" [Russian Ambassador to Athens: The islands have continental shelf and EEZ]. CNN. 14 June 2020. Retrieved 14 June 2020.
  43. ^ "Wess Mitchell sends clear message to Turkey over Cyprus". Kathimerini. 21 December 2018. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  44. ^ أ ب Keith Johnson (23 December 2019). "Newly Aggressive Turkey Forges Alliance With Libya". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  45. ^ "Turkey gets a free pass from big powers". Gulf News. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  46. ^ "Greece hopes talks with Erdoğan will ease maritime frictions". The Guardian. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  47. ^ أ ب "Greece expels Libyan ambassador in dispute with Turkey". Washington Post. 6 December 2019. Archived from the original on 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  48. ^ "Egypt condemns MoUs signed between Turkey, Libyan PM". ahram online. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  49. ^ "Η προκλητική συμφωνία Τουρκίας – Λιβύης ανοίγει το δρόμο για ΑΟΖ" [The provocative Turkey-Libya agreement opens the way for EEZ]. in.gr. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019. Μία ακόμα κίνηση στον σχεδιασμό της «Γαλάζιας Πατρίδας», βάσει του οποίου η Τουρκία επιχειρεί να οικειοποιηθεί μέρος του Αιγαίου και της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου υποστηρίζοντας τη θέση ότι τα νησιά δεν δικαιούνται θαλάσσιες ζώνες πέραν των χωρικών υδάτων [translation: Another attempt in the realization of the «Blue Homeland» whereby Turkey seeks to seize parts of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean by asserting the position that no islands are entitled to maritime zones beyond territorial waters.]
  50. ^ "Διχασμένη η Λιβύη για την συμφωνία της ΑΟΖ με την Άγκυρα: Η κυβέρνηση την επιβεβαιώνει - "Παράνομη" λέει η αντιπολίτευση" [Libya divided over EEZ deal with Ankara: Government confirms it - Opposition says "illegal"]. Real.gr. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  51. ^ "Cyprus, Greece and Egypt condemn Turkey-Libya deal (updated)". Cyprus Mail. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  52. ^ "Cyprus decries Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  53. ^ "Greece, Cyprus and Egypt outraged by Libyan-Turkish maritime border agreement amid oil-drilling row". Al Araby. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  54. ^ "Turkey and Libya sign maritime deal to counter Greek drilling". Middle East Eye. 28 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  55. ^ "Antonio Lopez: Turkey's Actions in Eastern Mediterranean Unlawful, as well as MoU with Libya". The National Herald. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  56. ^ "Greek ultimatum to Libya over deal with Turkey - Mitsotakis: Those who dispute sovereign rights will find Europe standing against them (Τελεσίγραφο της Ελλάδας στη Λιβύη για τη συμφωνία με Τουρκία - Μητσοτάκης: Όποιοι αμφισβητούν κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα θα βρουν απέναντί τους την Ευρώπη)". NewsPost. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  57. ^ "Μέσω Λιβύης χτίζει τη "Γαλάζια Πατρίδα" ο Ερντογάν" [Through Libya, Erdogan builds the "Blue Homeland"]. SLPress. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  58. ^ "Ιστουρίζ - Ταγιάνι καταδικάζουν τις παράνομες ενέργειες της Τουρκίας και στηρίζουν Ελλάδα" [Istúriz - Tajani condemn Turkey's illegal actions and back Greece]. SLPress. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  59. ^ ""Η Τουρκία να σέβεται το διεθνές δίκαιο": Κομισιόν κατά Άγκυρας για τη συμφωνία με τη Λιβύη" ["Turkey should respect the international law": EU Commission against Ankara on the agreement with Libya]. Eleutheros Typos. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019.
  60. ^ أ ب "EU asks to see Turkey-Libya maritime border deal". Kathimerini. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. The European Union on Wednesday called for the publication of a memorandum of understanding signed between Turkey and Libya which ostensibly delineates maritime borders between the two countries, and expressed its full support for the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus.
  61. ^ "Libya's Haftar hopes to have normal relations with Israel". Middle East Monitor. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. The official condemned Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's actions in the Middle East. This was a reference to the deal struck between Turkey and the UN-backed Libyan government last Wednesday relating to trade and arms sales. Al-Howeej claimed that the deal was signed with those who have "no right to give to those against whom we are battling."
  62. ^ "Αυστηρό μήνυμα Μακρόν σε Ερντογάν: Να σεβαστείς τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Ελλάδας" [Harsh message by Macron to Erdogan: Respect Greece's sovereign rights]. CNN. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019. «Turkey must respect the sovereign rights of NATO members. I support Greece's concerns over the Libya-Turkey Agreement» Macron said, commenting on the Turkish provocations and the agreement between Turkey and Libya on defining maritime borders and EEZ.)
  63. ^ "ΥΠΕΞ Ισραήλ: Είμαστε στο πλευρό της Ελλάδας" [FM of Israel: We are on Greece's side]. News 247. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  64. ^ "Turkey-Libya agreement 'arbitrary and illegal'". GUE/NGL. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  65. ^ "Moscow calls on Turkey, Libya to avoid stoking tensions in region". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  66. ^ "Παυλόπουλος: Ποιον εκπροσωπεί ο Σαράζ; Βούτσιτς: Αναγνωρίζουμε ακεραιότητα της Ελλάδας" [Pavlopoulos: who does Farraj represents? Voucic: we recognize Greece's integrity]. Kathimerini. 9 December 2019. Retrieved 10 December 2019. the Serbian president has made clear that his country will always recognize the territory and the integrity of Greece as well as of Cyprus.
  67. ^ "Ηχηρό μήνυμα υπέρ Ελλάδας και Κύπρου από τον Κόντε" [A strong message in favor of Greece and Cyprus by Conte]. EfSyn. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
  68. ^ "Μήνυμα Βερολίνου στην Αγκυρα για σεβασμό των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων)" [Message by Berlin to Ankara for the respect of sovereign rights]. Kathimerini. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019. The European Union's position of solidarity with Greece and Cyprus is "expressly endorsed" by Berlin, German Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Adebahr recently said, urging Turkey and Libya "to respect the sovereignty and sovereignty of all member states of the EU and to follow the delimitation of maritime areas in accordance with applicable international law."
  69. ^ Istanbul, Hannah Lucinda Smith (23 August 2020). "United Arab Emirates joins Greece in Mediterranean gas drilling dispute with Turkey". The Times. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  70. ^ "Η Μάλτα καταδίκασε τα ψευδομνημόνια του Ερντογάν με το καθεστώς Σαράτζ και την τουρκική ανάμιξη στη Λιβύη" [Malta condemns Erdogan's pseudo-agreement with Sarraj regime and the Turkish involvement in Libya]. Tribune. 18 May 2020. Retrieved 18 May 2020.
  71. ^ أ ب ت ث ج "Germany decries Turkey's actions in eastern Mediterranean". The Associated Press. 13 October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  72. ^ "Η Συρία καταδίκασε το ψευδομνημόνιο Άγκυρας-Τρίπολης με επιστολή στον ΟΗΕ)" [Syria condemned the Ankara-Tripoly pseudo-memorandum with a letter to the United Nations.]. Liberal.gr. 21 May 2020. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  73. ^ "Letter dated 29 April 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General". United Nations. 29 April 2020. Retrieved 21 May 2020.
  74. ^ أ ب "Να μην αποδεχθεί ο ΟΗΕ την τουρκολιβυκή συμφωνία ζητούν 5 χώρες" [5 countries demand that the UN reject the Turko-Libyan agreement]. To Pontiki. 14 July 2020. Retrieved 14 July 2020.
  75. ^ "Press conference: Egyptian, Greek FMs sign deal to establish exclusive economic zone". Egypt Today. 6 August 2020. Retrieved 7 August 2020. According to a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Greece and Cyprus agreed that these MoUs "has no legal effect", as the signing exceeds the powers of Sarraj in accordance with the Skhirat Agreement, which was announced in December 2015. In another statement by Egypt's Ministry of Foreign affairs it was stated that Skhirat Agreement, agreed upon by Libyans in December 2015, set the powers of the Government of National Accord. The eighth article of the agreement prohibited the Libyan prime minister from solely clinching international deals without consent of all the cabinet members. As the current Government of National Accord lacks full representation of all the Libyan regions, the current government is a caretaker cabinet with limited powers, the Foreign Ministry said in its statement. Such deals are not binding or affecting the interests and the rights of any third parties, it added.
  76. ^ "Libya's GNA Holds Onto Arab League Membership". Al-Awsat. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  77. ^ "Pyatt: Turkey-Libya deal undermining regional stability". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019.
  78. ^ "State Department: Turkey-Libya deal on maritime borders 'provocative'". Kathimerini. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2019.
  79. ^ "Israel opposes Turkey-Libya maritime border accord". Reuters. 23 December 2019.
  80. ^ "Bundestag service views Turkey-Libya maritime deal illegal, detrimental to third parties". Naftemporiki. 18 October 2020. Retrieved 18 October 2020.
  81. ^ "Athens issues ultimatum to Libyan envoy to present maritime deal with Turkey". Kathimerini. 29 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019.
  82. ^ "Mitsotakis-Erdogan meeting on Wed. in London". Naftemporiki. 3 December 2019. Retrieved 7 December 2019.
  83. ^ "Απελάθηκε ο πρέσβης της Λιβύης" [Libyan Ambassador is expelled]. Kathimerini. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019. Mr Dendias added that the text of the agreement bears the signature of the Libyan Foreign Minister, who in September provided assurances to the Greek side in the opposite direction. Expulsion is not a break in diplomatic relations, the Foreign Minister stressed.
  84. ^ "Greece expels Libyan ambassador over Turkey deal". Middle East Online. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 7 December 2019.
  85. ^ "Greece expels Libyan ambassador in row over maritime boundaries". The Guardian. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  86. ^ "Οργή σε Τουρκία και Λιβύη μετά την απέλαση του πρέσβη - Μητσοτάκης: Θα κάνουμε ό,τι περνάει από το χέρι μας να μην ισχύσει η συμφωνία" [Anger in Turkey and Libya after ambassador's expulsion - Mitsotakis: we will do whatever it needs for the agreement to not come into effect]. Enikos. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  87. ^ "Στην Αθήνα την ερχόμενη Πέμπτη ο πρόεδρος της λιβυκής Βουλής" [President of Libyan Parliament in Athens next week.]. Enikos. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  88. ^ "Turkey-Libya agreement bears consequences for Greece - analyst". Ahval. 30 November 2019. Retrieved 30 November 2019. The deal, referred to as a memorandum of understanding, comes as no surprise, Syrigos said, as Ankara asked for an agreement on the maritime borders between Libya and Turkey in exchange for its long-time support of the Islamist-rooted GNA.
  89. ^ Athens, Anthee Carassava (2 December 2019). "Greece fears Turkish encroachment over oil exploration deal with Libya". The Times. Retrieved 2 December 2019. The deal, which threatens to vastly extend Turkey's claimed rights over the Mediterranean, follows an agreement last week for Ankara to supply weaponry to the UN-recognized Libyan government in Tripoli, which is involved in a military struggle with forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar for control of the country.
  90. ^ "Libyan National Army says Erdogan exploiting 'clinical death' of al-Sarraj govt". Al Arabiya. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. The Libyan National Army (LNA) said on Monday that Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is trying to exploit the "clinical death" of the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj to sign "illegal" agreements which are a serious breach of international laws that disregards the lawful rights of other eastern Mediterranean countries. [...] Aguila Saleh, President of the Libyan House of Representatives, sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres regarding the agreement signed between Turkey and al-Sarraj. Saleh said that the signed agreement represents a threat to the Libyan state and its future and security.
  91. ^ "Turkey is trying to take over the Mediterranean, through Libya". Jerusalem Post. 2 December 2019. Retrieved 2 December 2019. One of the governments in Libya controls only a small percentage of the country and the capital of Tripoli, but in need of Turkish support it signed a bizarre deal with Ankara over who controls the Mediterranean. [...] The real story is buried in the report. Turkey is trying to assert itself across the swath of Iraq, Syria and now all the way to Libya, with its eyes set on having power not seen since the Ottoman Empire more than 100 years ago. The reports claim that Turkey now sees its control of the Mediterranean from the "three-dimensional viewpoint" and this "maximizes the country's maritime boundaries and shows that Turkey's border districts of Marmaris, Fethiye and Kas are actually neighbors with Libya's Derna, Tobruk and Bardiya districts."
  92. ^ "Greece expels Libyan ambassador in row over maritime boundaries". The Guardian. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  93. ^ "Erdogan si prende mezzo Mediterraneo. E l'Italia sta a guardare" [Erdogan takes half the Mediterranean Sea. And Italy is watching]. Repubblica. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019. There are those who want to rewrite history and those who now want to rewrite even geography. An agreement between Tripoli and Ankara in fact has redefined the maritime borders between the two countries, ignoring the Atlas and erasing all that is in the sea between Libya and Turkey: Cyprus and Crete have been considered as insignificant rocks. The dream of Erdogan, who imitated the Ottoman rulers and redesigned the maps, giving himself control of the eastern Mediterranean.
  94. ^ "Die Türkei und Libyen wollen das Mittelmeer unter sich aufteilen" [Turkey and Libya want to divide the Mediterranean among themselves]. Der Tagesspiegel. 5 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019. Not only because of the impact on the gas dispute in the Mediterranean, the Turkish-Libyan agreement provokes new tensions with the EU. The agreed arms deliveries to the Sarraj government could also fuel the conflict in Libya, where Germany is currently trying to end the fighting. The Federal Government is planning a peace conference on Libya in Berlin in early January; Germany wants to curb the influx of refugees from Libya to Europe. [...] Erdogan's Libya Treaty could make the German efforts fail. Turkey is the most important arms supplier for the Sarraj government, providing drones and armored vehicles, among other things.
  95. ^ "Libya reveals how Turkey blackmailed country into energy, mercenary deals". Seth J. Frantzman. Jerusalem Post. 30 July 2020. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  96. ^ "Turkey blackmailed Libya into energy deals, called on debt, analyst says". Ahval News. 31 July 2020. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  97. ^ "Turkey to start drilling in expanded Mediterranean jurisdiction - minister". Ahval. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  98. ^ "Ερντογάν: Κυριαρχικό μας δικαίωμα το μνημόνιο με τη Λιβύη" [Erdogan: The MoU with Libya is our sovereign right]. CNN. 4 December 2019. Retrieved 4 December 2019.
  99. ^ "Ο Ερντογάν έδειξε με χάρτες τις προθέσεις του στην ανατ. Μεσόγειο" [Erdogan shows his intentions in the eastern Mediterranean using maps]. SigmaLive. 10 December 2019. Retrieved 10 December 2019.
  100. ^ "Greece expels Libyan envoy following Turkish vote on East Mediterranean deal". Middle East Eye. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  101. ^ "Turkish lawmakers ratify contentious maritime borders deal with Libya". Kathimerini. 5 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  102. ^ "Η Βουλή της Λιβύης απορρίπτει το deal με Ερντογάν" [The Libyan Parliament rejects deal made with Erdogan]. TheTOC. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019. The Libyan Parliament rejects the agreement on the Maritime Borders between Turkey and Libya, which Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has portrayed as a great success. Hours after the Turkish National Assembly voted for the deal, and while the deal remains pending, the Libyan House of Representatives sent a letter to the UN declaring the text null and void.
  103. ^ "Ακυρη η συμφωνία με Τουρκία λέει ο πρόεδρος του Κοινοβουλίου της Λιβύης" [Invalid, says the president of the Libyan Parliament, about the agreement with Turkey]. Protagon. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  104. ^ "Απέλαση του πρέσβη της Λιβύης από την Ελλάδα" [Expulsion of the Ambassador of Libya from Greece]. Huffington Post. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  105. ^ "Συμφωνία Τουρκίας- Λιβύης: "Μπλόκο" μέσω Χαφτάρ και λιβυκής Βουλής" [Turkey-Libya Agreement: "Blockade" through Haftar and Libyan Parliament]. News 247. 7 December 2019. Retrieved 7 December 2019.
  106. ^ Letter dated 26 December 2019 from the Charge d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the UN addressed to the SG
  107. ^ Letter dated 27 February 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN addressed to the SG
  108. ^ "UN registers Turkey's maritime deal with Libya". TRT World. TRT World. Retrieved 1 October 2020.
  109. ^ "U.N. registers Turkey-Libya maritime deal - Turkish ministry". Reuters (in الإنجليزية). 2 October 2020.
  110. ^ "محكمة استئناف البيضاء تصدر حكما بانعدام اتفاقية التعاون وترسيم الحدود بين الرئاسي و تركيا". Parliament of Libya. 27 January 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  111. ^ "Libyan court cancels border demarcation and security cooperation agreement between Al-Wefaq and Turkey". Egypt Today. 27 January 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  112. ^ "Δικαστήριο της Λιβύης έκρινε άκυρο το τουρκολιβυκό Μνημόνιο" [A Libyan court has ruled that the Turkish-Libyan Memorandum is invalid]. To Vima. 27 January 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  113. ^ "Greece and Turkey closer to armed conflict, say experts". Al Jazeera. 6 December 2019. Retrieved 6 December 2019.
  114. ^ "Erdogan's Libya gambit tearing NATO apart". Financial Mirror. 13 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  115. ^ "Turkey, France, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt – the World War in the Mediterranean". Bulgarian Military. 5 July 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  116. ^ "Turkish-Greek relations tense amid fears of military showdown". Arab News. 13 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  117. ^ "Turkey's Latest Geopolitical Gamble Could Result In Catastrophe". Oil Price. 5 July 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  118. ^ "Rough seas for NATO as Turkey clashes with allies". Politico. 5 July 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  119. ^ "Turquie et conflit libyen : que peuvent faire la France et l'Europe ?". Radio France. 15 June 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  120. ^ "France directs EU foreign policy against Turkey, and the bloc is too weak to stop it". Middle East Monitor. 8 July 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.
  121. ^ "Μακρόν για Τουρκία: Παράγοντας αποσταθεροποίησης της Ευρώπης" [Macron for Turkey: Europe's source of instability]. Kathimerini. 20 August 2020. Retrieved 3 September 2020.
  122. ^ "Ο ναύαρχος της Λιβύης που σπούδασε στην Ελλάδα: Εχω εντολή να βυθίσω τα τουρκικά πλοία" [The Libyan admiral who graduated in Greece: I have a mandate to sink Turkish ships]. Ta Nea. 9 December 2019. Retrieved 10 December 2019.
  123. ^ "Γαλλική και ιταλική στήριξη με "μπλόκο" στην Τουρκία" [French and Italian support in "blocking" Turkey]. In.gr. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 December 2019. The French assistance to Greece aimed at ending the Turkish challenges has also been a major topic of discussion at the highest [diplomatic] level between Athens-Paris. [...] According to the Italian "La Repubblica", Italy also sends the frigate "Martinengo" to the port of Larnaca, as part of an Eastern Mediterranean patrol, with the aim of «presenting and monitoring maritime areas, with due regard for international law and for protection of national interests.»
  124. ^ "Cyprus, France and Italy conduct naval exercise as tensions rise". Financial Mirror. 12 December 2019. Retrieved 8 June 2020.
  125. ^ "Αποκάλυψη ΣΚΑΪ: Οι Τούρκοι θέλουν να κάνουν έρευνες στα 6 μίλια" [SKAI revelation: The Turks seek to conduct explorations at 6 miles]. Skai Channel. 31 May 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  126. ^ "Προκλητικός χάρτης της Τουρκίας: Αυτά είναι τα οικόπεδα που διεκδικεί κοντά σε Ρόδο, Κάρπαθο και Κρήτη" [Provocative map by Turkey: These are the sea plots Turkey claims near Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete]. TheToc. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  127. ^ "Athens reacts to Turkey claiming 24 blocks outlined in map". Kathimerini. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  128. ^ "Διάβημα στην Άγκυρα: Κλήθηκε ο Τούρκος πρέσβης στο υπουργείο Εξωτερικών" [Note of Protest to Ankara: The Turkish Ambassador summoned to the Foreign Ministry]. Ethnos. 1 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  129. ^ "EU top diplomat urges Turkey to respect Greece, Cyprus sovereignty". Kathimerini. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  130. ^ "Libyan MoU cannot affect Greek rights, says US energy official)". Kathimerini. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  131. ^ "Παρέμβαση ΥφΥΠΕΞ ΗΠΑ για την τουρκική προκλητικότητα" [USA's Assistant Secretary intervenes amid the Turkish provocations]. Capital. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  132. ^ "Νέο μήνυμα της Ουάσινγκτον στην Τουρκία: "Τα νησιά έχουν ΑΟΖ και υφαλοκρηπίδα"" [Washington sends new message to Turkey: "The Islands have EEZ and continental shelf"]. ProtoThema. 2 June 2020. Retrieved 2 June 2020.
  133. ^ "Leaders From Israel, Cyprus, Greece Sign EastMed Gas Pipe Deal". Bloomberg. 2 January 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  134. ^ "EastMed: Υπεγράφη η ιστορική συμφωνία και με ρήτρα για την ασφάλεια" [EastMed: The historic agreement is signed along with a clause for security]. Proto Thema. 2 January 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  135. ^ "Greece, Israel, Cyprus, move to build East Med gas pipeline". www.aljazeera.com. 2 January 2020. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  136. ^ Demitris Nellas (23 December 2019). "Cyprus, Greece, Israel to sign pipeline deal on 2 Jan". AP News. Retrieved 12 June 2020.
  137. ^ "Συμφωνία για οριοθέτηση ΑΟΖ ανάμεσα σε Ελλάδα και Ιταλία - Πέφτουν υπογραφές" [Agreement for demarcation of EEZ between Greece and Italy - Signatures are falling]. News 247. 9 June 2020. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
  138. ^ "ΥΠΕΞ: Το περιεχόμενο της ιστορικής συμφωνίας Ελλάδας - Ιταλίας για την ΑΟΖ" [Foreign Ministry: The contents of the historic Greece - Italy agreement for the EEZ]. Skai.gr. 9 June 2020. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
  139. ^ "Ανάλυση Άγγελου Συρίγου αποκλειστικά στο TheToc: Τι σημαίνει η συμφωνία Ελλάδας - Ιταλίας για την ΑΟΖ" [Exclusive analysis by Angelos Syrigos to TheToc: What does the Greek-Italian agreement on the EEZ mean?]. TheToc. 10 June 2020. Retrieved 10 June 2020.
  140. ^ "ΑΟΖ Ελλάδας-Ιταλίας: Μύθοι και πραγματικότητα – Ο χάρτης λέει την αλήθεια" [Greece-Italy EEZ: Myths and reality - The map says the truth]. Angelos Syrigos. SLPress. 13 June 2020. Retrieved 13 June 2020. More specifically, we have a reduced impact: First, in the area of Strofades (point 16) where the limit has been shifted to the detriment of Greece by 2,75 nautical miles (3,7 km). Secondly, in the area of Othonoi (point 1) where the limit is 1,4 n. miles (2,600 meters) closer to Othonoi. However, [...] at points 7 and 8 the limit has been shifted to the detriment of Italy in Calabria from 0,5 n.m. (900 m) to 2,8 nm (5,200 m) and in favor of Kephalonia. In other words, an island (Kephalonia) appears to have more sea area compared to a mainland coast! In essence, the losses on both sides of Greece and Italy are almost equal on the entire frontier line.
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