الإعارة-التأجير

هذا المقال هو عن برنامج الحرب العالمية الثانية. إذا كنت تريد الشركة، انظر مجموعة الإعارة والتأجير.

الرئيس روزڤلت يوقع كشف الإعارة-التأجير لمساعدة بريطانيا والصين (1941)

مشروع قانون مجلس النواب # 1776، ص.1

سياسة الإعارة-التأجير Lend-Lease، سابقاً قانون تعزيز الدفاع عن الولايات المتحدة، (Pub.L. 77–11، H.R. 1776، 55 Stat. 31، enacted مارس 11، 1941) هو برنامج بموجبه موّلت الولايات المتحدة فرنسا الحرة، بريطانيا العظمى، جمهورية الصين، ولاحقاً الاتحاد السوڤيتي وحلفاء آخرين بالغذاء، النفط والمواد بين عام 1941 وأغسطس 1945. تم التوقيع عليها للتحول إلى قانون في 11 مارس 1941 وانتهى العمل به في سبتمبر 1945. بصفة عامة كانت المساعدات مجانية، بالرغم من أن بعض العتاد (مثل السفن) تم إعادتها بعد الحرب. في المقابل، كانت الولايات المتحدة تحصل أثناء الحرب على إيجارات لقواعد بأراضي الحلفاء.

تم شحن ما بلغت قيمته الإجمالية 50.1 بليون دولار أمريكي (ما يعادل اليوم 647 billion دولار)، أو 17% من إجمالي نفقات الولايات المتحدة أثناء الحرب. ذهبت منها 31.4 بليون دولار إلى بريطانيا، 11.3 بليون دولار إلى الاتحاد السوڤيتي، من 3.2 إلى 31.4 بليون دولار إلى فرنسا، 1.6 بليون دولار إلى الصين، وال2.6 بليون دولار المتبقية إلى الحلفاء الآخرين. شكل سياسات الإعارة-التأجير المعكوسة خدمات مثل إيجارات القواعد الجوية التي ذهبت إلى الولايات المتحدة، إجمالي 7.8 بليون دولار؛ منها، 6.8 بليون دولار أتت من بريطانيا والكومنولث. نصت شروط الاتفاقية على أن المواد سيتم استخدامها حتى وقت إعادتها أو تدميرها. عملياً تم إعادة معدات قليلة للغاية. التوريدات التي كانت تصل بعد تاريخ الإنتهاء كانت تباع لبريطانيا بتخفيض كبير مقابل 1.075 جنيه إسترليني، وتستخدم كقروض طويلة الأجل من الولايات المتحدة. أدارت كندا برنامجاً مشابهاً كان يسمى المساعدة المتبادلة وفي إطاره أُرسل قرض قيمته بليون دولار و3.4 بليون دولار في صورة توريدات وخدمات إلى بريطانيا وحلفاء آخرين. لم تحصل الولايات المتحدة على رسوم للمساعدة المقدمة بموجب هذا التشريع.

أنهى هذا البرنامج فعلياً التظاهر الأمريكي بالحياد، الذي كان منصوصاً عليه في قوانين الحياد في عقد 1930. فكان خطوة حاسمة في الابتعاد عن سياسة عدم التدخل، التي هيمنت على العلاقات الخارجية الأمريكية منذ عام 1931، وباتجاه الدعم العلني للحلفاء. وكان لكبير مستشاري روزڤلت للسياسة الخارجية هاري هوپكنز سيطرة فعالة على برنامج الإعارة-التأجير، للتأكد من أنه متسق مع أهداف السياسة الخارجية لروزڤلت.

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 التاريخ

 عدم التدخل والحياد

معونة غذائية من أمريكا: التلاميذ البريطانيون يلوِّحون للكاميرا أثناء تسلمهم صحوناً من شرائح لحم الخنزير والبيض.

بدأ ع1930 بواحدة من world's greatest economic depressions – which had started in the United States – and the later recession of 1937–38 (although minor relative to the Great Depression) was otherwise also one of the worst of the 20th century. Following the Nye Committee hearings, as well as influential books of the time, such as Merchants of death, both dating 1934, the United States Congress adopted several Neutrality Acts in the 1930s, motivated by non-interventionism — following the aftermath of its costly involvement in World War I (the war debts were still not paid off), and seeking to ensure that the country would not become entangled in foreign conflicts again. The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 intended to keep the United States out of war, by making it illegal for Americans to sell or transport arms, or other war materials to warring nations – neither to aggressors, nor to defenders.

 ادفع نقداً واستلم

المقالة الرئيسية: ادفع نقداً واستلم (الحرب العالمية الثانية)

إلا أنه في 1939 – as Germany, Japan, and Italy pursued aggressive, militaristic policies – President Roosevelt wanted more flexibility to help contain Axis aggression. FDR suggested amending the act to allow warring nations to purchase military goods, arms and munitions if they paid cash and bore the risks of transporting the goods on non-American ships, a policy that would favor Britain and France. Initially, this proposal failed, but after Germany invaded Poland in September, Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1939 ending the munitions embargo on a "cash and carry" basis. The passage of the 1939 amendment to the previous Neutrality Acts marked the beginning of a congressional shift away from isolationism, making a first step toward interventionism.

 الحجم والقيمة والاقتصاد

قيمة العتاد من الولايات المتحدة إلى حلفائها

البلد	مليون دولار
الإجمالي	48,395.4
الامبراطورية البريطانية	31,387.1
البرازيل	372.0
الاتحاد السوڤيتي	10,982.1
المكسيك	39.2
فرنسا	3,223.9
تشيلى	21.6
الصين	1,627.0
پيرو	18.9
هولندا	251.1
كولومبيا	8.3
بلجيكا	159.5
الإكوادور	7.8
اليونان	81.5
أوروگواي	7.1
النرويج	47.0
كوبا	6.6
تركيا	42.9
بوليڤيا	5.5
يوغسلاڤيا	32.2
ڤنزويلا	4.5
السعودية	19.0
گواتيمالا	2.6
پولندا	12.5
پاراگواي	2.0
ليبريا	11.6
جمهورية الدومنيكان	1.6
إيران	5.3
هايتي	1.4
إثيوپيا	5.3
نيكاراگوا	0.9
أيسلندا	4.4
السلڤادور	0.9
العراق	0.9
هندوراس	0.4
تشيكوسلوڤاكيا	0.6
كوستاريكا	0.2

A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $ in 2022) was involved, or 11% of the total war expenditures of the U.S. In all, $31.4 billion ($) went to Britain and its Empire, $11.3 billion ($) to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion ($) to France, $1.6 billion ($) to China, and the remaining $2.6 billion to the other Allies. Reverse lend-lease policies comprised services such as rent on bases used by the U.S., and totaled $7.8 billion; of this, $6.8 billion came from the British and the Commonwealth, mostly Australia and India. The terms of the agreement provided that the materiel was to be used until returned or destroyed. In practice very little equipment was in usable shape for peacetime uses. Supplies that arrived after the termination date were sold to Britain at a large discount for £1.075 billion, using long-term loans from the United States. Canada was not part of Lend Lease. However it operated a similar program called Mutual Aid that sent a loan of C$1 billion (equivalent to C$ billion in 2021) and C$3.4 billion (C$ billion) in supplies and services to Britain and other Allies.

العلاقة بالناتج المحلي الإجمالي بين الحلفاء وقوى المحور، 1938–1945. انظر الإنتاج العسكري أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية.

 الأهمية

Lend-Lease helped the British, Soviets, and other Allied nations win the war. Even after the United States forces in Europe and the Pacific began to attain full strength during 1943–1944, Lend-Lease continued. Most remaining Allies were largely self-sufficient in frontline equipment (such as tanks and fighter aircraft) by this time but Lend-Lease provided a useful supplement in this category and Lend-Lease logistical supplies (including motor vehicles and railroad equipment) were of enormous assistance.

Much of the meaning of Lend-Lease aid can be better understood when considering the innovative nature of World War II, as well as the economic distortions caused by the war. One of the greatest differences with prior wars, was the enormous increase in the mobility of armies. This was the first big war in which whole formations were routinely motorized; soldiers were supported with large numbers of all kinds of vehicles. Most belligerent powers severely decreased production of non-essentials, concentrating on producing weapons. This inevitably produced shortages of related products needed by the military or as part of the military–industrial complex. On the Allied side, there was almost total reliance upon American industry production, weaponry and especially unarmored vehicles purpose-built for military use, vital for the modern army's logistics and support. The USSR was very dependent on rail transport and starting during the latter half of the 1920s but accelerating during the 1930s (The Great Depression), hundreds of foreign industrial giants such as Ford were commissioned to construct modern dual purpose factories in the USSR, 16 alone within a week of May 31, 1929. With the outbreak of war these plants switched from civilian to military production and locomotive production ended virtually overnight. Just 446 locomotives were produced during the war, with only 92 of those being built between 1942 and 1945. In total, 92.7% of the wartime production of railroad equipment by the USSR was supplied by Lend-Lease, including 1,911 locomotives and 11,225 railcars which augmented the existing stocks of at least 20,000 locomotives and half a million railcars.

Playing a significant role in filling the losses of the red army in military equipment, weapons and military materials, lend-lease did not have a significant impact on the course of hostilities in 1941, as, however, and in the subsequent. It was obvious to the direct participants events'. At the end of May 1945, Hopkins stated the following: "We never believed that our help lend-lease is the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern front. It was achieved by heroism and blood of the Russian army."}}

"In the struggle against the common enemy, the allies assisted the Soviet Union. The coalition was finally formed by the summer of 1942 the U.S. Economy and Britain was increasingly rebuilt in a military way. In 1942 on lend-lease in USSR delivered more than 2.5 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand tanks, about 79 thousand cars, radio equipment, hydroacoustic devices, gasoline, food, footwear and so on. However, "by the end of 1942, the agreed program of deliveries to the USSR were made by the Americans and the British by 55%. In 1941-1942, the USSR received only 7% of cargo shipped during the war from the USA. The main number of weapons and other the materials were received by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945."

Nikita Khrushchev, having served as a military commissar and intermediary between Stalin and his generals during the war, addressed directly the significance of Lend-lease aid in his memoirs:

I would like to express my candid opinion about Stalin's views on whether the Red Army and the Soviet Union could have coped with Nazi Germany and survived the war without aid from the United States and Britain. First, I would like to tell about some remarks Stalin made and repeated several times when we were "discussing freely" among ourselves. He stated bluntly that if the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war. If we had had to fight Nazi Germany one on one, we could not have stood up against Germany's pressure, and we would have lost the war. No one ever discussed this subject officially, and I don't think Stalin left any written evidence of his opinion, but I will state here that several times in conversations with me he noted that these were the actual circumstances. He never made a special point of holding a conversation on the subject, but when we were engaged in some kind of relaxed conversation, going over international questions of the past and present, and when we would return to the subject of the path we had traveled during the war, that is what he said. When I listened to his remarks, I was fully in agreement with him, and today I am even more so.

Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference during 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: "Without American machines the United Nations could never have won the war."

In a confidential interview with the wartime correspondent Konstantin Simonov, the Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov is quoted as saying:

Today [1963] some say the Allies didn't really help us ... But listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over to us material without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war.

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 إعادة العتاد بعد الحرب

Roosevelt, eager to ensure public consent for this controversial plan, explained to the public and the press that his plan was comparable to one neighbor's lending another a garden hose to put out a fire in his home. "What do I do in such a crisis?" the president asked at a press conference. "I don't say ... 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it' ... I don't want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over." To which Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), responded: "Lending war equipment is a good deal like lending chewing gum—you certainly don't want the same gum back."

In practice, very little was returned except for a few unarmed transport ships. Surplus military equipment was of no value in peacetime. The Lend-Lease agreements with 30 countries provided for repayment not in terms of money or returned goods, but in "joint action directed towards the creation of a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world." That is the U.S, would be "repaid" when the recipient fought the common enemy and joined the world trade and diplomatic agencies, such as the United Nations.

 التوريدات الأمريكية للاتحاد السوڤيتي

وارسو 1945: جيپ ويلي كانت تستخدم من قبل الجيش الپولندي الأول كجزء من البرنامج الأمريكي للإعارة-التأجير.

نصب تذكاري للإعارة-التأجير في فيربانكس، ألاسكا احتفالاً بشحن طائرات أمريكية للاتحاد السوڤيتي على Northwest Staging Route.

BM-13N كاتيوشا on a Lend-Lease Studebaker US6 truck, at the متحف الحرب الوطنية الكبرى، موسكو.

 التوريدات البريطانية للاتحاد السوڤيتي

The Red Army in Bucharest near Boulevard of Carol I. with British-supplied Universal Carrier

A Valentine tank destined for the Soviet Union leaves the factory in Britain.

In June 1941, within weeks of the German invasion of the USSR, the first British aid convoy set off along the dangerous Arctic sea route to Murmansk, arriving in September. It carried 40 Hawker Hurricanes along with 550 mechanics and pilots of No. 151 Wing in Operation Benedict, to provide air defence of the port and to train Soviet pilots. The convoy was the first of many convoys to Murmansk and Archangelsk in what became known as the Arctic convoys, the returning ships carried the gold that the USSR was using to pay the US.

 المساعدة الكندية لبريطانيا

المقالة الرئيسية: منحة البليون دولار والمساعدة المتبادلة

 السداد

المقالة الرئيسية: القرض الأنگلو-أمريكي

 انظر أيضاً

• ALSIB
• القرض الأنگلو-أمريكي
• قوافل القطب الشمالي في الحرب العالمية الثانية
• قانون مراقبة تصدير الأسلحة
• منحة البليون دولار والمساعدة المتبادلة، من كندا
• Banff-class sloop
• معركة الأطلسي (1939–1945)
• ادفع واحمل (الحرب العالمية الثانية)
• إعارة-تأجير دبابات شرمان
• الانتاج العسكري أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية
• Northwest Staging Route
• العملية سيدار
• الرواق الفارسي
• مشروع هولا

 ملاحظات

 المراجع

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• Bryce, Robert B. Canada and the Cost of World War II: The International Operations of Canada's Department of Finance, 1939-1947 (2005) ch 7 on Mutual Aid
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 وصلات خارجية

• Lend-Lease Shipments, World War II (Washington: War Department, 1946)
• Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union
• The Voice of Russia on the Allies and Lend-Lease Museum, Moscow
• Official New Zealand war history of Lend-lease, from War Economy
• Official New Zealand war history; termination of Mutual Aid from 21 December 1945, from War Economy
• Allies and Lend-Lease Museum, Moscow
• "Reverse Lend-Lease" a 1944 Flight article reporting a speech by President Roosevelt