پترودولار

هذه مقالة جيدة. لمزيد من المعلومات، اضغط هنا.
(تم التحويل من بترودولار)
هذا المقال هو عن the trade surpluses of oil-exporting nations. إذا كنت تريد a broader term with multiple meanings، انظر Petrocurrency.

refer to caption
Fluctuations of OPEC net oil export revenues since 1972, showing elevated inflation-adjusted levels during 1974–1981 and 2005–2014[1][2]

الپترودولار Petrodollar، يشير إلى الدولارات الأمريكية المجنية عن طريق تصدير النفط.[3] كما تشير بشكل عام إلى ظاهرة الدول المصدرة للنفط، وبشكل أساسي أعضاء أوپك بالإضافة إلى روسيا و النرويج، اللتان تحققان المزيد من الأرباح المالية العائدة من تصدير النفط الخام مما يمكنهم استثماره بكفاءة في اقتصاداتهم. ويمكن أن تصل الإستقلالية العالمية الناتجة والتدفقات المالية، من منتجي النفط إلى مستهلكي النفط، إلى مقياس بمئات المليارات من دولارات أمريكية سنويًا – والتي من ضمنها نطاق واسع من المعاملات في مجموعة متنوعة من العملات، بعضها يربط عملته بالدولار الأمريكي والبعض الآخر لا. كما تتأثر هذه التدفقات المالية بشدة في القرارات الحكومية المتعلقة بالإستثمار والمساعدات الدولية، مع العواقب الجليلة على كل من التمويل العالمي و السياسات البترولية. وتنتشر هذه الظاهرة بشكل أكبر خلال الفترات التي يكون فيها سعر النفط مرتفع أقتصادياً. [4] حيث نتجَ عن أول صعود كبير للدولار النفطي (1974-1981) مضاعفات مالية أكثر من الثانية (2005-2014). [5] وفي أغسطس عام 2018، أعلنت فنزويلا أنها ستتوقف عن تسعير نفطها بالدولار الأمريكي وبدلاً من ذلك تستخدم اليورو ، و اليوان والعملات الأخرى. [6][7]

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الأصول

في إطار الجهود المبذولة لرفع قيمة الدولار، تفاوض ريتشارد نيكسون حول اتفاقية مع السعودية أنه في مقابل الأسلحة والحماية يتم إدراج جميع مبيعات النفط المستقبلية بالدولار.[8] بالتالي، وافقت جميع بلدان الاوپك على اتفاقيات مشابهة مما عمل على ضمان الطلب العالم على الدولار الأمريكي وسمح للولايات المتحدة بتصدير بعض التضخم الذي تعاني منه.[بحاجة لمصدر] ولأن هذه الدولار لا تدور داخل البلاد فهي بالتالي ليست جزءاً من الإمداد النقدي الطبيعي، مما دفع بعض الاقتصاديين بالشعور بالاحتياج إلى مصطلح آخر لوصف الدولارات التي تُجنى من البلدان المصدرة للنفط (الاوپك) مقابل النفط، لذا فقد قام ابراهيم عويس، أستاذ الاقتصاد في جامعة جورجتاون بصياغة مصطلح الپترودولار.

ولأن الولايات المحدة كانت ثاني أكبر منتج ومستهلك للنفط في العالم، يتم تسعير سوق النفط العالمي بالدولار الأمريكي منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية.[9] تعتمد أسعار النفط الدولي على الخصومات أو فروق القيمة المتعلقة بهذا النفط في خليج المكسيك.[10] لكن، وعلى الرغم من أن مبيعات النفط قبل 1973 كانت بالدولار الأمريكي، إلا أنه ليس هناك ما يمنع من تسويتها بالعملة المحلية.

في أكتوبر 1973، أعلنت دول الاوپك حظر النفط رداً على دعم الولايات المتحدة وأوروپا الغربية لإسرائيل في حرب أكتوبر، وأدى هذا التوتر (والقوى الجديدة للاوپك) إلى الخوف من أن يصبح الدولار غير فعال في تجارة النفط.


التأثير المالي

التدفقات الضخمة للپترودولار إلى البلاد عادة ما يكون له أثراً على قيمة عملتها. بالنسبة لكندا اتضح أن زيادة 10% في سعر النفط أدى إلى زيادة قيمة الدولار الكندي مقابل الدولار الأمريكي بنسبة 3%.[11] والعكس صحيح.

معاني بديلة

بالإضافة إلى الپترودولار الأمريكي، قد يشير الپترودولار أيضاً إلى الدولار الكندي في المعاملات المالية التي تتضمن بيع النفط الكندي لدول أخرى.

في هذا الإطار، فإن مصطلح الپترودولار يرتبط لكن لا يتوجب الخلط بينه وبين پتروكرنسي والذي يشير إلى العملة الوطنية الفعلية لكل بلد مصدر للنفط.

التدفقات النقدية

خلفية

خلال سنوات 1974-1981 و 2005-2014، جمع مصدري النفط فائض ضخم من "دولارات النفط" من النفط غالي الثمن أقتصادياً. [1][2][12] (حيث نُسب هذه الأمر بالتناوب إلى الاقتصادي المصري الأمريكي إبراهيم عويس وإلى وزير التجارة الأمريكي بيتر بيترسون، وكلاهما في عام 1973.)[13][14][15] يمكن وصف هذا الفائض من البترودولار على أنه مكسب صافي بالدولار الأمريكي التي حُصل عليها من تصدير البترول، بما يتجاوز احتياجات التنمية الداخلية للدول المصدرة.[16] ولا يمكن استثمار الفائضات بكفاءة في اقتصاداتها، بسبب قلة عدد السكان أو لكونها في المراحل الأولى من التصنيع. ولكن يمكن استثمارها بشكل مفيد في دول أخرى، أو إنفاقها على الواردات مثل المنتجات الاستهلاكية، وإمدادات البناء، وتجهيزات العسكرية. بدلاً من ذلك، كان النمو الاقتصادي العالمي سيتضرر إذا تم سحب هذه الأموال من الاقتصاد العالمي، بينما كانت الدول المصدرة للنفط بحاجة إلى أن تكون قادرة على الاستثمار بشكل مثمر للنهوض مستويات معيشتها على المدى الطويل.[17]

طفرة 1974–1981

في حين أن معالجة البترودولار قللت من تأثير الفترة القصيرة من الركود الأقتصادي لـ أزمة النفط 1973، فقد تسبب في مشاكل خاصة للبلدان المستوردة للنفط التي كانت تدفع أسعارًا أعلى بكثير للنفط، وتتحمل الديون لمدة طويلة. وقَدر صندوق النقد الدولي (IMF) أن الديون الخارجية لـ 100 دولة مستوردة للنفط في البلدان النامية قد ازدادت بنسبة 150٪ بين عامي 1973 و 1977، بالإضافة إلى أنها زادت من تعقيدها التبديل العالمي إلى سعر الصرف العائم . Johan Witteveen, the Managing Director of the IMF, said in 1974: "The international monetary system is facing its most difficult period since the 1930s."[18] The IMF administered a new lending program during 1974–1976 called the Oil Facility. Funded by oil-exporting states and other lenders, it was available to governments suffering from acute problems with their balance of trade due to the rise in oil prices, notably including Italy and the UK as well as dozens of developing countries.[19]

From 1974 through 1981, the total current account surplus for all members of OPEC amounted to US$450 billion, without scaling-up for the subsequent decades of inflation. Ninety percent of this surplus was accumulated by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf and Libya, with Iran also accumulating significant oil surpluses through 1978 before suffering the hardships of revolution, war and sanctions.[16]

Large volumes of Arab petrodollars were invested directly in US Treasury securities and in other financial markets of the major industrial economies, often directed discreetly by government entities now known as sovereign wealth funds.[20][21] Many billions of petrodollars were also invested through the major commercial banks of the United States, European Union, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In fact, the process contributed to the growth of the Eurodollar market as a less-regulated rival to US monetary markets. As the recessionary condition of the world economy made investment in corporations less attractive, bankers and well-financed governments lent much of the money directly to the governments of developing countries, especially in Latin America such as Brazil and Argentina[16] as well as other major developing countries like Turkey. The 1973 oil crisis had created a vast dollar shortage in these countries; however, they still needed to finance their imports of oil and machinery. In early 1977, when Turkey stopped heating its prime minister's office, opposition leader Suleyman Demirel famously described the shortage as: "Turkey is in need of 70 cents."[22] As political journalist William Greider summarized the situation: "Banks collected the deposits of revenue-rich OPEC governments and lent the money to developing countries so they could avoid bankruptcy."[23] In subsequent decades, many of these developing states found their accumulated debts to be unpayably large, concluding[ممن؟] that it was a form of neocolonialism from which debt relief was the only escape.[24]

طفرة 2005–2014

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Inflation and interest rates surged with oil prices in the 1970s, but not in the 2000s.[25]

In the 2005–2014 petrodollar surge, financial decision-makers were able to benefit somewhat from the lessons and experiences of the previous cycle. Developing economies generally stayed better balanced than they did in the 1970s; the world economy was less oil-intensive; and global inflation and interest rates were much better contained. Oil exporters opted to make most of their investments directly into a diverse array of global markets, and the recycling process was less dependent on intermediary channels such as international banks and the IMF.[26][27][28]

Thanks to the historic oil price increases of 2003–2008, OPEC revenues approximated an unprecedented US$1 trillion per year in 2008 and 2011–2014.[2] Beyond the OPEC countries, substantial surpluses also accrued to Russia and Norway,[12] and sovereign wealth funds worldwide amassed US$7 trillion by 2014–2015.[29] Some oil exporters were unable to reap the full benefits, as the national economies of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela all suffered from multi-year political obstacles associated with what economists call the "resource curse".[30][31] Most of the other large exporters accumulated enough financial reserves to cushion the shock when oil prices and petrodollar surpluses fell sharply again from an oil supply glut in 2014–2017.[32]

المعونات الأجنبية

Oil-exporting countries have used part of their petrodollar surpluses to fund foreign aid programs, as a prominent example of so-called "checkbook diplomacy" or "petro-Islam". The Kuwait Fund was an early leader since 1961, and certain Arab nations became some of the largest donors in the years since 1974, including through the IMF and the OPEC Fund for International Development.[16][33][34] Oil exporters have also aided poorer nations indirectly through the personal remittances sent home by tens of millions of foreign workers in the Middle East,[35] although their working conditions are generally harsh.[36] Even more controversially, several oil exporters have been major financial supporters of armed groups challenging the governments of other countries.[37][38][39][40]

High-priced oil allowed the USSR to support the struggling economies of the Soviet bloc during the 1974–1981 petrodollar surge, and the loss of income during the 1980s oil glut contributed to the bloc's collapse in 1989.[41] During the 2005–2014 petrodollar surge, OPEC member Venezuela played a similar role supporting Cuba and other regional allies,[42] before the 2014–2017 oil downturn brought Venezuela to its own economic crisis.[43]

قتال البترودولار

The term petrodollar warfare refers to the theory that the motivation of US military offensives is to preserve by force the status of the United States dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency and as the currency in which oil is priced. The term was coined by William R. Clark, who has written a book with the same title. The phrase oil currency war is sometimes used with the same meaning.

الفرضية

The United States dollar remains de facto world currency.[44] Accordingly, almost all oil sales throughout the world are denominated in United States dollars (USD).[45] Because most countries rely on oil imports, they are forced to maintain large stockpiles of dollars in order to continue imports. This creates a consistent demand for USDs and ostensibly supports the USD's value, regardless of economic conditions in the United States.

According to proponents of the petrodollar warfare hypothesis, this in turn allegedly allows the US government to gain revenues through seignorage and by issuing bonds at lower interest rates than supposedly they otherwise would be able to. As a result, the U.S. government, according to this theory, can run higher budget deficits at a more sustainable level than most other countries can. The theory points out that a stronger USD also means that goods imported into the United States are relatively cheap (although the country's exports become relatively more expensive for the rest of the world).

Another component of the hypothesis is that the price of petroleum is more stable in the U.S. than anywhere else since importers do not need to worry about exchange rate fluctuations. Since the U.S. imports a great deal of oil, its markets are heavily reliant on oil and its derivative products (jet fuel, diesel fuel, gasoline, etc.) for their energy needs. As the price of oil can be an important political factor, U.S. administrations are quite sensitive to the price of oil.

Political competitors of the United States therefore have some interest in seeing oil denominated in euros or other currencies. The European Union could also theoretically accrue the same benefits if the euro replaced the dollar.


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التاريخ

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, feared that the abandonment of the international gold standard under the Bretton Woods arrangement (combined with a growing US trade deficit, and massive debt associated with the ongoing Vietnam War) would cause a decline in the relative global demand of the U.S. dollar.[46] In a series of meetings, the United States — represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — and the Saudi royal family made an agreement. The United States would offer military protection for Saudi Arabia's oil fields, and in return the Saudis would price their oil sales exclusively in United States dollars (in other words, the Saudis were to refuse all other currencies, except the U.S. dollar, as payment for their oil exports).

By 1975, all of the oil-producing members of OPEC had agreed to price their oil in dollars and to invest surplus oil proceeds in U.S. government debt securities in exchange for similar offers by the U.S.[47]

أحداث سياسية

انظر أيضاً: Foreign interventions by the United States and United States involvement in regime change
A U.S. soldier stands guard duty near a burning oil well in the Rumaila oil field, Iraq, April 2003

In 2000, Iraq converted all its oil transactions under the Oil for Food program to euros,[48] even though the move was deemed by analysts to "fly in the face of financial logic",[48] since it meant that Iraq would earn less interest on its oil revenues, which were held in a UN-monitored escrow account in New York. Also, the switch would create "cumbersome new administrative processes" because Baghdad decided to keep also its existing deposits in dollars, which meant that the oil-for-food program would maintain two accounts, one in dollars and one in euros.[48]

Several commentators writing contemporaneously with the buildup to the invasion[49][50][51] linked Iraq's Nov 2000 re-denomination of oil from USD to euros and the possibility of more widespread adoption of the euro as an oil pricing standard to the risk that that would place on the post-Bretton Woods use of the USD as the international reserve currency and the impact that that would have on the US economy, and theorised that one of the fundamental purposes for war in Iraq would be to force Iraq to revert to pricing its oil in USD.

After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, Iraq returned the denomination of its oil sales to the US dollar, despite the greenback's then-fall in value.[52]

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ostensibly takes this theory as fact. As retaliation to this policy, which is seen by Tehran as "neoimperialism",[53] Iran made an effort to create its own bourse, which started selling oil in gold, euros, dollars, and Japanese yen.[54] In mid-2006 Venezuela indicated "support" of Iran's decision to offer global oil trade in the euro currency.[55] Muammar Gaddafi of Libya had tried to implement the gold-for-oil plan in 2011[56] and the introduction of a Libyan gold dinar.

In 2005, William Roberts Clark, Professor and Faculty Associate, Political Science Department, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, published a work which claimed that a "petrodollar warfare" was under way between mainly the euro and the United States dollar waged in the field of world petroleum trade.[57]

Over the years, multiple scholars expressed the view that the Iraq War was conducted to re-assert the dollar hegemony in the wake of Saddam Hussein's attempts to switch from petrodollar in the oil trade and to sell Iraqi oil in exchange for other currencies or commodities.[58][59][60]

Gallery of notable examples

These images illustrate the diversity of major petrodollar recycling activities, in roughly chronological order:

انظر أيضاً

الهامش

  1. ^ أ ب "OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet". U.S. Energy Information Administration. يناير 10, 2006. Archived from the original on يناير 7, 2008. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ أ ب ت "OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet". U.S. Energy Information Administration. مايو 15, 2017. Retrieved مايو 28, 2017.
  3. ^ The Petrodollar
  4. ^ Nsouli, Saleh M. (مارس 23, 2006). "Petrodollar Recycling and Global Imbalances". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved يناير 14, 2017.
  5. ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2008). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Wiley. ISBN 978-0470185490.
  6. ^ "US dollars no longer a quote currency in Venezuela". Xinhua Net. أكتوبر 18, 2018. Retrieved أكتوبر 19, 2018.
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  8. ^ The Oil Kings: How Nixon courted the shah.
  9. ^ Hamilton, James D. Historical Oil Shocks. Department of Economics. University of California, San Diego. Revised: February 1, 2011
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  11. ^ Correlation between the oil prices and the Canadian dollar
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  13. ^ "Personality: Ibrahim M. Oweiss". Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. ديسمبر 26, 1983. p. 8. Retrieved يناير 11, 2017. In March 1973... Two weeks after Dr. Oweiss had used the word – at an international monetary seminar held at Columbia University's Arden House in Harriman, New York – it was picked up by a prestigious economics commentator in The New York Times. According to the Oweiss and NYT websites, it appears that these events actually occurred in March 1974.
  14. ^ Rowen, Hobart (يوليو 9, 1973). "Peterson Urges Cooperation". The Washington Post. p. A1. Retrieved فبراير 5, 2016. He thinks the U.S. should give more study to ways in which the excess funds – he calls them petro dollars – can be soaked up.
  15. ^ Popik, Barry (فبراير 1, 2012). "Petrodollar". Retrieved يناير 11, 2017. Georgetown University economics professor Ibrahim Oweiss has written about petrodollars and is credited with the word's coinage by Wikipedia, but there is insufficient documentary evidence that he used the term first in 1973. Former commerce secretary Peter G. Peterson was credited with using 'petrodollar' in a July 1973 Washington Post article.
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  21. ^ Wong, Andrea (مايو 30, 2016). "The Untold Story Behind Saudi Arabia's 41-Year U.S. Debt Secret". Bloomberg News. Retrieved مايو 31, 2016.
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  23. ^ Greider, William (1987). Secrets of the Temple. Simon & Schuster. p. 340. ISBN 978-0-671-47989-3. Retrieved يناير 31, 2016.
  24. ^ Carrasco, Enrique; McClellan, Charles; Ro, Jane (أبريل 2007). "Foreign Debt: Forgiveness and Repudiation". The E-Book on International Finance & Development. University of Iowa. Archived from the original on يونيو 6, 2011. Retrieved يونيو 6, 2011.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  25. ^ "Federal Reserve Economic Data graph". Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Retrieved أغسطس 25, 2016.
  26. ^ Lubin, David (مارس 19, 2007). "Petrodollars, emerging markets and vulnerability" (PDF). Citigroup. Retrieved يناير 31, 2016.
  27. ^ "Recycling the Petrodollars". The Economist. نوفمبر 10, 2005. Retrieved فبراير 14, 2016.
  28. ^ Oxford Analytica (أغسطس 11, 2008). "World Economy Less Vulnerable To Petrodollars". Retrieved يناير 13, 2017.
  29. ^ Bianchi, Stefania (فبراير 22, 2016). "Sovereign Wealth Funds May Sell $404 Billion of Equities". Bloomberg News. Retrieved فبراير 22, 2016.
  30. ^ "The Resource Curse" (PDF). Natural Resource Governance Institute. مارس 2015. Retrieved يناير 22, 2017.
  31. ^ Aguilera, Roberto F.; Radetzki, Marian (2015). The Price of Oil. Cambridge University Press. pp. 87–89. ISBN 978-1-31643242-6. Retrieved يناير 22, 2017.
  32. ^ Blas, Javier (أبريل 13, 2015). "Oil-Rich Nations Are Selling Off Their Petrodollar Assets at Record Pace". Bloomberg News. Retrieved فبراير 14, 2016.
  33. ^ "Timeline". Kuwait Fund. Retrieved يناير 22, 2017.
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  41. ^ McMaken, Ryan (نوفمبر 7, 2014). "The Economics Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall". Mises Institute. Retrieved يناير 12, 2016. High oil prices in the 1970s propped up the regime so well, that had it not been for Soviet oil sales, it's quite possible the regime would have collapsed a decade earlier.
  42. ^ Gibbs, Stephen (أغسطس 24, 2005). "Venezuela ends upbeat Cuba visit". BBC. Retrieved نوفمبر 28, 2016.
  43. ^ Polanco, Anggy (يوليو 17, 2016). "Venezuelan shoppers flock across border to Colombia". Reuters. Retrieved ديسمبر 31, 2016.
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