أزمة الديون الأوروپية
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أزمة الديون الأوروپية (كثيراً ما يُطلق عليها "أزمة منطقة اليورو" أو "أزمة الديون السيادية الاوروپية") هي أزمة ديون لعدة سنوات تضطرم في الاتحاد الأوروپي منذ نهاية 2009. عدد من الدول الأعضاء في منطقة اليورو (اليونان والبرتغال وأيرلندا واسبانيا و قبرص) عجزوا عن سداد أو تأجيل ديونهم الحكومية أو أن يكفلوا البنوك المتعسرة الواقعة تحت إشرافهم الوطني بدون مساعدة أطراف ثالثة مثل بلدان أخرى من منطقة اليورو أو البنك المركزي الأوروپي (ECB) أو صندوق النقد الدولي (IMF).
في بداية عام 2010 كانت هناك مخاوف لبعض الدول المتقدمة حيال أزمة الديون السيادية الاوروبية شملت اليونان، أيرلندا، المملكه المتحدة،إسبانيا والبرتغال مما أدى الى ازمه الثقه في توسيع نطاق نشر عوائد السندات ومخاطر التامين في المقايضه بين هذه الدول واخرى من اعضاء الاتحاد الاوروبى والاكثر اهميه المانيا.
كان هناك قلق من الحكومه تجاه تاعجز ومستويات الديون عبر العالم من تخفيض الحكومه الاوروبيه للدين بانشاء تنبيه مالى للاسواق وتركزت معظم ازمه الديون في الاحداث الاخيره لليونان حيث كان هناك مخاوف من ارتفاع تكاليف تمويل الدين الحكومى في 2 مايو 2010 وافقت الدول اليوريه وصندوق النقد الدولى على اقتراض اليونان 10 بليون مع فرض شروط تقشفيه قاسية عليها في 9 مايو 2010 قام وزراء الماليه بعمل خطه انقاذ شامله بقيمه ما يقرب من تريليون دولار وتهدف الى ضمان الاستقرار المالى في جميع انحاء اوروبا
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أزمة تمويل الحكومة اليونانية
الأسباب
نتجت أزمة الديون الأوروپية بسبب مشكلة هيكلية في منطقة اليورو ومجموعة من العوامل المعقدة، وتشمل العولمة المالية؛ سهولة شروط الائتمان في الفترة 2002-2008 والتي شجعت على ممارسات الإقراض والاقتراض عالي المخاطر؛ الأزمة المالية 2007-2008؛ اختلالات التجارة الدولية؛ فقاعات العقارات التي اندلعت منذ ذلك الحين؛ الكساد الكبير 2008-2012؛ اختيارات السياسة المالية المرتبطة بالدخل والإنفاق الحكومي؛ المنهجيات المستخدمة من قبل الدول لإنقاذ الصناعات المصرفية المتعثرة وحاملي السندات الخاصة، تحمل أعباء الديون الخاصة أو الخسائر الاجتماعية.
تطور الأزمة
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اندلعت أزمة الديون الأوروپية في مطلع الكساد الكبير في أواخر 2009، وتميزت ببيئة يهيمن عليها العجز الهيكلي الحكومي المرتفع وتسارع مستويات الدين. كأثر سلبي للكساد الكبير، عندما عانى القطاع المصرفي الهش نسبياً من خسائر كبيرة في رأس المال، كان على معظم الدول في أوروبا أن تنقذ العديد من بنوكها الأكثر تأثراً ببعض القروض الداعمة لإعادة الرسملة، بسبب الترابط القوي بين بقاءها والاستقرار المالي للاقتصاد. في يناير 2009، كانت مجموعة مكونة من 10 بنوك مركزية وشرق أوروپية قد طلبت بالفعل الانقاذ.[3] عند ذلك الوقت، أصدرت اللجنة الأوروپية توقعات بانخفاض قدره 1.8٪ في الناتج الاقتصادي للاتحاد الأوروپي لعام 2009، مما يجعلها التوقعات الأسوأ بالنسبة للبنوك.[3][4] كانت عمليات إعادة الرسملة المصرية العديدة الممولة من القطاع العام أحد الأسباب وراء التدهور الحاد في نسبة الدين مقابل ن.م.إ التي عانت منتها مختلف الحكومات الأوروپية في مطلع الكساد الكبير. وكانت الأسباب الجذرية الرئيسية لأزمات الديون السيادية الأربعة التي اندلعت في أوروپا، مزيج من: ضعف النمو المحتمل والفعلي؛ ضعف التنافسية؛ تصفية البنوك والهيئات السيادية؛ نسب الدين مقابل ن.م.إ. الضخمة الموجودة مسبقاً؛ ومخزون الديون الكبير (الحكومة والقطاع الخاص والقطاع غير الخاص).[5]
اليونان
أزمة الدين الحكومي اليوناني هي أزمة مالية عصفت بالاقتصاد اليوناني في أبريل 2010 حينما طلبت الحكومة اليونانية من الاتحاد الأوروبي وصندوق النقد الدولي تفعيل خطة إنقاذ تتضمن قروضا لمساعدة اليونان على تجنب خطر الإفلاس والتخلف عن السداد وكانت معدلات الفائدة على السندات اليونانية قد ارتفعت إلى معدلات عالية نتيجة مخاوف بين المستثمرين من عدم قدرة اليونان على الوفاء بديونها لاسيما مع ارتفاع معدل عجز الموازنة وتصاعد حجم الدين العام. هددت الأزمة اليونانية استقرار منطقة اليوور وطرحت فكرة خروج اليونان من المنطقة الاقتصادية إلا أن أوروبا قررت تقديم المساعدة إلى اليونان مقابل تنفيذها لإصلاحات اقتصادية واجراءات تقشف تهدف إلى خفض العجز بالموازنة العامة.[6]
بدأت الأزمة اليونانية في أواخر عام 2009 مع انتشار المخاوف بين المستثمرين حول عدم قدرة اليونان على الوفاء بديونها نتيجة الزيادة الحادة لحجم الدين العام. وقد أدى ذلك إلى أزمة ثقة في الأسواق المالية اتضحت بارتفاع الفائدة على السندات اليونانية وارتفاع التأمين على السندات اليونانية ضد التخلف عن السداد. ومع تزايد حجم الديون العمومية وارتفاع عجز الموانة واجه الاقتصاد اليوناني ضعفا في النمو وهو ما عقد من وضع اليونان وصعب من قدرتها على الحصول على قروض جديدة لتسديد ديونها السابقة.
قدمت الحكومة اليونانية طلبا رسميا في 23 يونيو 2010 إلى دول منطقة اليورو وصندوق النقد الدولي بتفعيل خطة الإنقاذ المالي التي اتفق عليها قبل 10 أيام مع المفوضية الأوروبية، وتتضن الخطة قروضا من دول الاتحاد الأوروبي وصندوق النقد بقيمة 45 مليار يورو تحتاجها الحكومة اليونانية للنفقات المالية خلال السنة الجارية إضافة إلى حاجة اليونان لتسديد 16 مليار يورو لسندات يحل أجل سدادها مع نهاية شهر مايو وبسبب ارتفاع معدلات الفائدة إلى 8.3% فإن اليونان غير قادرة على إعادة تمويل هذه السندات.[7]
وردت المفوضية الأوروبية على الطلب اليوناني بأنها سوف تقوم بتفعيل الآلية في أسرع وقت ممكن، فيما صرح مدير عام صندوق النقد الدولي دومينيك شتروس "نحن مستعدون للتحرك سريعا لتلبية هذا الطلب وتقديم المساعدة لليونان والبالغة قيمتها 60 مليار دولار". وأضاف "كنا نعمل بشكل وثيق مع السلطات اليونانية منذ أسابيع لبحث المساعدة التقنية ولدينا فريق على الأرض في أثينا يعمل منذ أيام مع السلطات والاتحاد الأوروبي".[8]
ويتعين على المفوضية والبنك المركزي الأوروبي أولاً تقييم احقية اليونان بالطلب، وبعد ذلك ستقرر الدول الـ15 الأخرى الأعضاء في “منطقة اليورو” ما إذا كانت ستدعم اليونان مالياً. وقالت المفوضية الأوروبية إن قروضاً طارئة ستصرف لليونان في أقرب وقت ممكن.[8]
في 2 مايو وافقت جميع دول الاتحاد الأوروبي إضافة إلى صندوق النقد الدولي على منح اليونان سلسة من القروض المالية بمجموع 110 مليار يورو على مدى 3 سنوات خلال الفترة من مايو 2010 حتى يونيو 2013.[9] منها 80 مليار يورور مقدمة دول الاتحاد الأوروبي فيما قدم صندوق النقد الدولي 30 مليار يورو، وتبلغ الفائدة على هذه القروض نحو 5.2% وفترة سداد 3 سنوات[10] وقد خفضت الفائدة في قمة بروكسل لقادة الاتحاد الأوروبي في مارس 2011 حيث تقرر تخفيض الفائدة بنحو 1% لتصبح 4.2% فيما زيدت فترة السداد لتبلغ 7 سنوات ونصف[10]، وقد اشترط على اليونان للحصول على القروض القيام باجراءات تقشف تهدف إلى خفض الانفاق.
وبحسب الخطة يتعين على اليونان على خفض العجز في ميزانيتها إلى 8.1 في المائة من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي في العام الحالي و7.6 في المائة في عام 2011 و6.5 في عام 2012. ويتوقع أن ينخفض العجز إلى أقل من 3 في المائة من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي وهو الحد الأقصى بحلول عام 2014. في حين سيرتفع الدين العام إلى نحو 150 في المائة من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي في 2013 قبل أن يبدأ تراجعه بداية من عام 2014.[11]
أقرت دول منطقة اليورو في 21 فبراير 2012 الحزمة الثانية لإنقاذ اليونان، وتتضمن الحزمة جملة إجراءات خصصت لها 130 مليار يورو، فضلا عن اتفاق لتبادل سندات ديون أثينا مع دائنيها من القطاع الخاص ينص على شطب 107 مليارات يورو.[12] من خلال اتفاق مبادلة مع المؤسسات المالية الخاصة ينص على شطب 53.5% من قيمة سندات الدين اليوناني التي تحوزها تلك المؤسسات أي ما يعادل 107 مليارات يورو عن طريق تبديل السندات القديمة بأخرى جديدة بتاريخ استحقاق يحل بعد بعد ثلاثين سنة وبنسبة فائدة متغيرة، تتراوح بين 2% حتى 2015، و3% حتى 2020، و4.3% في السنوات الموالية، إلى أن تنتهي آجال استحقاق الديون اليونانية في 2042. وأما القروض التي سيقدمها الدائنون الدوليون فتصل في مجموعها إلى 130 مليار يورو، تسدد تدريجيا إلى غاية 2014.[12]
وتهدف خطة الإنقاذ إلى إعادة هيكلة ديون اليونان التي تناهز 350 مليار يورو ، ومن المتوقع أن تقلص إجراءات الحزمة الثانية ديون اليونان من 160% من ناتجها المحلي الإجمالي إلى 120.5% في 2020، وهي النسبة الأقصى للدين التي يمكن أن تتحملها البلاد على المدى البعيد.[12]
وكانت اليونان أولى الدول المتقدمة التي تأخرت عن السداد لصندوق النقد الدولي في 2015.
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أيرلندا
لم تكن بداية أزمة الديون السيادية الأيرلندية بسبب الإنفاق الحكومي المرتفع، لكن بسبب ضمان الدولة للبنوك الستة الرئيسية في أيرلندا والتي كانت تمول فقاعة العقارات. في 29 سبتمبر 2008، أصدر وزير المالية الأيرلندي بريان لنيهان ينر ضمان مدته عامين للمودعين وحاملي السندات بالبنوك.[13] لاحقاً تم تجديد الضمانات الخاصة بالودائع والسندات الجديدة بطريقة مختلفة قليلاً. في 2009، تأسست الوكالة الوطنية لادارة الأصول للحصول على قروض كبيرة ذات صلة بالملكية من البنوك الستة "بالقيمة الاقتصادية السوقية طويلة الأجل".[14]
الپرتغال
على عكس الدول الأوروپية الأخرى التي تضررت بشدة من الركود الكبير في أواخر عقد 2000، وتلقت في نهاية المطاف عمليات الإنقاذ في أوائل عقد 2010 (مثل اليونان وأيرلندا)، لم يشد عقد 2000 في الپرتغال نمواً اقتصادياً، لكنها كانت فترة أزمة اقتصادية فعلية، تميزت بالجمود وفترتي كساد (في 2002-03)[15][16] و2008–09[17][16]) وفرضت تدابير التقشف المالي برعاية حكومية بهدف تخفيض عجز الميزانية إلى الحدود المسموح بها في ميثاق الاستقرار والنمو الأوروپي.[18][19][20]
إسپانيا
كانت الديون الإسپانية ذات مستوى منخفض نسبياً مقارنة بالاقتصادات المتقدمة قبل وقوع الأزمة.[21] ووصلت نسبة الدين العام مقابل ن.م.إ. في 2010 إلى 60% فقط، أي أقل بأكثر من 20 نقطة من ألمانيا، وفرنسا أو الولايات المتحدة، وأقل بأكثر من 60 نقطة عن إيطاليا، أيرلندا أو اليونان.[22][23] تم تجنب الديون إلى حد كبير بسبب الإيرادات الضريبية المتضخمة من فقاعة الإسكان، والتي ساعدت على استيعاب الإنفاق الحكومي المتزايد لعقد من الزمان دون تراكم الديون.[24] عند انفجار القاعة، أنفقت إسپانيا مبالغ ضخمة على إنقاذ البنوك. في مايو 2012، حصل بانيكا على إنقاذ قيمته 19 بليون يورو،[25] بالإضافة إلى 4.5 بليون يورو سابقة لدعم بانكيا.[26] وكانت الأساليب المحاسبية المشكوك بها سبباً في خسائر البنوك.[27] في سبتمبر 2012، أشار المنظمون إلى أن البنوك الإسپانية قد طلبت 59 مليار يورو (77 مليار دولار أمريكي) من رأس المال الإضافي لتعويض خسائر الاستثمارات العقارية.[28]
قبرص
أصيب اقتصاد جزيرة قبرص الصغيرة ذات الـ840.000 نسمة بالعديد من الضربات القوية في عام 2012، ومنها، خسارة البنوك القبرصية مبلغ 22 بليون يورو [[أزمة الديون الحكومية اليونانية| to the خصم الدين اليوناني، مما دفع وكالات التقييم الدولية إلى وضع الاقتصاد القبرصي في ترتيب غير مرغوب فيه وإلى عدم قدرة الحكومة على سترداد النفقات.[29]
في 25 يونيو 2012، طلبت الحكومة القبرصية حزمة إنقاذ من مرفق الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي أو آلية الاستقرار الأوروپية، مشيرة إلى الصعوبات التي تواجهها في دعم القطاع المصرفي من التعرض لخصم الدين اليوناني.[30]
ردود الفعل السياسية
تدابير الطوارئ في الاتحاد الأوروپي
يلقي الجدول التالي نظرة عامة على المكون المالي لجميع برامج الإنقاذ التي حصلت عليها الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروپي، منذ اندلاع الأزمة المالية العالمية في سبتمبر 2008. الدول أعضاء الاتحاد الأوروپي خارج منطقة اليورو (موضحين بالأصفر في الجدول) لا يمكنهم الحصول على التمويلات الموفرة من قبل EFSF/ESM، لكن يمكنهم الحصول على قروض إنقاذ من برنامج الاتحاد الأوروپي لميزان المدفوعات، قروض صندوق الندق الدولي والقروض الثنائية (مع مساعدة إضافية محتملة من البنك الدولي/بنك الاستثمار الأوروپي/البنك الأوروپي لاعادة البناء والتنمية إذا كانت مصنفة كبلد نامي). منذ أكتوبر 2012، ظهرت آليت الاستقرار الأوروپية كصندوق جديد دائم للاستقرار المالي لتغطية أي حزم إنقاذ مستقبلية محتملة ضمن منطقة اليورو، والذي حل محل صناديق GLF + EFSM + EFSF المؤقتة.
| الدولة العضو | الفترة الزمنية | ص.ن.د[31][32] (بليون €) |
البنك الدولي[32] (بليون €) |
EIB / EBRD (بليون €) |
ثنائية[31] (بليون €) |
BoP[32] (بليون €) |
GLF[33] (بليون €) |
EFSM[31] (بليون €) |
EFSF[31] (بليون €) |
ESM[31] (بليون €) |
إجمالي حزم الإنقاذ (بليون €) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| قبرص I1 | ديسمبر 2011-ديسمبر 2012 | – | – | – | 2.5 | – | – | – | – | – | 2.51 |
| قبرص II2 | مايو2013-مارس.2016 | 1.0 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9.0 | 10.02 |
| اليونان I+II3 | مايو 2010- يونيو2015 | 32.1 out of 48.1 | – | – | – | – | 52.9 | – | 130.9 من إجمالي 144.6 | – | 215.9 من إجمالي 245.63 |
| اليونان III4 | أغسطس 2015-أغسطس 2018 | (مبلغ 86، لينظر فيه أكتوبر 2015) |
– | – | – | – | – | – | – | (حتى 86) | 864 |
| المجر5 | نوفمبر 2008-أكتوبر 2010 | 9.1 من 12.5 | 1.0 | – | – | 5.5 من 6.5 | – | – | – | – | 15.6 من 20.05 |
| أيرلندا6 | نوفمبر 2010-ديسمبر 2013 | 22.5 | – | – | 4.8 | – | – | 22.5 | 18.4 | – | 68.26 |
| لاتڤيا7 | ديسمبر 2008-ديمبر 2011 | 1.1 من 1.7 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 من 2.2 | 2.9 من 3.1 | – | – | – | – | 4.5 من 7.57 |
| الپرتغال8 | مايو 2011 يونيو 2014 | 26.5 من 27.4 | – | – | – | – | – | 24.3 من 25.6 | 26.0 | – | 76.8 من 79.08 |
| رومانيا I9 | مايو 2009 - يونيو 2011 | 12.6 out of 13.6 | 1.0 | 1.0 | – | 5.0 | – | – | – | – | 19.6 من 20.69 |
| رومانيا II10 | مارس 2011-يونيو 2013 | 0.0 out of 3.6 | 1.15 | – | – | 0.0 من 1.4 | – | – | – | – | 1.15 out of 6.1510 |
| رومانيا III11 | أكتوبر 2013-سبتمبر 2015 | 0.0 out of 2.0 | 2.5 | – | – | 0.0 من 2.0 | – | – | – | – | 2.5 out of 6.511 |
| إسپانيا12 | يوليو 2012-ديسمبر 2013 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 41.3 من 100 | 41.3 من 10012 |
| إجمالي الدفعة | نوفمبر 2008-أغسطس 2018 | 104.9 | 6.05 | 1.1 | 7.3 | 13.4 | 52.9 | 46.8 | 175.3 | 136.3 | 544.05 |
| 1 Cyprus received in late December 2011 a €2.5bn bilateral emergency bailout loan from Russia, to cover its governmental budget deficits and a refinancing of maturing governmental debts until 31 December 2012.[34][35][36] Initially the bailout loan was supposed to be fully repaid in 2016, but as part of establishment of the later following second Cypriot bailout programme, Russia accepted a delayed repayment in eight biannual tranches throughout 2018-2021 - while also lowering its requested interest rate from 4.5% to 2.5%.[37] | |||||||||||
| 2 When it became evident Cyprus needed an additional bailout loan to cover the government's fiscal operations throughout 2013-2015, on top of additional funding needs for recapitalization of the Cypriot financial sector, negotiations for such an extra bailout package started with the Troika in June 2012.[38][39][40] In December 2012 a preliminary estimate indicated, that the needed overall bailout package should have a size of €17.5bn, comprising €10bn for bank recapitalisation and €6.0bn for refinancing maturing debt plus €1.5bn to cover budget deficits in 2013+2014+2015, which in total would have increased the Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio to around 140%.[41] The final agreed package however only entailed a €10bn support package, financed partly by IMF (€1bn) and ESM (€9bn),[42] because it was possible to reach a fund saving agreement with the Cypriot authorities, featuring a direct closure of the most troubled Laiki Bank and a forced bail-in recapitalisation plan for Bank of Cyprus.[43][44] The final conditions for activation of the bailout package was outlined by the Troika's MoU agreement in April 2013, and include: (1) Recapitalisation of the entire financial sector while accepting a closure of the Laiki bank, (2) Implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions, (3) Fiscal consolidation to help bring down the Cypriot governmental budget deficit, (4) Structural reforms to restore competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, (5) Privatization programme. The Cypriot debt-to-GDP ratio is on this background now forecasted only to peak at 126% in 2015 and subsequently decline to 105% in 2020, and thus considered to remain within sustainable territory. The €10bn bailout comprise €4.1bn spend on debt liabilities (refinancing and amortization), 3.4bn to cover fiscal deficits, and €2.5bn for the bank recapitalization. These amounts will be paid to Cyprus through regular tranches from 13 May 2013 until 31 March 2016. According to the programme this will be sufficient, as Cyprus during the programme period in addition will: Receive €1.0bn extraordinary revenue from privatization of government assets, ensure an automatic roll-over of €1.0bn maturing Treasury Bills and €1.0bn of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors, bring down the funding need for bank recapitalization with €8.7bn — of which 0.4bn is reinjection of future profit earned by the Cyprus Central Bank (injected in advance at the short term by selling its gold reserve) and €8.3bn origin from the bail-in of creditors in Laiki bank and Bank of Cyprus.[45] The forced automatic rollover of maturing bonds held by domestic creditors were conducted in 2013, and equaled according to some credit rating agencies a "selective default" or "restrictive default", mainly because of the fact that the fixed yields of the new bonds did not reflect the market rates — while maturities at the same time automatically were extended.[37] | |||||||||||
| 3 Many sources list the first bailout was €110bn followed by the second on €130bn. When you deduct €2.7bn due to Ireland+Portugal+Slovakia opting out as creditors for the first bailout, and add the extra €8.2bn IMF has promised to pay Greece for the years in 2015-16 (through a programme extension implemented in December 2012), the total amount of bailout funds sums up to €245.6bn.[33][46] The first bailout resulted in a payout of €20.1bn from IMF and €52.9bn from GLF, during the course of May 2010 until December 2011,[33] and then it was technically replaced by a second bailout package for 2012-2016, which had a size of €172.6bn (€28bn from IMF and €144.6bn from EFSF), as it included the remaining committed amounts from the first bailout package.[47] All committed IMF amounts were made available to the Greek government for financing its continued operation of public budget deficits and to refinance maturing public debt held by private creditors and IMF. The payments from EFSF were earmarked to finance €35.6bn of PSI restructured government debt (as part of a deal where private investors in return accepted a nominal haircut, lower interest rates and longer maturities for their remaining principal), €48.2bn for bank recapitalization,[46] €11.3bn for a second PSI debt buy-back,[48] while the remaining €49.5bn were made available to cover continued operation of public budget deficits.[49] The combined programme was scheduled to expire in March 2016, after IMF had extended their programme period with extra loan tranches from January 2015 to March 2016 (as a mean to help Greece service the total sum of interests accruing during the lifespan of already issued IMF loans), while the Eurogroup at the same time opted to conduct their reimbursement and deferral of interests outside their bailout programme framework — with the EFSF programme still being planned to end in December 2014.[50] Due to the refusal by the Greek government to comply with the agreed conditional terms for receiving a continued flow of bailout transfers, both IMF and the Eurogroup opted to freeze their programmes since August 2014. To avoid a technical expiry, the Eurogroup postponed the expiry date for its frozen programme to 30 June 2015, paving the way within this new deadline for the possibility of transfer terms first to be renegotiated and then finally complied with to ensure completion of the programme.[50] As Greece withdrew unilaterally from the process of settling renegotiated terms and time extension for the completion of the programme, it expired uncompleted on 30 June 2015. Hereby, Greece lost the possibility to extract €13.7bn of remaining funds from the EFSF (€1.0bn unused PSI and Bond Interest facilities, €10.9bn unused bank recapitalization funds and a €1.8bn frozen tranche of macroeconomic support),[51][52] and also lost the remaining SDR 13.561bn of IMF funds[53] (being equal to €16.0bn as per the SDR exchange rate on 5 Jan 2012[54]), although those lost IMF funds might be recouped if Greece settles an agreement for a new third bailout programme with ESM — and passes the first review of such programme. | |||||||||||
| 4 A new third bailout programme worth €86bn in total, jointly covered by funds from IMF and ESM, will be disbursed in tranches from August 2015 until August 2018.[55] The programme was approved to be negotiated on 17 July 2015,[56] and approved in full detail by the publication of an ESM facility agreement on 19 August 2015.[57][58] IMF's transfer of the "remainder of its frozen I+II programme" and their new commitment also to contribute with a part of the funds for the third bailout, depends on a successful prior completion of the first review of the new third programme in October 2015.[59] Due to a matter of urgency, EFSM immediately conducted a temporary €7.16bn emergency transfer to Greece on 20 July 2015,[60][61] which was fully overtaken by ESM when the first tranche of the third program was conducted 20 August 2015.[58] Due to being temporary bridge financing and not part of an official bailout programme, the table do not display this special type of EFSM transfer. The loans of the program has an average maturity of 32.5 years and carry a variable interest rate (currently at 1%). The program has earmarked transfer of up till €25bn for bank recapitalization purposes (to be used to the extent deemed needed by the annual stress tests of the SSM), and also include establishment of a new privatization fund to conduct sale of Greek public assets — of which the first generated €25bn will be used for early repayment of the bailout loans earmarked for bank recapitalizations. Potential debt relief for Greece, in the form of longer grace and payment periods, will be considered by the European public creditors after the first review of the new programme, by October/November 2015.[58] | |||||||||||
| 5 Hungary recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €4.4bn bailout support scheduled for October 2009-October 2010.[32][62] IMF paid in total 7.6 out of 10.5 billion SDR,[63] equal to €9.1bn out of €12.5bn at current exchange rates.[64] | |||||||||||
| 6 In Ireland the National Treasury Management Agency also paid €17.5bn for the program on behalf of the Irish government, of which €10bn were injected by the National Pensions Reserve Fund and the remaining €7.5bn paid by "domestic cash resources",[65] which helped increase the program total to €85bn.[31] As this extra amount by technical terms is an internal bail-in, it has not been added to the bailout total. As of 31 March 2014 all committed funds had been transferred, with EFSF even paying €0.7bn more, so that the total amount of funds had been marginally increased from €67.5bn to €68.2bn.[66] | |||||||||||
| 7 Latvia recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €3.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[67][68] | |||||||||||
| 8 Portugal completed its support programme as scheduled in June 2014, one month later than initially planned due to awaiting a verdict by its constitutional court, but without asking for establishment of any subsequent precautionary credit line facility.[69] By the end of the programme all committed amounts had been transferred, except for the last tranche of €2.6bn (1.7bn from EFSM and 0.9bn from IMF),[70] which the Portuguese government declined to receive.[71][72] The reason why the IMF transfers still mounted to slightly more than the initially committed €26bn, was due to its payment with SDR's instead of euro — and some favorable developments in the EUR-SDR exchange rate compared to the beginning of the programme.[73] In November 2014, Portugal received its last delayed €0.4bn tranche from EFSM (post programme),[74] hereby bringing its total drawn bailout amount up at €76.8bn out of €79.0bn. | |||||||||||
| 9 Romania recovered faster than expected, and thus did not receive the remaining €1.0bn bailout support originally scheduled for 2011.[75][76] | |||||||||||
| 10 Romania had a precautionary credit line with €5.0bn available to draw money from if needed, during the period March 2011-June 2013; but entirely avoided to draw on it.[77][78][32][79] During the period, the World Bank however supported with a transfer of €0.4bn as a DPL3 development loan programme and €0.75bn as results based financing for social assistance and health.[80] | |||||||||||
| 11 Romania had a second €4bn precautionary credit line established jointly by IMF and EU, of which IMF accounts for SDR 1.75134bn = €2bn, which is available to draw money from if needed during the period from October 2013 to 30 September 2015. In addition the World Bank also made €1bn available under a Development Policy Loan with a deferred drawdown option valid from January 2013 through December 2015.[81] The World Bank will throughout the period also continue providing earlier committed development programme support of €0.891bn,[82][83] but this extra transfer is not accounted for as "bailout support" in the third programme due to being "earlier committed amounts". In April 2014, the World Bank increased their support by adding the transfer of a first €0.75bn Fiscal Effectiveness and Growth Development Policy Loan,[84] with the final second FEG-DPL tranch on €0.75bn (worth about $1bn) to be contracted in the first part of 2015.[85] No money had been drawn from the precautionary credit line, as of May 2014. | |||||||||||
| 12 Spain's €100bn support package has been earmarked only for recapitalisation of the financial sector.[86] Initially an EFSF emergency account with €30bn was available, but nothing was drawn, and it was cancelled again in November 2012 after being superseded by the regular ESM recapitalisation programme.[87] The first ESM recapitalisation tranch of €39.47bn was approved 28 November,[88][89] and transferred to the bank recapitalisation fund of the Spanish government (FROB) on 11 December 2012.[87] A second tranch for "category 2" banks on €1.86n was approved by the Commission on 20 December,[90] and finally transferred by ESM on 5 February 2013.[91] "Category 3" banks were also subject for a possible third tranch in June 2013, in case they failed before then to acquire sufficient additional capital funding from private markets.[92] During January 2013, all "category 3" banks however managed to fully recapitalise through private markets and thus will not be in need for any State aid. The remaining €58.7bn of the initial support package is thus not expected to be activated, but will stay available as a fund with precautionary capital reserves to possibly draw upon if unexpected things happen — until 31 December 2013.[86][93] In total €41.3bn out of the available €100bn was transferred.[94] Upon the scheduled exit of the programme, no follow-up assistance was requested.[95] |
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مرفق الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي (EFSF)
في 9 مايو 2010، وافق 27 من أعضاء الاتحاد الأوروپي على تأسيس مرفق الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي، جهازاً قانونياً[96] يهدف إلى الحفاظ على الاستقرار المالي في أوروپا عن طريق توفير المساعدة المالية لدول منطقة اليورو التي تعاني من صعوبات. يمكن للمرفق إصدار سندات أو أي صكوك ديون أخرى في السوق بدعم من المكتب الألماني لادارة الديون لرفع التمويلة المطلوبة للحصول على القرود لبلدان منطقة اليورو التي تعاني من مشكلات مالية، عادة رسملة البنوك أو شراء الديون السيادية.[97]
آلية الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي (EFSM)
في 5 يناير 2011، أسس الاتحاد الأوروپي آلية الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي، برنامج تمويل طوارئ يعتمد على الأموال التي يتم جمعها في الأسواق المالية وتضمنها المفوضية الاوروپية باستخدام ميزانية الاتحاد الأوروپي كضامن.[98] وتعمل تحت إشراف المفوضية[99] وتهدف إلى الحفاظ على الاستقرار المالي في أوروپا بتوفير المساعدة المالية للدول الأعضاء التي تعاني من صعوبات اقتصادية.[100] صندوق اللجنة، المدعون من جميع الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروپي، مخول لرفع المساعدات المالية إلى 60 بليون يورو[101] وتم تقييمه AAA من قبل فيش، موديز وستاندارد أند پور.[102]
اتفاقية بروكسل وما بعدها
في 26 أكتوبر 2011، التقى قادة 17 من بلدان منطقة اليورو في بروكسل واتفقوا على شطب 50% من الديون السيادية اليونانية لدى البونك، زيادة بمقدار أربع أضعاف (إلى حوالي تريليون يورو) في ميزانية صناديق الإنقاذ المنشئة تحت إشراف [[مرفق الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي، زيادة مستوى الوصاية بمقدار 9% لرسملة البنوك داخل الاتحاد الأوروپي وتأسيس إيطاليا لمجموعة من الالتزامات من أجل التخاذ تدابير لخفض ديونها الوطنية. كما تعهدت بمبلغ 35 بليون يورو لصالح "تعزيز الائتمان" للتخفيف من الخسائر التي من المحتمل أن تتعرض لها البنوك الأوروبية. ووصف خوسيه مانويل باروسو القرارات على أنها مجموعة من "التدابير الاستثنائية للأوقات الاستثنائية".[103][104]
البنك المركزي الأوروپي
اتخذ البنك المركزي الأوروپي سلسلة من التدابير والتي تهدف إلى الحد من التقلبات في الأسواق المالية وتحسين السيولة.[105]
آلية الاستقرار الأوروپي
آلية الاستقرار الأوروپي هو برنامج تمويل إنقاذ دائم تأسس خلفاً لمرفق الاستقرار المالي الأوروپي وآلية التمكين المالي الأوروپي المؤقتين في يوليو 2012[106] لكن تم تعليقه بعد صدقت المحكمة الدستورية الألمانية على شرعية التدابير في 12 سبتمبر 2012.[107][108] دخلت حزمة الإنقاذ الدائمة حيز التنفيذ لـ16 من الموقعيت في 27 سبتمبر 2012. بدأت تنفيذ في إستونيا في 4 أكتوبر 2012 بعد إنهاء عملية التصديق عليها.[109]
الاتفاق المالي الأوروپي
In March 2011 a new reform of the Stability and Growth Pact was initiated, aiming at straightening the rules by adopting an automatic procedure for imposing of penalties in case of breaches of either the 3% deficit or the 60% debt rules.[110] By the end of the year, Germany, France and some other smaller EU countries went a step further and vowed to create a fiscal union across the eurozone with strict and enforceable fiscal rules and automatic penalties embedded in the EU treaties.[111][112] On 9 December 2011 at the European Council meeting, all 17 members of the eurozone and six countries that aspire to join agreed on a new intergovernmental treaty to put strict caps on government spending and borrowing, with penalties for those countries who violate the limits.[113] All other non-eurozone countries apart from the UK are also prepared to join in, subject to parliamentary vote.[106] The treaty will enter into force on 1 January 2013, if by that time 12 members of the euro area have ratified it.[114]
مقترحات الاصلاحات والتعافي الاقتصادي
القروض المصرفية المباشرة واللوائح المصرفية
On 28 June 2012 eurozone leaders agreed to permit loans by the European Stability Mechanism to be made directly to stressed banks rather than through eurozone states, to avoid adding to sovereign debt. The reform was linked to plans for banking regulation by the European Central Bank. The reform was immediately reflected by a reduction in yield of long-term bonds issued by member states such as Italy and Spain and a rise in value of the Euro.[115][116][117]
| البلد | Banks recapitalised |
|---|---|
| Portugal | Banco BPI, Caixa Geral de Depositos, Millennium BCP |
| Ireland | Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland |
| Greece | Alpha Bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank |
| Spain | Banco de Valencia, Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa, Novagalicia |
تقشف أقل واستثمار مزيد
There has been substantial criticism over the austerity measures implemented by most European nations to counter this debt crisis. US economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman argues that an abrupt return to "'non-Keynesian' financial policies" is not a viable solution.[118] Pointing at historical evidence, he predicts that deflationary policies now being imposed on countries such as Greece and Spain will prolong and deepen their recessions.[119] Together with over 9,000 signatories of "A Manifesto for Economic Sense"[120] Krugman also dismissed the belief of austerity focusing policy makers such as EU economic commissioner Olli Rehn and most European finance ministers[121] that "budget consolidation" revives confidence in financial markets over the longer haul.[122][123] In a 2003 study that analysed 133 IMF austerity programmes, the IMF's independent evaluation office found that policy makers consistently underestimated the disastrous effects of rigid spending cuts on economic growth.[124][125] In early 2012 an IMF official, who negotiated Greek austerity measures, admitted that spending cuts were harming Greece.[126][126] In October 2012, the IMF said that its forecasts for countries which implemented austerity programmes have been consistently overoptimistic, suggesting that tax hikes and spending cuts have been doing more damage than expected, and countries which implemented fiscal stimulus, such as Germany and Austria, did better than expected.[127] Also Portugal did comparably better than Spain. The latter introduced drastic austerity measures but was unable not meet its EU budget deficit targets. On the other hand, Portugal's leftist coalition fought austerity (it increased the minimum wage by 25 percent and took back cuts in the pension system and the public sector) and at the same time reduced its budget deficit to below three percent in 2016.[128] According to historian Florian Schui from University of St. Gallen no austerity program has ever worked. Schui particularly notes Winston Churchill's attempt in 1925 and Heinrich Brüning's attempt in 1930 during the Weimar Republic. Both led to disastrous consequences.[129]
زيادة القدرة التنافسية
Crisis countries must significantly increase their international competitiveness to generate economic growth and improve their terms of trade. Indian-American journalist Fareed Zakaria notes in November 2011 that no debt restructuring will work without growth, even more so as European countries "face pressures from three fronts: demography (an aging population), technology (which has allowed companies to do much more with fewer people) and globalisation (which has allowed manufacturing and services to locate across the world)".[130]
معالجة اختلالات الحساب الجاري
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Regardless of the corrective measures chosen to solve the current predicament, as long as cross border capital flows remain unregulated in the euro area,[132] current account imbalances are likely to continue. A country that runs a large current account or trade deficit (i.e., importing more than it exports) must ultimately be a net importer of capital; this is a mathematical identity called the balance of payments. In other words, a country that imports more than it exports must either decrease its savings reserves or borrow to pay for those imports. Conversely, Germany's large trade surplus (net export position) means that it must either increase its savings reserves or be a net exporter of capital, lending money to other countries to allow them to buy German goods.[133]
حشد الائتمان
Several proposals were made in mid-2012 to purchase the debt of distressed European countries such as Spain and Italy. Markus Brunnermeier,[134] the economist Graham Bishop, and Daniel Gros were among those advancing proposals. Finding a formula, which was not simply backed by Germany, is central in crafting an acceptable and effective remedy.[135]
تعقيب
US President Barack Obama stated in June 2012: "Right now, [Europe's] focus has to be on strengthening their overall banking system...making a series of decisive actions that give people confidence that the banking system is solid ... In addition, they're going to have to look at how do they achieve growth at the same time as they're carrying out structural reforms that may take two or three or five years to fully accomplish. So countries like Spain and Italy, for example, have embarked on some smart structural reforms that everybody thinks are necessary—everything from tax collection to labour markets to a whole host of different issues. But they've got to have the time and the space for those steps to succeed. And if they are just cutting and cutting and cutting, and their unemployment rate is going up and up and up, and people are pulling back further from spending money because they're feeling a lot of pressure—ironically, that can actually make it harder for them to carry out some of these reforms over the long term ... [I]n addition to sensible ways to deal with debt and government finances, there's a parallel discussion that's taking place among European leaders to figure out how do we also encourage growth and show some flexibility to allow some of these reforms to really take root."[136]
حلول مقترحة على المدى الطويل
الاتحاد المالي الأوروپي
The crisis is pressuring the Euro to move beyond a regulatory state and towards a more federal EU with fiscal powers.[137] Increased European integration giving a central body increased control over the budgets of member states was proposed on 14 June 2012 by Jens Weidmann President of the Deutsche Bundesbank,[138] expanding on ideas first proposed by Jean-Claude Trichet, former president of the European Central Bank. Control, including requirements that taxes be raised or budgets cut, would be exercised only when fiscal imbalances developed.[139] This proposal is similar to contemporary calls by Angela Merkel for increased political and fiscal union which would "allow Europe oversight possibilities".[140]
هيئة الاسترداد وتسوية البنوك الأوروپية
European banks are estimated to have incurred losses approaching €1 trillion between the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2010. The European Commission approved some €4.5 trillion in state aid for banks between October 2008 and October 2011, a sum which includes the value of taxpayer-funded recapitalisations and public guarantees on banking debts.[141] This has prompted some economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman to note that Europe is not suffering from a sovereign debt crisis but rather from a banking crisis.[142]
سندات اليورو
A growing number of investors and economists say Eurobonds would be the best way of solving a debt crisis,[143] though their introduction matched by tight financial and budgetary co-ordination may well require changes in EU treaties.[143] On 21 November 2011, the European Commission suggested that eurobonds issued jointly by the 17 euro nations would be an effective way to tackle the financial crisis. Using the term "stability bonds", Jose Manuel Barroso insisted that any such plan would have to be matched by tight fiscal surveillance and economic policy coordination as an essential counterpart so as to avoid moral hazard and ensure sustainable public finances.[144][145]
السندات الآمنة الأوروپية
A group of economists from Princeton University suggest a new form of European Safe Bonds (ESBies), i.e. bundled European government bonds (70% senior bonds, 30% junior bonds) in the form of a "union-wide safe asset without joint liability". According to the authors, ESBies "would be at least as safe as German bunds and approximately double the supply of euro safe assets when protected by a 30%-thick junior tranche". ESBies could be issued by public or private-sector entities and would "weaken the diabolic loop and its diffusion across countries". It requires "no significant change in treaties or legislation.“[146][147]
صندوق النقد الأوروپي
On 20 October 2011, the Austrian Institute of Economic Research published an article that suggests transforming the EFSF into a European Monetary Fund (EMF), which could provide governments with fixed interest rate Eurobonds at a rate slightly below medium-term economic growth (in nominal terms). These bonds would not be tradable but could be held by investors with the EMF and liquidated at any time. Given the backing of all eurozone countries and the ECB, "the EMU would achieve a similarly strong position vis-à-vis financial investors as the US where the Fed backs government bonds to an unlimited extent". To ensure fiscal discipline despite lack of market pressure, the EMF would operate according to strict rules, providing funds only to countries that meet fiscal and macroeconomic criteria.
شطب الديون بتمويل من ضرائب الثروات
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the combined private and public debt of 18 OECD countries nearly quadrupled between 1980 and 2010, and will likely continue to grow, reaching between 250% (for Italy) and about 600% (for Japan) by 2040.[148] A BIS study released in June 2012 warns that budgets of most advanced economies, excluding interest payments, "would need 20 consecutive years of surpluses exceeding 2 per cent of gross domestic product—starting now—just to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio back to its pre-crisis level".[149] The same authors found in a previous study that increased financial burden imposed by ageing populations and lower growth makes it unlikely that indebted economies can grow out of their debt problem if only one of the following three conditions is met:[150]
- government debt is more than 80 to 100% of GDP;
- non-financial corporate debt is more than 90 percent;
- private household debt is more than 85% of GDP.
شطب الديون بموجب اتفاق دولي
In 2015 Hans-Werner Sinn, president of German Ifo Institute for Economic Research, called for a debt relief for Greece.[151] In addition, economists from London School of Economics suggested a debt relief similar to the London agreement. In 1953, private sector lenders as well as governments agreed to write off about half of West Germany’s outstanding debt; this was followed by the beginning of Germany's "economic miracle" (or Wirtschaftswunder). According to this agreement, West Germany had to make repayments only when it was running a trade surplus, that is "when it had earned the money to pay up, rather than having to borrow more, or dip into its foreign currency reserves. Its repayments were also limited to 3% of export earnings." As LSE researchers note, this had the effect that, Germany’s creditors had an incentive to buy the country’s goods, so that it would be able to afford to pay them.[152]
جدل
The European bailouts are largely about shifting exposure from banks and others, who otherwise are lined up for losses on the sovereign debt they have piled up, onto European taxpayers.[153][154][155][156][157][158]
انتهاكات معاهدة الاتحاد الأوروپي
- No bail-out clause
The EU's Maastricht Treaty contains juridical language that appears to rule out intra-EU bailouts. First, the "no bail-out" clause (Article 125 TFEU) ensures that the responsibility for repaying public debt remains national and prevents risk premiums caused by unsound fiscal policies from spilling over to partner countries. The clause thus encourages prudent fiscal policies at the national level.
وكالات التقييم الائتماني
The international US-based credit rating agencies—Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch—which have already been under fire during the housing bubble[159][160] and the Icelandic crisis[161][162]—have also played a central and controversial role[163] in the current European bond market crisis.[164] On one hand, the agencies have been accused of giving overly generous ratings due to conflicts of interest.[165] On the other hand, ratings agencies have a tendency to act conservatively, and to take some time to adjust when a firm or country is in trouble.[166] In the case of Greece, the market responded to the crisis before the downgrades, with Greek bonds trading at junk levels several weeks before the ratings agencies began to describe them as such.[167]
الإعلام
Some in the Greek, Spanish, and French press and elsewhere spread conspiracy theories that claimed that the U.S. and Britain were deliberately promoting rumors about the euro in order to cause its collapse or to distract attention from their own economic vulnerabilities. The Economist rebutted these "Anglo-Saxon conspiracy" claims, writing that although American and British traders overestimated the weakness of southern European public finances and the probability of the breakup of the eurozone breakup, these sentiments were an ordinary market panic, rather than some deliberate plot.[168]
المضاربون
Both the Spanish and Greek Prime Ministers have accused financial speculators and hedge funds of worsening the crisis by short selling euros.[169][170] German chancellor Merkel has stated that "institutions bailed out with public funds are exploiting the budget crisis in Greece and elsewhere".[171]
تكهنات حول تفكك منطقة اليورو
Some economists, mostly from outside Europe and associated with Modern Monetary Theory and other post-Keynesian schools, condemned the design of the euro currency system from the beginning because it ceded national monetary and economic sovereignty but lacked a central fiscal authority. When faced with economic problems, they maintained, "Without such an institution, EMU would prevent effective action by individual countries and put nothing in its place."[172][173] US economist Martin Feldstein went so far to call the euro "an experiment that failed".[174] Some non-Keynesian economists, such as Luca A. Ricci of the IMF, contend that the eurozone does not fulfil the necessary criteria for an optimum currency area, though it is moving in that direction.[175][176]
الدين البغيض
Some protesters, commentators such as Libération correspondent Jean Quatremer and the Liège-based NGO Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt (CADTM) allege that the debt should be characterised as odious debt.[177] The Greek documentary Debtocracy,[178] and a book of the same title and content examine whether the recent Siemens scandal and uncommercial ECB loans which were conditional on the purchase of military aircraft and submarines are evidence that the loans amount to odious debt and that an audit would result in invalidation of a large amount of the debt.[179]
التلاعب بالديون وإحصائيات العجز
In 1992, members of the European Union signed an agreement known as the Maastricht Treaty, under which they pledged to limit their deficit spending and debt levels. Some EU member states, including Greece and Italy, were able to circumvent these rules and mask their deficit and debt levels through the use of complex currency and credit derivatives structures.[180][181] The structures were designed by prominent US investment banks, who received substantial fees in return for their services and who took on little credit risk themselves thanks to special legal protections for derivatives counterparties.[180] Financial reforms within the U.S. since the financial crisis have only served to reinforce special protections for derivatives—including greater access to government guarantees—while minimising disclosure to broader financial markets.[182]
Collateral for Finland
On 18 August 2011, as requested by the Finnish parliament as a condition for any further bailouts, it became apparent that Finland would receive collateral from Greece, enabling it to participate in the potential new €109 billion support package for the Greek economy.[183] Austria, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Slovakia responded with irritation over this special guarantee for Finland and demanded equal treatment across the eurozone, or a similar deal with Greece, so as not to increase the risk level over their participation in the bailout.[184] The main point of contention was that the collateral is aimed to be a cash deposit, a collateral the Greeks can only give by recycling part of the funds loaned by Finland for the bailout, which means Finland and the other eurozone countries guarantee the Finnish loans in the event of a Greek default.[183]
الأثر السياسي
انظر أيضاً
- 2000s commodities boom
- Crisis situations and unrest in Europe since 2000
- Federal Reserve Economic Data
- الكساد الكبير
- الكساد الكبير في الأوروپي
- List of acronyms: European sovereign-debt crisis
- List of countries by credit rating
- List of protagonists: European sovereign-debt crisis
- Political midlife crisis
الهوامش
المصادر
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- ^ أوروبا تقرّر مساعدة اليونان لإنقاذ اليورو
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We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. The Commission will present Proposals on the basis of Article 127(6) for a single supervisory mechanism shortly. We ask the Council to consider these Proposals as a matter of urgency by the end of 2012. When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalise banks directly.
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We need not just a currency union; we also need a so-called fiscal union, more common budget policies. And we need above all a political union. That means that we must, step by step as things go forward, give up more powers to Europe as well and allow Europe oversight possibilities. (Angela Merkel)
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{{cite AV media}}: Unknown parameter|deadurl=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Kitidē, Katerina; Vatikiōtēs, Lēōnidas; Chatzēstephanou, Arēs (2011). Debtocracy. Ekdotikos organismōs livanē. p. 239. ISBN 978-960-14-2409-5.
- ^ أ ب Simkovic, Michael (2009). "Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008". American Bankruptcy Law Journal. 83: 253. SSRN 1323190.[dead link]
- ^ "Michael Simkovic, Bankruptcy Immunities, Transparency, and Capital Structure, Presentation at the World Bank". SSRN. 11 January 2011. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1738539. SSRN 1738539.
{{cite web}}:|access-date=requires|url=(help); Missing or empty|url=(help)[dead link] - ^ "Michael Simkovic, Paving the Way for the Next Financial Crisis, Banking & Financial Services Policy Report". SSRN. 1 January 2010. SSRN 1585955.
{{cite web}}:|access-date=requires|url=(help); Missing or empty|url=(help)[dead link] - ^ أ ب Neuger, James G (2 September 2011). "IMF Said to Oppose Push for Greek Collateral". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 8 May 2012. Retrieved 5 May 2014.
{{cite news}}: Unknown parameter|dead-url=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help) - ^ Schneeweiss, Zoe (18 August 2011). "Finns Set Greek Collateral Trend as Austria, Dutch, Slovaks Follow Demands". Bloomberg.com. Archived from the original on 9 April 2012. Retrieved 17 August 2013.
{{cite news}}: Unknown parameter|dead-url=ignored (|url-status=suggested) (help)
قراءات إضافية
- Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. and Tausch A. (2016) Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery. Springer International Publishing, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, ISBN 978-3-319-17780-9; https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783319412603
- Foremny, Dirk; von Hagen, Jürgen (2012). "Fiscal federalism in times of crisis". CEPR Discussion Papers. Centre for Economic Policy Research. 9154. SSRN 2155524.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help)CS1 maint: postscript (link) - Nedergaard, Peter; Bang, Henrik; Jensen, Mads Dagnis (March 2015). "'We the People' versus 'We the Heads of States': the debate on the democratic deficit of the European Union". Policy Studies. Taylor and Francis. 36 (2): 196–216. doi:10.1080/01442872.2014.1000846.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help)CS1 maint: postscript (link) - Nedergaard, Peter; Snaith, Holly (September 2015). "'As I drifted on a river I could not control': the unintended ordoliberal consequences of the Eurozone crisis". Journal of Common Market Studies. Wiley. 53 (5): 1094–1109. doi:10.1111/jcms.12249.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help)CS1 maint: postscript (link)
وصلات خارجية
- The EU Crisis Pocket Guide by the Transnational Institute in English (2012) – Italian (2012) – Spanish (2011)
- Eurostat – Statistics Explained: Structure of government debt (October 2011 data)
- Interactive Map of the Debt Crisis Economist Magazine, 9 February 2011
- European Debt Crisis New York Times topic page updated daily.
- Budget deficit from 2007 to 2015 Economist Intelligence Unit 30 March 2011
- Stefan Collignon: Democratic requirements for a European Economic Government Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, December 2010 (PDF 625 KB)
- Wolf, Martin, "Creditors can huff but they need debtors", Financial Times, 1 November 2011 7:28 pm.
- More Pain, No Gain for Greece: Is the Euro Worth the Costs of Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Internal Devaluation? Center for Economic and Policy Research, February 2012
- Michael Lewis-How the Financial Crisis Created a New Third World-October 2011 NPR, October 2011
- Global Financial Stability Report International Monetary Fund, April 2012
- OECD Economic Outlook-May 2012
- "Leaving the Euro: A Practical Guide" by Roger Bootle, winner of the 2012 Wolfson Economics Prize
- Macroeconomic Policy Advice and the Article IV Consultations: A European Union Case Study Center for Economic and Policy Research, January 2013
- Over Their Heads: The IMF and the Prelude to the Euro-zone Crisis, Paul Blustein, CIGI, March 2015
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- التاريخ الاقتصادي في عقد 2000
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