العلاقات عبر مضيق تايوان

(تم التحويل من Cross-Strait relations)
العلاقات التايوانية الصينية
Map indicating locations of الصين and تايوان

الصين
تايوان
العلاقات عبر المضيق
الصينية التقليدية兩岸關係
الصينية المبسطة两岸关系
Alternative Chinese name
الصينية التقليدية海峽兩岸關係
الصينية المبسطة海峡两岸关系
Second alternative Chinese name
الصينية التقليدية臺海關係
الصينية المبسطة台海关系
المعنى الحرفيالعلاقات عبر مضيق تايوان
Third alternative Chinese name
الصينية التقليدية陸臺關係
الصينية المبسطة陆台关系
المعنى الحرفيعلاقات بر الصين بتايوان
Fourth alternative Chinese name
الصينية التقليدية中臺關係
الصينية المبسطة中台关系
المعنى الحرفيالعلاقات الصينية-التايوانية
الأراضي الموجودة حالياً تحت ادارة الحكومتين والتي كانت تسمى سابقاً الصين.
جمهورية الصين الشعبية (بالقرمزي) وتايوان (بالبرتقالي). أحجام الجزر الصغرى مكبرة لتسهيل التعرف عليها.

العلاقات التايوانية الصينية أو العلاقات عبر المضيق،[1] تشير للعلاقات بين بر الصين وتايوان، والذي يفصل بينهما مضيق تايوان غرب المحيط الهادي، وخاصة العلاقات بين حكومتي الصين وتايوان.[2] وبسبب الجدل القائم حول وضع تايوان و مسألة الشرعية الصينية، فإنهما لا يُعرّفوا كعلاقات دبلوماسية من كل الطرفين.

عام 1949، أحدثت الحرب الأهلية الصينية تحول حاسم لصالح الشيوعيين، تراجعت الحكومة الصينية بقيادة كومن‌تانگ إلى تاي‌پـِيْ، في تايوان، بينما أعلنت الصين الشعبية حكومتها في بكين. منذ ذلك الحين، تميزت العلاقات الصينية التايوانية بالتواصل المحدود، التوترات، وعدم الاستقرار. في السنوات المبكرة، استمرت النزاعات السعكرية، بينما تنافست كلا الحكومتين على أن تصبح "الحكومة الشرعية" للصين". في الآونة الأخيرة، الأسئلة حول الوضع القانوني والسياسي لتايوان تركزت حول الأوجه البديلة لاعادة التوحيد السابق مع البر الرئيسي أو الاستقلال التايواني الكامل.

The relationship has been complex and controversial due to the dispute regarding the political status of Taiwan after the island's administration was transferred from Japan to the Republic of China in 1945, and the split between the PRC and ROC in 1949 as a result of the ROC's retreat to the island after losing the Chinese Civil War. The essential questions are whether the two governments are still in a state of civil war over One China, each holding one of two "regions" or parts of the same country (i.e. "one nation, two states"); whether they can be unified under a "one country, two systems" framework; or whether they are now separate countries (either as Two Chinas, or as "one China, one Taiwan"). The English expression "cross-strait relations" is considered to be a neutral term that avoids reference to the political status of either side.

After the Japanese surrender at the end of the Second World War in 1945, the administration of Taiwan was transferred from the Empire of Japan (who had annexed Taiwan as a spoil of war through the First Sino-Japanese War) to the Republic of China, who was one of the "Big Four" of Allied Nations, although questions remain regarding the legal language used in the Treaty of San Francisco. In 1949, with the Chinese Civil War turning decisively in favor of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Republic of China Government led by the Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang, or KMT) evacuated to Taiwan and established a provisional capital in Taipei, while still claiming to be the legitimate government of all of China. The CCP proclaimed the establishment of the Central People's Government with Beijing as the capital, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) subsequently conquered and quelled all of mainland China, although the disastrous landing attempt at Kinmen, the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent American involvement halted any further plans to invade Taiwan. The two sides then entered decades of stalemate and de facto ceasefire with sporadic episodes of naval skirmishes and island shellings, but no armistice or peace treaty has ever been signed, and debate continues as to whether the civil war has legally ended.[3]

Since then, the relations between the governments in Beijing and Taipei have been characterized by limited contact, tensions, and instability. In the early years, military conflicts continued, while diplomatically both governments competed to be the "legitimate government of China". Since the democratization of Taiwan, the question regarding the political and legal status of Taiwan has shifted focus to the choice between political unification with the mainland or de jure Taiwanese independence. The PRC remains hostile to any formal declaration of independence and maintains its claim over Taiwan, citing its status as the only internationally recognized government of all of China since the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971.

The administration of cross-strait relations of both sides are independent from the official diplomatic system. The Taiwanese government established the Mainland Affairs Council led by the Executive Yuan, and China established the Taiwan Affairs Office in both the State Council and the CCP. The communication between both sides are through two semi-official institutions: Straits Exchange Foundation by the ROC side, and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits by the PRC side.

التاريخ

خط زمني

Leaders of the two governments

Chiang Kai-shekYen Chia-kanChiang Ching-kuoLee Teng-huiChen Shui-bianMa Ying-jeouTsai Ing-wenLai Ching-teMao ZedongHua GuofengDeng XiaopingJiang ZeminHu JintaoXi Jinping

قبل 1949

Territories currently administered by the two governments that formally use the name China: the People's Republic of China (PRC, in purple) and the Republic of China (ROC, in orange). The PRC currently actually rules the mainland (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Hainan), while the ROC currently actually rules Taiwan (including Kinmen, Matsu, Pratas Islands, and Taiping Island & Zhongzhou Reef of the Spratly Islands). The size of minor islands is exaggerated in this map for ease of identification.
المقالة الرئيسية: History of cross-strait relations

The early history of cross-strait relations involved the exchange of cultures, people, and technology.[4][5][6] However, no Chinese dynasty formally incorporated Taiwan in ancient times.[7] In the 16th and 17th centuries, Taiwan first caught the attention of Portuguese, then Dutch and Spanish explorers. After establishing their first settlement in Taiwan in 1624, the Dutch were defeated in 1662 by Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong), a Ming dynasty loyalist, who took the island and established the first formally Han Chinese regime in Taiwan. Koxinga's heirs used Taiwan as a base for launching raids into mainland China against the Manchu Qing dynasty, before being defeated in 1683 by Qing forces. Taiwan was incorporated into Fujian Province in 1684.

With other powers increasingly eyeing Taiwan for its strategic location and resources in the 19th century, the administration began to implement a modernization drive.[8] In 1887, Fujian-Taiwan Province was declared by Imperial decree. However, the fall of the Qing outpaced the development of Taiwan, and in 1895, following its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Imperial government ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. Qing loyalists briefly resisted Japanese rule under the banner of the "Republic of Formosa" but were quickly put down by Japanese authorities.[9]

Japan ruled Taiwan until 1945. As part of the Japanese Empire, Taiwan was a foreign jurisdiction in relation to the Qing dynasty until 1912, and then to the Republic of China for the remainder of Japanese rule. From 1928 to 1942, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[10] In a 1937 interview with Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong stated, "we will extend them (the Koreans) our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Taiwan."[11]

In 1945, Japan was defeated in World War II and surrendered its forces in Taiwan to the Allies; the ROC, then ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT), took custody of the island. The period of post-war KMT rule over China (1945–1949) was marked by conflict in Taiwan between local residents and the new KMT authority. The Taiwanese rebelled on 28 February 1947, but the uprising was violently suppressed by the KMT. The seeds of the Taiwan independence movement were sown during this period.

China was soon engulfed in full-scale civil war. In 1949, the conflict turned decisively against the KMT in favor of the CCP. On 1 October 1949, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. The ROC government retreated to Taiwan, eventually declaring Taipei its temporary capital in December 1949.[12]


من الجمود العسكري إلى الحرب الدبلوماسية (1949–1979)

Kuomintang's retreat

In June 1949, the ROC declared a "closure" of all Chinese ports, and its navy attempted to intercept all foreign ships. The closure covered area from a point north of the mouth of Min river in Fujian Province to the mouth of the Liao River in Manchuria.[13] Since China's railroad network was underdeveloped, north–south trade depended heavily on sea lanes. ROC naval activity caused severe hardship for Chinese fishermen.

The two governments continued in a state of war until 1979. In October 1949, the PRC's attempt to take the ROC-controlled island of Kinmen was thwarted in the Battle of Kuningtou, halting the advance of the PLA towards Taiwan.[14] In the Battle of Dengbu Island on 3 November 1949, the ROC forces repulsed their PRC counterparts but were later forced to retreat after the PRC established air superiority.[15] The ROC government also launched a number of air bombing raids into key coastal cities of China such as Shanghai.[16] Other PRC amphibious operations conducted in 1950 were more successful. They led to the Communist conquest of Hainan Island in April 1950, along with the capture of Wanshan Islands off the Guangdong coast (May–August 1950) and of Zhoushan Island off Zhejiang (May 1950).[17] Additional PRC successes included the Battle of Dongshan Island on 11 May 1950, as well as the Battle of Nanpeng Island in September and October of the same year. However, the ROC won the Battle of Nanri Island in 1952 with United States support. In 1953 the communists won the Battle of Nanpeng Archipelago, the Battle of Dalushan Islands and the Dongshan Island Campaign.

After the ROC lost the mainland, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into southern China during the early 1950s.[18] The ROC paid a salary to the guerrilla leader General Li Mi and issued him the nominal title "Governor of Yunnan". Initially the U.S. supported these remnants, and the Central Intelligence Agency provided aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers left Burma, and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands of guerrilla fighters remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements. In northwestern China during the 1950s and 1960s, the Kuomintang Islamic insurgency led by Muslim Kuomintang army officers continued fighting, refusing to surrender to the PRC.[بحاجة لمصدر]

Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises

The Taiwan Strait

Most observers expected Chiang's government to eventually fall in response to a Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the U.S. initially showed no interest in supporting Chiang's government in its final stand. Things changed radically with the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. At this point, it became politically impossible in the U.S. to allow a total Communist victory over Chiang, so President Harry S. Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the ROC and PRC from attacking each other.[19] The U.S. fleet hindered the Communist invasion of Taiwan, and the PRC decided to send troops to Korea in October 1950.[20] The ROC proposed participation in the Korean War but was rejected.[21] During the Korean War, some captured Communist Chinese soldiers, many of whom were originally KMT soldiers, were repatriated to Taiwan rather than China.[22][23][24]

Though viewed as a military liability by the United States, the ROC viewed its remaining islands in Fujian as vital for any future campaign to defeat the PRC and retake China. On 3 September 1954, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis began when the PLA started shelling Kinmen and threatened to take the Dachen Islands.[13] On 20 January 1955, the PLA took nearby Yijiangshan Island, with the entire ROC garrison of 720 troops killed or wounded defending the island. On 24 January, the U.S. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution authorizing the President to defend the ROC's offshore islands.[13] The First Taiwan Strait Crisis ended in March 1955 when the PLA ceased its bombardment. The crisis was brought to a close during the Bandung conference.[13] At the conference, the PRC articulated its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence with Premier Zhou Enlai publicly stating, "[T]he Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States. The Chinese government is willing to sit down to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."[25] Two years of negotiations with the U.S. followed, although no agreement was reached on the Taiwan issue.[25]

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis began on 23 August 1958 with air and naval engagements between the PRC and the ROC military forces, leading to intense artillery bombardment of Kinmen (by the PRC) and Xiamen (by the ROC), and ended in November of the same year.[13] PLA patrol boats blockaded the islands from ROC supply ships. Though the U.S. rejected Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to bomb Chinese artillery batteries, it quickly moved to supply fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles to the ROC. It also provided amphibious assault ships to land supply, as a sunken ROC naval vessel was blocking the harbor. On 7 September, the U.S. escorted a convoy of ROC supply ships, and the PRC refrained from firing. On 25 October, the PRC announced an "even-day ceasefire"—the PLA would only shell Kinmen on odd-numbered days.

الرئيس الأمريكي دوايت أيزنهاور، يركب سيارة مع الرئيس چيانگ كاي-شـِك، ويحيي الجماهير أثناء زيارته إلى تاي‌پـِيْ، تايوان في يونيو 1960.
U.S. President Richard Nixon shakes hands with Premier Zhou Enlai during his visit to Beijing, China in February 1972.

After the 1950s, the "war" became more symbolic than real, represented by on again, off again artillery bombardment towards and from Kinmen. In later years, live shells were replaced with propaganda sheets.[26] The ROC once initiated Project National Glory, a plan to retake mainland China.[27] The project failed in the 1960s,[28] and the bombardment finally ceased after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States.[26] The PRC and the ROC have never signed any agreement or treaty to officially end the war.[29] There were occasional defectors from both sides.[30][31]

Until the 1970s, the ROC had international recognition from most countries.[32](p. 228) The PRC government was recognized by Soviet Bloc countries, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and some Western nations such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Both governments claimed to be the legitimate government of China, labeling the other as illegitimate. Civil war propaganda permeated the educational curriculum. Each side portrayed people of the other as living in hell-like misery. In official media, each side called the other "bandits". The ROC also suppressed expressions of support for Taiwanese identity or Taiwan independence.[بحاجة لمصدر]

The ROC represented China at the United Nations until 1971, when the PRC obtained the UN seat.[32](p. 228)

ذوبان الجليد (1979–1998)

مضيق تايوان.

After the United States formally recognized the PRC and broke its official relations with the ROC in 1979, the PRC under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping shifted its strategy from liberating Taiwan to peaceful unification.[33][34] The PRC moderated its rhetoric, referring to the "Taiwan authorities" instead of "Chiang's clique" and "peaceful reunification" instead of "liberating Taiwan."[32](p. 228) In the 1 January 1979 "New Year's Day Message to Taiwan Compatriots," the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) stated that the PRC would "take present realities into account in accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses."[32](p. 228)

Deng proposed a model for the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC which involved a high degree of autonomy within the Chinese state, similar to the model proposed to Hong Kong which would eventually become one country, two systems. Consistent with Deng's one country, two systems approach, NPC Standing Committee Chair Ye Jianying elaborated on peaceful unification under per his 30 September 1981 "Nine Points Proposal" in which Taiwan would have a high degree of autonomy following unification.[32](p. 228) The Nine Points Proposal also talked of trade, transportation, and postal services as "three links" across the strait and "four exchanges" in the areas of culture, academics, economics, and sports.[32](p. 228)

The ROC government under Chiang Ching-kuo maintained a Three Noes policy of no contact, no negotiation and no compromise to deal with the PRC government.[35](p. 11) However, Chiang was forced to break from this policy during the May 1986 hijacking of a China Airlines cargo plane,[35](p. 11) in which the Taiwanese pilot subdued other members of the crew and flew the plane to Guangzhou. In response, Chiang sent delegates to Hong Kong to discuss with PRC officials the return of the plane and crew, which was seen as a turning point in cross-strait relations.[36][37]

In 1987, Chiang became willing to open up cross-strait economic and cultural contacts.[32](p. 229) That year, the ROC government began allowing visits to China. This benefited many, especially old KMT soldiers, who had been separated from their families in China for decades.[38][39] This catalyzed a thawing of relations between the two sides, but problems arising from increased contact necessitated a mechanism for regular negotiations. From the end of 1987 to June 1995, the two sides frequently exchanged envoys to develop formal and informal institutions and agencies for cross-strait relations.[32](p. 229)

In 1988, a guideline was approved by PRC to encourage ROC investments in the PRC.[40][41] It guaranteed that ROC establishments would not be nationalized, exports would be free from tariffs, and ROC businessmen would be granted multiple visas for easy movement.

In 1990, under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, the National Unification Council was established in Taiwan.[34] The following year, the Guidelines for National Unification were adopted, and the period of mobilization for the suppression of Communist rebellion was terminated. Seeking to negotiate with China on operational issues without affirming the other side's legitimacy, the ROC government created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF),[32](p. 229) a nominally non-governmental institution directly led by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), an instrument of the Executive Yuan in 1991. The PRC established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS),[32](p. 229) directly led by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. This system, described as "white gloves", allowed the two governments to engage with each other on a semi-official basis without compromising their respective sovereignty policies.[42]

On 1 August 1992, the ROC's National Unification Council passed the "Definition of One China Resolution," stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."[32](p. 229)

This resolution became the basis for quasi-governmental negotiations between SEF and ARATS from October to November 1992.[32](p. 229) Led by Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, these talks culminated in the 1993 Wang–Koo summit. Both sides agreed to confer ambiguity on questions of sovereignty in order to engage on operational questions affecting both sides.[43] The ambiguity of the 1992 Consensus allowed the PRC to emphasize that both sides of the strait upheld the position of one China and allowed the ROC to emphasize that it was the one China to which both the mainland and Taiwan belonged.[32](p. 230) This facilitated the improvement of cross-strait relations in the early 1990s.[32](p. 230)

Nevertheless, the rhetoric of ROC President Lee Teng-hui began turning further towards Taiwan independence.[44] Prior to the 1990s, the ROC had been a one-party authoritarian state committed to eventual unification with China. However, democratic reforms reshaped attitudes of the general public, which in turn began influencing policy in Taiwan. As a result, the ROC government shifted away from its commitment to One China and towards a separate political identity for Taiwan.

In January 1995, Jiang Zemin announced the PRC's "Eight-Point Proposal" discussing a gradual process of cross-strait rapprochement and negotiation leading to eventual unification.[32](p. 231) The Eight-Point Proposal emphasized maintaining the status quo, facilitating economic exchanges and the "three links" (trade, transportation, and postal services), and seeking to deter Taiwan from separating from the mainland.[32](p. 231) As long as Taiwan was committed to the One China principle, than the PRC stated that it would consider Taiwan concerns like renouncing the use of force or treating the Taipei government as an equal political entity.[32](p. 231)

In 1995, Lee visited the United States and delivered a speech to an invited audience at Cornell University.[45] In response to Taiwan's diplomatic moves, the PRC postponed the second Wang–Koo summit indefinitely.[46] The PLA attempted to influence the 1996 Taiwanese presidential election by conducting a missile exercise, leading to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.[47][48] Following the crisis and the growing influence of a pro-independence element in Taiwan politics, the PRC increased its focus on modernizing its military to deter Taiwan independence and deter U.S.-involvement.[32](p. 231)

In May 1998, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened a Work Conference on Taiwan Affairs which stated that the whole party and the whole nation should work together for peaceful unification.[35](p. 11) The next month, the ARATS and the SEF resumed contact and the second Wang–Koo summit was held in Shanghai, China.[49] Jiang also received the Taiwanese representatives in Beijing.


القطيعة العدائية (1998–2008)

Lien Chan (first row, fourth from left in background) and Chiang Pin-kung (first row, second from left in background) touring the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing with the Kuomintang delegation to mainland China in 2005.
ثاني زيارة للين چان إلى البر الرئيسي للصين في أبريل 2006.

While Wang Daohan's return visit to Taiwan was scheduled, Lee Teng-hui described cross-strait relations as "state-to-state or at least special state-to-state relations" in July 1999.[50] Lee's two-states theory postponed Wang's visit indefinitely and the PRC issued a white paper entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February 2000, before the 2000 Taiwanese presidential election.[51] In the white paper, the PRC warned against conduct it would view as separatism and stated that the PRC would consider the use of force if Taiwan sought to indefinitely avoid meaningful talks with the PRC.[32](p. 231)

Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected President of the ROC in 2000. Before the KMT handed over power to the DPP, chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Su Chi suggested a new term 1992 Consensus as a common point that was acceptable to both sides so that Taiwan and China could keep up cross-strait exchanges.[52] Chen expressed some willingness to accept the 1992 Consensus, but backed down after backlash within his own party.[53] In his inaugural speech, Chen Shui-bian pledged to the Four Noes and One Without, in particular, promising to seek neither independence nor unification as well as rejecting the concept of special state-to-state relations expressed by his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, as well as establishing the Three Mini-Links. Furthermore, he pursued a policy of normalizing economic relations with the PRC.[54] The PRC did not engage Chen's administration, but meanwhile in 2001 Chen lifted the 50-year ban on direct trade and investment with the PRC.[55][56] In November 2001, Chen repudiated "One China" and called for talks without preconditions.[57] On 3 August 2002, Chen defined the cross-strait relations as One Country on Each Side (namely, that China and Taiwan are two different countries). The PRC subsequently cut off official contact with the ROC government.[58]

Hu Jintao became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in late 2002, succeeding Jiang as top leader of the PRC.[32](p. 233) Hu urged Taiwan's DPP administration to resume cross-strait dialogue on the basis of the 1992 Consensus.[32](p. 233) The PRC also continued applying diplomatic pressure to other nations to isolate the ROC diplomatically.[59] However, during the 2003 Iraq war, the PRC allowed Taiwanese airlines use of China's airspace.[60]

After the re-election of Chen Shui-bian in 2004, Hu's government changed the previous blanket no-contact policy, a holdover from the Jiang Zemin administration. Under the new policy, on the one hand, the PRC government continued a no-contact policy towards Chen Shui-bian. It maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically.[بحاجة لمصدر] In March 2005, the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law authorizing military force for unification.[61]

Lien Chan touring the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum with the Kuomintang delegation to mainland China in 2005

On the other hand, the PRC administration pursued contact with apolitical, or politically non-independence leaning, groups in Taiwan. In his May 17 Statement in 2004, Hu Jintao made friendly overtures to Taiwan on resuming negotiations for the "Three Links", reducing misunderstandings, and increasing consultation.[بحاجة لمصدر] However, the Anti-Secession Law was passed in 2005, which was not well received in Taiwan. The CCP increased contacts on a party-to-party basis with the KMT,[62](p. 138) then the opposition party in Taiwan, due to their support for the One China principle. The increased contacts culminated in the 2005 Pan-Blue visits to China, including a meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan in April 2005.[63][64] It was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[65][66][67]

استئناف الاتصالات رفيعة المستوى (2008–2016)

In 2008, the KMT won a large majority in the legislative election and its candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the following Taiwanese presidential election on 22 March.[68] Ma advocated that cross-strait relations should shift from "mutual non-recognition" to "mutual non-denial".[69] He stated that the relations are neither between two Chinas nor two states. It is a special relationship.[70] Cross-strait cooperation increased during Ma's tenure.[71] During Ma's administration, the two sides signed 23 agreements and held eleven high-level talks.[72](p. 125)

Both Hu Jintao and his new counterpart, Ma Ying-jeou, considered the 1992 Consensus to be the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with the U.S. President George W. Bush, in which he explained that the "1992 Consensus" shows that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition".[73][74][75] There followed a series of meetings between the two sides. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao held a meeting with ROC's then vice-president elect Vincent Siew as chairman of the Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation during the Boao Forum for Asia.[76] On 28 May 2008, Hu met with the KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung, the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties.[77] During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should recommence semi-official dialogue under the 1992 Consensus.[78][79]

قمة چن-چيانگ في تيان‌جين بين ARATS وSEF في أكتوبر 2011

Cross-strait high-level talks between the ARATS and the SEF reopened in June 2008, with the first meeting held in Beijing. On 13 June, President of the ARATS, Chen Yunlin, and President of the SEF, Chiang Pin-kung, signed files agreeing that direct flights between the two sides would begin on 4 July,[80] and that Taiwan would allow entrance of up to 3,000 visitors from China daily.[81] The first direct flights took off on 15 December 2008.[82] On 31 December 2008, Hu stated that both sides of the strait should "make pragmatic explorations in their political relations under the special circumstances where the country has not yet been unified."[32](p. 334)

The financial relationship between the two areas improved on 1 May 2009 in a move described as "a major milestone" by The Times.[83] The ROC's financial regulator, the Financial Supervisory Commission, announced that Chinese investors would be permitted to invest in Taiwan's money markets for the first time since 1949. Investors can apply to purchase Taiwan shares that do not exceed one tenth of the value of the firm's total shares. The move came as part of a "step by step" movement designed to relax restrictions on Chinese investment. Taipei economist Liang Chi-yuan commented: "Taiwan's risk factor as a flash point has dropped significantly with its improved ties with Chinese. The Chinese would be hesitant about launching a war as their investment increases here."

From military aspect, a report in 2010 from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said that China's charm offensive is only accommodating on issues that do not undermine China's claim to Taiwan and that the PRC would invade if Taiwan declared independence, developed weapons of mass destruction, or suffered from civil chaos.[بحاجة لمصدر] President Ma has called repeatedly for the PRC to dismantle the missile batteries targeted on Taiwan's cities, without result.[بحاجة لمصدر] Ma also called on the PRC to embrace Sun Yat-sen's call for freedom and democracy.[بحاجة لمصدر]

In June 2013, China offered 31 new measures to improve Taiwan's economic integration with the mainland.[84]

2014 Wang-Zhang Meeting in Taiwan

In October 2013, in a hotel lobby on the sidelines of the APEC Indonesia 2013 meetings, Wang Yu-chi, Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, spoke briefly with Zhang Zhijun, Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office, each addressing the other by his official title. Both called for the establishment of a regular dialogue mechanism between their two agencies. Zhang also invited Wang to visit China.[85][86] The two ministers met in Nanjing on 11 February 2014, in the first official, high-level, government-to-government contact between the two sides since 1949.[87][88][89][90] During the meeting, Wang and Zhang agreed on establishing a direct and regular communication channel. They also agreed on finding a solution for health insurance coverage for Taiwanese students studying in mainland China, on pragmatically establishing SEF and ARATS offices in their respective territories, and on studying the feasibility of allowing visits to detained persons once these offices had been established. Zhang visited Taiwan between 25 and 28 June 2014, becoming the first ministerial-level PRC official to do so.[91]

In 2014, the Sunflower Student Movement broke out. Citizens occupied the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan for 23 days, protesting against the government's forcing through the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. The protesters felt that the trade pact with China would leave Taiwan vulnerable to political pressure from Beijing.[92] The agreement ended up unratified in the legislature.[93] In September 2014, Xi Jinping adopted a more uncompromising stance than his predecessors as he called for the "one country, two systems" model to be applied to Taiwan.[94] It was noted that the model had not been mentioned by the PRC since 2005, when the Anti-Secession Law was passed.[95]

2015 Ma–Xi meeting in Singapore

On 7 November 2015, Xi and Ma met and shook hands in Singapore, marking the first meeting between leaders of the two sides since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[96][97] They met within their capacity as "Leader of Mainland China" and "Leader of Taiwan" respectively and addressed each other as "mister".[32](p. 236) No major agreements were reached on the occasion, however, a hotline connecting the head of the Mainland Affairs Council and the head of the Taiwan Affairs Office was established at the end of 2015.[98][99]

In January 2016, the opposition DPP won the Taiwanese presidential election.[100] In the transition to a new administration, the ROC Justice Minister Luo Ying-shay embarked on a 5-day historic visit to mainland China in March, making her the first minister of the Government of the Republic of China to visit the mainland after the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949.[101]

Deteriorating relations (2016–present)

Tsai Ing-wen succeeded Ma Ying-jeou as the ROC President in May 2016.

In the 2016 Taiwan general elections, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP captured landslide victories.[102] Tsai initially pursued a similar strategy as Chen Shui-bian, but after winning the election she received a similarly frosty reception from the PRC.[103][104][105] On 12 March 2016, Xi stated that the 1992 Consensus was "the greatest common denominator and political bottom line for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations".[35](p. 13)

In her inauguration speech, President Tsai acknowledged that the talks surrounding the 1992 Consensus took place without agreeing that a consensus was reached. She credited the talks with spurring 20 years of dialogue and exchange between the two sides. She hoped that exchanges would continue on the basis of these historical facts, as well as the existence of the Republic of China's constitutional system and the democratic will of the Taiwanese people.[106] In response, Beijing called Tsai's answer an "incomplete test paper" because Tsai did not agree to the content of the 1992 Consensus.[104] On 25 June 2016, Beijing suspended official cross-strait communications,[107] with any remaining cross-strait exchanges thereafter taking place through unofficial channels.[108]

The Tsai administration blocked former President Ma Ying-jeou from visiting Hong Kong,[109][110][111] but eight non-DPP magistrates and mayors from Taiwan visited Beijing in 2016.[112][113][114] Their visit was aimed to reset and restart cross-strait relations after Tsai took office. The eight local leaders reiterated their support of One China under the 1992 Consensus.

On 10 October 2016 (the ROC's National Day), Tsai stated the New Four Noes: "our pledges will not change, and our goodwill will not change; but we will not bow to pressure, and we will of course not revert to the old path of confrontation".[115](p. 66)

In November 2016, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) made its first circumnavigation around Taiwan.[115](p. 67)

In October 2017, Tsai Ing-wen expressed hopes that both sides would restart their cross-strait relations after the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and argued that new practices and guidelines governing mutual interaction should be examined.[116][117] However, Xi Jinping emphasized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan in his opening speech at the 19th National Congress.[118] At the same time, he offered the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as the government moved to accept the 1992 Consensus.[118][119] Xi stated that people from Taiwan could receive national treatment in pursuing careers on the mainland and in February 2018 the PRC government announced 31 preferential policies for Taiwan people on matters of industry, finance, taxation, land use, employment, education, and health care.[35](p. 13) Among other measures, beginning 1 September 2018 Taiwan people who live on the mainland for six months and have stable jobs are eligible to obtain residence permits.[35](pp. 13-14) By the end of February 2018, 24 provinces and 72 cities had introduced preferential policies for people from Taiwan.[115](p. 72)

Beginning in the mid-to-late 2010s, Beijing has significantly restricted the number of Chinese tour groups allowed to visit Taiwan in order to place pressure upon President Tsai Ing-wen.[120] Apart from Taiwan, the Holy See and Palau have also been pressured to recognize the PRC over the ROC.[121] China was also accused of conducting hybrid warfare against Taiwan.[122][123] ROC political leaders, including President Tsai and Premier William Lai, as well as international media outlets, have repeatedly accused the PRC of spreading fake news via social media to create divisions in Taiwanese society and influence voters.[124][125][126][127]

In a January 2019 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Xi Jinping called for "peaceful reunification with Taiwan" in accordance with the "One China principle" and the 1992 Consensus.[32](p. 240) In Xi's view, the Taiwan issue emerged from China's weakness dating back to the Opium Wars and after World War II, the "two sides of the Taiwan straits fell into a special state of protracted political confrontation due to the civil war in China and the interferences of foreign forces."[32](pp. 240–241)

In response, Tsai emphasized that she has never accepted the 1992 Consensus.[128] Tsai made a shift from not publicly accepting the 1992 Consensus to directly rejecting it, stating that there's no need to talk about the 1992 Consensus anymore, because this term has already been defined by Beijing as "one country, two systems."[129] Tsai, who supported the 2019–20 Hong Kong protests, pledged that as long as she is Taiwan's president, she will never accept the "one country, two systems."[130] In January 2020, re-elected Tsai Ing-wen argued that Taiwan already was an independent country called the "Republic of China (Taiwan)", further arguing that the mainland Chinese authorities had to recognize that situation.[131]

The Taiwanese public turned further against mainland China, due to fallout from the Hong Kong protests and also due to the PRC's continued determination to keep the ROC out of the World Health Organization during the COVID-19 pandemic.[132] The opposition KMT also appeared to distance itself from the Chinese mainland in 2020, stating it would review its unpopular advocacy of closer ties with the PRC. In March 2021, KMT chairman Johnny Chiang rejected "one country, two systems" as a feasible model for Taiwan, citing Beijing's response to protests in Hong Kong as well as the value that Taiwanese place in political freedoms.[133]

The Hong Kong Economic, Trade and Cultural Office in Taiwan suspended its operation indefinitely in 2021, followed by the Macau Economic and Cultural Office.[134] In October 2021, Tsai stated in her National Day speech that Taiwanese people would not be forced to "bow" down to mainland Chinese pressure, and said that Taiwan would keep bolstering its defenses.[135] The PRC denounced Tsai's speech as "incited confrontation and distorted facts", and added that seeking Taiwanese independence was closing doors to dialogue.[136] Following a ban on the importation of pineapples from Taiwan and wax apples in 2021, the Chinese government banned the import of grouper fish in June 2022, claiming they had found banned chemicals and excessive levels of other substances.[137][138]

ROC President Tsai Ing-wen with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on 3 August 2022

On 2 August 2022, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. China perceived her visit as a violation of its sovereign rights on Taiwan, and the PLA announced it would conduct live-fire exercises in six zones surrounding Taiwan from 4 to 7 August.[139][140] The live-fire drills were unprecedented in recent history[140] and took place in zones that surrounded the island's busiest territorial waters and airspace.[141][142] The military exercises involved the usage of live-fire ammunition, air assets, naval deployments, and ballistic missile launches by the PLA.[143] In response, Taiwan deployed ships and aircraft. No military conflict came of this, although it greatly increased tensions between the two countries. China announced an end to the exercises on 10 August, but also stated that regular "patrols" would be launched in the Taiwan Strait.[144][145]

On 10 August 2022, the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office and the State Council Information Office jointly published the first white paper about Taiwan's status since 2000 called "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era". In it, the PRC urged again for Taiwan to unify under the "one country, two systems" formula. Notably, the white paper did not contain a previous line stating that no troops would be sent to Taiwan after unification. In response, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council said the white paper was "wishful thinking and disregarding facts".[146]

Another set of military exercises began on 8 April 2023, after president Tsai visited U.S. Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California.[147][148][149] Beijing called this operation the "Joint Sword". Taiwan reportedly spotted 70 aircraft and 11 ships from China. On the first day of the military exercises, one of the Chinese vessels discharged a shot while sailing near Pingtan Island – the nearest point between China and Taiwan.[150]

In June 2023, Wang Huning, the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, unveiled a plan to transform Fujian province into a demonstration zone for "Taiwan’s economic integration into China".[151] The plan was officially proposed jointly by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of China in September 2023. Under the plan, the Chinese government would boost economic and transportation cooperation with Taiwan and make it easier for Taiwanese people to live, buy property, access social services and study in Fujian.[152]

Taiwan's prosecutions of Chinese espionage cases spiked in 2023, reaching 16 throughout the year. From 2013 to 2019, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau registered 44 espionage cases by China.[153] In September 2024, China sentenced a Taiwanese person to nine years in prison on "separatism" charges.[154] According to the Mainland Affairs Council, this was the first instance of a Taiwanese person incarcerated on such charges.[154]

President Xi requested that President Biden change U.S. language to explicitly oppose Taiwan independence, but the U.S. maintains its current stance, affirming its "One China" policy without altering its wording.[155]

In October 2024 American drone maker Skydio was sanctioned by China after its products were approved for use by fire departments in Taiwan. The Chinese government forbade components suppliers and other businesses in China from doing business with Skydio.[156]

العلاقات شبه الرسمية

الرئيس الصيني شي جن‌پنگ والتايواني ما يينگ-جيوو في سنغافورة، 7 نوفمبر 2015.

في 7 نوفمبر 2015، التقى الرئيس الصيني شي جن‌پنگ بالرئيس التايواني ما يينگ-جيوو في سنغافورة.

في 1 يناير 2019، أثناء كلمة ألقاها الرئيس الصيني شي جن‌پنگ بمناسبة مرور 40 عام على بيان سياسي لتحسين العلاقات مع تايوان، أكد شي دعوة الصين إلى إيجاد طريقة سلمية لإعادة الوحدة مع تايوان، وأضاف أن بلاده تحتفظ في الوقت ذاته بحق إستخدام القوة من أجل تحقيق هذا الهدف. وقال الرئيس الصيني في خطابه إن "الطرفين يمثلان جزءاً من العائلة الصينية"، مضيفا أن "مطالب استقلال تايوان كانت تيارا معاكسا من التاريخ لا مستقبل أمامه". وحذر الرئيس الصيني الشعبي التايوان من الاستقلال قائلا إنه "لن يجلب سوى البلاء". ويرى الرئيس الصيني أن "إعادة توحيد الصين وتايوان أمر لا مفر منه في نهاية المطاف".[157]



تفسير العلاقات

انظر أيضاً: الوضع السياسي لتايوان


بين الحكومات

لقاءات 2008

اللقاء الأول 2008

انظر أيضاً: ميثاق عبر المضيق

اللقاء الثاني 2008

اللقاء الثالث 2014

في فبراير 2014 أُعلن عن مباحثات تايوانية صينية ستعقد في نان‌جينگ الصينية لأربعة أيام. ومن المرجح أن يطرح المفاوضون التايوانيون مسألة تعيين ممثلين دائميين بشكل متبادل بين كلا الحكومتين.[158] لكنهم سيواجهون ضغوطا لطرح موضوع حرية الصحافة بعد أن رفضت الصين السماح لعدد من وسائل الإعلام بتغطية المباحثات. ويقول مراسلون إن من المرجح أن يضغط المفاوضون الصينيون من أجل تحقيق تعاون اقتصادي أكبر.

بين الأحزاب

غير حكومية

الدعم الجماهيري

كابلات الاتصالات

كابلات الاتصالات عبر مضيق تايوان، 2025.

في 25 فبراير 2025، انقطع كابل اتصالات بين تايوان وجزيرة كينمن التابعة لها والملاصقة لبر الصين. وقد احتجز خفر سواحل تايوان طاقم السفينة الصينية “هونج تاي” بعد انقطاع "Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 cable” في صباح ذلك اليوم. الطاقم كله من الصينيين.

0:08
خفر السواحل التايواني يعتلي السفينة الصينية هونج تاي، قرب جزيرة كينمن، 25 فبراير 2025


العلاقات الغير رسمية

الروابط الثلاثة

المقالة الرئيسية: الروابط الثلاثة
الرحلة CI581، أول رحلة مباشرة بين تاي‌پـِيْ وبكين، وكذلك أول رحلة مباشرة بين بر الصين وتايوان: 29 يناير 2005.


الاستثمارات عبر المضيق

انظر أيضاً: اقتصاد الصين and اقتصاد تايوان

التبادل الثقافي، التعليمي، الديني والرياضي

الحراك الإنساني

أوجه أخرى


الحشد العسكري

A map depicting Taiwan and a part of China showing that the Surface-To-Air Missiles coverage of China extends to most of the west coast of the island
China's Surface to Air Missile coverage over the Taiwan Strait in 2006, according to the US Department of Defense.
قاذفة تابعة للجيش الصيني تطير بالقرب من طائرة إف-16 تايوانية.


في 29 مارس 2021، أفادت وزارة الدفاع التايوانية إن عشر طائرات عسكرية صينية بينها مقاتلات دخلت الركن الجنوبي الغربي من منطقة تحديد الدفاع الجوي لتايوان، في تصعيد جديد للتوتر عبر مضيق تايوان. وأضافت الوزارة أن القوات الجوية التايوانية نشرت صواريخ لمراقبة التوغل، دون أن تكشف عن مزيد من التفاصيل. وقالت أيضاً إن طائراتها أنذرت الطائرات الصينية عبر أجهزة اللاسلكي.[159] وفي تقريرها الدفاعي الذي ينشر مرة كل أربع سنوات واطلعت عليه وكالة رويترز للأنباء، حذرت الوزارة من أن الصين تنشر تكتيكات حربية في المنطقة الرمادية لإخضاع الجزيرة التي تطالب الصين بأحقيتها فيها، سعياً منها لإنهاك تايوان بالمناورات والنشاطات المتكررة قريباً من مجالها الجوي ومياهها. وورد في التقرير أن الصين تواصل تحديث جيشها ورفع قدراته. وتعتبر الصين جزيرة تايوان إقليماً تابعاً لها، وصعّدت نشاطها العسكري خلال الأشهر الأخيرة، سعياً منها لتأكيد سيادتها عليها والتعبير عن استيائها من الدعم الذي تقدمه واشنطن للجزيرة. وأورد التقرير أن بمقدور الصين أن تغلق بشكل جزئي موانئ تايوان الرئيسية وممراتها البحرية وتقطع عنها سبل النقل البحري، بينما يهدف نشرها للصواريخ بعيدة المدى إلى منع قوات أجنبية من تقديم دعم لتايوان. وكان رئيس الوزراء الصيني لي كه تشيانگ قد قال في وقت سابق من هذا الشهر إن الصين ستردع بقوة أي نشاء انفصالي يدعم استقلال تايوان.

في 11 أبريل 2021، أفادت مجلة أمريكية إن الصين تواصل تدريباتها العسكرية على جانبي مضيق تايوان، وتقوم مقاتلات وطائرات استطلاع تابعة للجيش الصيني باختراق مناطق تغطية الدفاعات الجوية التايوانية. وتقول مجلة ناشيونال إنترست إن الصين تستعد للحرب حول تايوان، مشيرة إلى وجود تقارير تفيد بوجود أنشطة عسكرية صينية تبدو وكأنها استعداد لعمل عسكري محتمل في مضيق تايوان. ولفتت المجلة إلى قول أحد الخبراء العسكريين من تايوان، إن التدريبات العسكرية التي تجريها الصين تحمل طابعا هجوميا. وأوضحت المجلة أن شكل التدريبات يوحي بوجود نوايا صينية لمحاصرة تايوان من 3 جهات، مشيرة إلى أن وجود أنشطة عسكرية متزايدة في اتجاه الشرق وهو ما يمكن الجيش الصيني من شن هجمات على أهداف في شرق تايوان.[160]

وتكثف الصين، التي تعتبر تايوان جزءاً من أراضيها، نشاطها العسكري حول الجزيرة خلال الأشهر الأخيرة، ردا على ما وصفته بكين بأنه "تواطؤ" بين تايبه وواشنطن، أهم داعم دولي لتايوان. وتقول وزارة الدفاع التايوانية إن الطلعات الجوية الصينية تضم قاذفات قنابل قادرة على حمل رؤوس نووية ومقاتلات حربية، مؤكدة أنها ترسل تحذيرات للطائرات الصينية وتقوم بنشر صواريخ لمراقبتها، بحسب وكالة رويترز.

وتدعي بكين السيادة الكاملة على تايوان الواقعة قبالة الساحل الجنوبي الشرقي من البر الرئيسي للصين، وأرسلت بعد أسبوع من تولي الرئيس الأمريكي جو بايدن، طائرات حربية إلى مناطق قريبة من الجزيرة، مما دفع تايوان إلى اتخاذ إجراءات دفاعية بما في ذلك مراقبة الرحلات الجوية الصينية.

وقال وزير الخارجية الصيني وانگ يي، في مارس 2021، إن مبدأ الصين الواحدة خط أحمر لا يجوز تجاوزه في مسألة تايوان، مضيفا: "لا بد من إعادة توحيد جانبي مضيق تايوان". ويحتل الجيش الصيني المرتبة الـ 3 عالميا، وبينما يأتي الجيش التايواني في المرتبة رقم 22 بين أقوى 139 جيشاً في العالم، وفقا لإحصاءات 2021، التي أوردها موقع گلوبال فاير بور الأمريكي.

عسكريون تايوانيون يضعون أسلحة مضادة للطائرات في نقطة عسكرية على إحدى الجزر الصغيرة تحت إدارة تايوان.


في 13 أبريل 2022، أعلنت تايوان تعزيز موقعها العسكري الصغير في جزيرة دونگ‌يين صغيرة قبالة مقاطعة فوجيان في البر الرئيسي للصين قبل نهاية 2022، مع نشر نظام دفاع آلي قصير المدى محلي الصنع. وتأتي خطة تعزيز القدرة القتالية على جزيرة دونگ‌يين في أعقاب المخاوف التي أثيرت في فبراير عندما حلقت طائرة مدنية صغيرة من البر الرئيسي للصين بالقرب من الجزيرة، وهي جزء من أرخبيل ماتسو الذي تسيطر عليه تايوان.[161]

كانت هناك تكهنات بأن الجيش الصيني كان يستخدم هاربين واي-12 لتكثيف الضغط على تايوان من خلال اختبار إجراءات الاستجابة قبل هجوم محتمل يهدف إلى إعادة الجزيرة التي تتمتع بالحكم الذاتي إلى السيطرة على البر الرئيسي. تقع دونگ‌يين على بعد أقل من 50 كيلومترًا شرق فوجيان وغالبًا ما يُنظر إليها على أنها إحدى الجزر الصغيرة التي قد يستولي عليها جيش التحرير الشعبي قبل شن هجوم على جزيرة تايوان نفسها.

لم تستبعد بكين استخدام القوة للسيطرة على تايوان، التي تدعي أنها جزء من أراضيها، وضغطت على رئيسة الجزيرة ذات الميول الاستقلالية تساي إنگ-ون محاولة لدفعها إلى الموافقة على محادثات التوحيد. في تقرير أرسل إلى الهيئة التشريعية الأسبوع الماضي، قالت وزارة الدفاع التايوانية إن اختبار نظام الأسلحة قد اكتمل، وطلبت من المشرعين إلغاء تجميد التمويل لنشره. وقال التقرير "من المتوقع أن ينتهي الجيش من تركيب السلاح قبل نهاية سبتمبر ومن المتوقع إجراء فحص كامل للنظام والاستيلاء عليه قبل نهاية نوفمبر"، مضيفا أن النظام يجب أن يكون جاهزا للعمل قبل نهاية العام.

خصص الجيش التايواني ميزانية قدرها 725 مليون دولار تايواني (24.8 مليون دولار أمريكي) لسبع مجموعات أنظمة، أربعة منها يجب نشرها في ووتشيو- وهي جزيرة صغيرة أخرى ضمن أرخبيل كيوموي الذي يسييطر عليها تايوان، والمعروفة أيضًا باسم كين‌من، بالقرب من مقاطعة فوجيان - حوالي يونيو، وفقاً للتقرير.

تشمل الصفقة، مع معهد تشونگ شان الوطني للعلوم والتكنولوجيا، أكبر صانع أسلحة تايواني، مجموعتين من أنظمة القيادة والتحكم، بالإضافة إلى بناء الموقع وتركيب المرافق ذات الصلة. قال المطور إن النظام الآلي قصير المدى يتميز بمدفعين آليين تي-75 20 ملم مثبتين جنبًا إلى جنب، جنبًا إلى جنب مع المستشعرات المرتبطة، والطاقة، ومعدات القيادة والتحكم.

قال بعض الخبراء العسكريين إن النظام التايواني يمكن مقارنته بنظام سلاح فلاناكس الأمريكي القريب الذي يمكنه إطلاق النار ضد التهديدات القادمة - مثل القوارب الصغيرة والطوربيدات السطحية والصواريخ المضادة للسفن والطائرات ذات الأجنحة الثابتة والمروحيات - من مسافة قريبة. يمكن تركيب النظام المحلي على مركبات مدرعة وسفن بحرية وفي مواقع أرضية ثابتة. يمكن أن تدور أبراجها 360 درجة بسرعة قصوى تبلغ 60 درجة في الثانية على ارتفاع من 15 درجة إلى 85 درجة. كما يتميز النظام أيضًا بالتعرف على الصور الضوئية على متن الطائرة وتتبع الهدف والتحكم في الحرائق مما يضمن قوة نيران سريعة وشرسة وشريرة ودقيقة، وفقًا للمعهد.

تواردت أنباء لأول مرة من قبل السكان المحليين عن تحليق طائرة صينية من من دونگ‌يين في فبراير. وأكدت وزارة الدفاع التايوانية في وقت لاحق أن الطائرة لم تحلق فوق الجزيرة مباشرة، خلافاً للتقارير الأولية. وقالت الوزارة إن الوحدات العسكرية في الجزيرة اتخذت الإجراءات المناسبة لمراقبة تحركات الطائرة ولن تستبعد احتمال استخدام جيش التحرير الشعبي للطائرة لاختبار إجراءات الاستجابة التايوانية.


الاستقرار السياسي

انظر أيضاً

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قراءات إضافية

كتب

  • Bush, R. & O'Hanlon, M. (2007). A War Like No Other: The Truth About China's Challenge to America. Wiley. ISBN 0-471-98677-1
  • Bush, R. (2006). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1290-1
  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china. Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 261–272. (بالإسپانية)
  • Carpenter, T. (2006). America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6841-1
  • Cole, B. (2006). Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-36581-3
  • Copper, J. (2006). Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China over Taiwan. Praeger Security International General Interest. ISBN 0-275-98888-0
  • Gill, B. (2007). Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-3146-9
  • Shirk, S. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-530609-0
  • Tsang, S. (2006). If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-40785-0
  • Tucker, N.B. (2005). Dangerous Strait: the U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13564-5
  • Wachman, Alan M. (2007 ) Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804755542

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