عن القدر

عن القدر
CICERONIS, MARCUS TULLIUS. De divinatione et De fato, objectnr 47677.JPG
طبعة بوند من عن الكهانة وعن القدر، 1828
المؤلفشيشرون
اللغةاللاتينية
الموضوعالقدر والإرادة الحرة
الصنفحوار
تاريخ النشر
44 BC

عن القدر (باللاتينية: De Fato)، هي أطروحة فلسفية مفقودة جزئياً كتبها الخطيب الروماني شيشرون عام 44 ق.م. لم يتبقى سوى ثلثي العمل، المقدمة والخاتمة مفقودة.[1][2] العمل على شكل حوار، على الرغم من أنه يبدو أشبه بالعرض،[1][3] حيث المحاوران هما شيشرون وصديقه أولوس هيرتيوس.

في العمل، يحلل شيشرون مفهوم القدر، ويقترح أن الإرادة الحرة هي شرط من شروط القدر.[4][5] ومع ذلك، فإن شيشرون لا يتعامل بوعي عند التمييز بين القدرية والحتمية.[6]

يبدو أن "في القدر" هو ملحق للرسالة في اللاهوت المكونة من ثلاثة كتب بعنوان "عن طبيعة الآلهة" وكتابي "عن الكهانة".[7] توفر هذه الكتب الثلاثة معلومات مهمة عن الرواقية علم الكون وعلم اللاهوت.[8]

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التاريخ

De fato is part of the second group of Cicero's writings.[1][9] The work was composed at Pozzuoli between April 17 and May 23 of 44 BC.[1][3] In any case, the work would have most likely been completed prior to Cicero's abortive departure for Greece in July of that year.[1][3] The work was written in haste, as Cicero was planning to return to the political arena.[1][2]


الجدل

Hirtius notes that Cicero has adopted the Academic method of investigation: arguing against all propositions.[10] Therefore, he outlines the positions of Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle as those who maintained that everything happens by necessity. As such Cicero develops the propositions of fate and necessity as follows:

"If all things happen by fate, all things happen with an antecedent cause; and if this is true of desire, it is true also of what follows desire, and therefore true of assent. But if the cause of desire is not within us, desire itself is not in our power; and if this is so, then those things which are brought about by desire are not within us. Therefore neither assent nor action is in our power; and from this it follows that neither praise nor blame are just, nor honours nor punishment"[11]

Cicero essentially dismisses this proposition as antithetical to what is observed, but postulates freedom as a necessity for moral life.[6] Ultimately, Cicero maintains this position as he is emotionally convinced that it is in man's power to achieve virtue for himself; if determinism were the order of things, then such ability would not be true.[6]

انظر أيضاً

المصادر

  1. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح R. W. Sharples. Cicero: On Fate (De fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV.5-7, V (Philosophiae Consolationis). Aris & Phillips Ltd, 1991.
  2. ^ أ ب Preface, iv
  3. ^ أ ب ت Introduction, 5
  4. ^ Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Trans. C.D. Yonge The treatises of M.T. Cicero: On the nature of the gods; On divination; On fate; On the republic; On the laws; and On standing for the consulship. pg. 264. London G. Bell, 1878. Web.
  5. ^ Cicero, De fato. I.
  6. ^ أ ب ت Henry, Margaret Y. Cicero's Treatment of the Free Will Problem. Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 58 pp. 32-42. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1927. Web.
  7. ^ Cicero. On the Orator: Book 3. On Fate. Stoic Paradoxes. Divisions of Oratory, pg. 189. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 349. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942.
  8. ^ Colish, Marcia. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, Volume 1, pg 109
  9. ^ Introduction, 3
  10. ^ Cicero, De fato. II.
  11. ^ Huby, Pamela M. An Epicurean Argument in Cicero, "De Fato" XVII-40.Phronesis 15.1, pp. 83-85. BRILL, 1970. Web.

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