محادثات الحد من الأسلحة الاستراتيجية

"SALT" redirects here. For other uses, see SALT (توضيح).

محادثات الحد من الأسلحة الاستراتيجية (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ‏سالت SALT) كانت دورتين من المؤتمرات الثنائية و المعاهدات الدولية المناظرة بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوڤيتي—القوى العظمى في الحرب الباردة—حول قضية الحد من التسلح. دورتا المحادثات والاتفاقيات كانتا سالت-1 SALT I و سالت-2 SALT II.

بدأت المفاوضات في هلسنكي، فنلندا، في نوفمبر 1969. سالت-1 أفضت إلى معاهدة الصواريخ المضادة للبالستية واتفاقية مؤقتة بين البلدين. وبالرغم من أن سالت-2 أسفرت عن اتفاقية في 1979، إلا أن مجلس الشيوخ الأمريكي اختار ألا يصدّق على المعاهدة رداً على الحرب السوڤيتية في أفغانستان، التي نشبت لاحقاً في ذلك العام. المجلس التشريعي السوڤيتي لم يصدّق، بدوره. الاتفاقية انقضت مدتها في 31 ديسمبر 1985 ولم تُجدد.

A belief commonly held during this time was that the Helsinki negotiations were designed to completely terminate the military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, or result in ultimate cooperation between the two countries. This was not the case, considering neither of the countries were ready to disarm themselves, rendering themselves totally vulnerable to the opposing side.

The talks led to the STARTs, or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, which consisted of START I (a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union) and START II (a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia, which was never ratified by the United States), both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. A successor to START I, New START, was proposed and was eventually ratified في فبراير 2011.

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 سالت-1

الرئيس الأمريكي ريتشارد نيكسون والأمين العام للحزب الشيوعي السوڤيتي ليونيد بريجنيڤ يوقعان معاهدة الحد من أنظمة الصواريخ المضادة للبالستية والمعاهدة المؤقتة للأسلحة الهجومية الاستراتيجية، في موسكو في 26 مايو 1972.

 سالت-2

جيمي كارتر وليونيد برجنيڤ يوقعان معاهدة سالت-2، في 18 يونيو 1979، في قصر هوفبورگ في ڤيينا.

 موقف ريگان من سالت-2

SALT II was devised during the ادارة كارتر. His goal was to continually strengthen the regulations proposed in SALT I and push forward into more advanced future arms control plans. However, when Ronald Reagan took office, he openly criticized the quality of the SALT II plan. According to President Reagan, SALT II contained fundamental errors that needed to be addressed. This open criticism of the past president’s foreign policy plan was an unusual occurrence, and it resulted in the overall rejection of SALT II. It is usually customary for a president to reassess their predecessor’s foreign policy plans and make adjustments based on what is going on in the world.

Despite Reagan’s criticism and SALT II’s inability to become ratified by the US Congress, his administration continued to follow to the terms laid out in the treaty until November 1986.

 بدون سالت

Without the SALT agreements providing stability between the United States and the Soviet Union arms restraints, there would have been the scare of yet another strategic arms race between these two countries. The Soviet Union had deployed some 2,250 nuclear delivery vehicles and were capable of producing and deploying many more missiles by the middle of the 1980's. If this was to occur, the United States would then begin to retain the equipment necessary to build and increase their production of missiles to match that of the Soviet Union. This would increase the costs and security over the United States, nonetheless, making sure that neither side reached ultimate superiority over the other. In addition, the failure of SALT consequently would have led to "increased political insecurity, and the inherent instability of an unrestrained, and more costly, strategic arms competition".

 انظر أيضاً

• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
• START
• New START
• Threshold Test Ban Treaty

 ببليوگرافيا

• Burr, William (ed.), The Secret History of The ABM Treaty, 1969-1972, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 60, The National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 8 November 2001, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB60/index.html
• Calvo-Goller Karin and Calvo Michel, The SALT AGREEMENTS: Content, Application, Verification, Brill, 1987, 428 p, [1] في كتب گوگل
• Clearwater, John Murray, Johnson, McNamara, and the Birth of SALT and the ABM Treaty, 1963-1969 (Dissertation.Com, 1999) ISBN 978-1581120622
• Garthoff, Raymond L., "Negotiating SALT," Wilson Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 5, Autumn 1977, pp. 76–85, JSTOR 40255284
• Garthoff, Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. pgs. 146-223
• Haslam, Jonathan and Theresa Osborne, SALT I: The Limitations of Arms Negotiations. U.S.-Soviet Talks Leading to the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 1969-1972, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1987
• Mahan, Erin R. and Edward C. Keefer (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010),
• Newhouse, John, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973)
• Payne, Samuel B. The Soviet Union and SALT (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980)
• Savel'yev, Alexander' G. and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995)
• Smart, Ian. “The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.” The World Today, vol. 26, no. 7, 1970, pp. 296–305. JSTOR 40394395
• Smith, Gerard C., Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I by the Chief American Negotiator (New York: Doubleday, 1980)
• Smith, Gerard C., Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator (Toronto, Ontario: Madison Books, 1996)
• Talbott, Strobe, Endgame: The Inside Story of Salt II (New York: Harpercollins, 1979)
• United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Intelligence Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee. Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. SALT II : An Interim Assessment : Report of the Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee or Armed Service, House of Representatives, with Dissenting and Supplementary Views, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. Print.
• United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Rev. May 1979.. ed. Washington]: Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communications, 1979. Print. Department of State Publication. General Foreign Policy Ser. ; 308.
• United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Washington: Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication : for Sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. Print. Department of State Publication. General Foreign Policy Ser. ; 308.

 وصلات خارجية

• Text of SALT I
• Text of SALT II
• Text of SALT II (cont.)
• Text of the treaty from the U.S. Department of State
• NuclearFiles.org Text of SALT II 1979
• Arms Control Today: U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control, June 2002.
• Soviet Violations from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives