معاهدة الصواريخ المضادة للبالستية
النوع | Bilateral treaty |
---|---|
وُقـِّعت | 26 مايو 1972 |
المكان | Moscow, Russian SFSR, USSR |
الموقعون | |
الأطراف | |
المصدقون | |
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty في معرفة المصادر |
معاهدة الصواريخ المضادة للبالستية Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty أو ABMT) كانت معاهدة بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوڤيتي للحد من أنظمة الصواريخ المضادة للصواريخ البالستية (ABM) المستخدمة في الدفاع عن مناطق ضد الأسلحة النووية المحمولة بصواريخ. وحسب بنود المعاهدة، فكل طرف كان محدوداً بمجمعين من الصواريخ المضادة للبالستية، كل منهم لا يزيد عن 100 صاروخ مضاد للبالستي.[1]
وُقـِّعت المعاهدة في 1972، ودخلت حيز التنفيذ لمدة الثلاثين عاماً التالية حتى انسحبت الولايات المتحدة بشكل منفرد منها في يونيو 2002.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
خلفية
ABM Treaty
The United States first proposed an anti-ballistic missile treaty at the 1967 Glassboro Summit Conference during discussions between U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Alexei Kosygin. McNamara argued both that ballistic missile defense could provoke an arms race, and that it might provoke a first-strike against the nation fielding the defense. Kosygin rejected this reasoning. They were trying to minimize the number of nuclear missiles in the world.[2] Following the proposal of the Sentinel and Safeguard decisions on American ABM systems, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began in November 1969 (SALT I). By 1972 an agreement had been reached to limit strategic defensive systems. Each country was allowed two sites at which it could base a defensive system, one for the capital and one for ICBM silos.
The treaty was signed during the 1972 Moscow Summit on 26 May by the President of the United States, Richard Nixon and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev; and ratified by the US Senate on 3 August 1972.
The 1974 Protocol reduced the number of sites to one per party, largely because neither country had developed a second site.[3] The sites were Moscow for the USSR and the North Dakota Safeguard Complex for the US, which was already under construction.
الصواريخ المحدود بهذه المعاهدة
The Treaty limited only ABMs capable of defending against "strategic ballistic missiles", without attempting to define "strategic". It was understood that both ICBMs and SLBMs are obviously "strategic".[4] Neither country intended to stop the development of counter-tactical ABMs. The topic became disputable as soon as most potent counter-tactical ABMs started to be capable of shooting down SLBMs (SLBMs naturally tend to be much slower than ICBMs), nevertheless both sides continued counter-tactical ABM development.[4]
بعد إعلان مبادرة الدفاع الاستراتيجي (حرب الكواكب)
On 23 March 1983, Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, a research program into ballistic missile defense which would be "consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty". Reagan was wary of mutual deterrence with what he had recently called an "Evil Empire", and wanted to escape the traditional confines of mutual assured destruction.[5] The project was a blow to Yuri Andropov's so-called "peace offensive". Andropov said that "It is time [Washington] stopped thinking up one option after another in search of the best way of unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it. To do this is not just irresponsible. It is madness".[6]
Regardless of the opposition, Reagan gave every indication that SDI would not be used as a bargaining chip and that the United States would do all in its power to build the system. The Soviets were threatened because the Americans might have been able to make a nuclear first strike possible. In The Nuclear Predicament, Beckman claims that one of the central goals of Soviet diplomacy was to terminate SDI. A surprise attack from the Americans would destroy much of the Soviet ICBM fleet, allowing SDI to defeat a "ragged" Soviet retaliatory response. Furthermore, if the Soviets chose to enter this new arms race, they would further cripple their economy. The Soviets could not afford to ignore Reagan's new endeavor, therefore their policy at the time was to enter negotiations with the Americans.[7][8] By 1987, however, the USSR withdrew its opposition, concluding the SDI posed no threat and scientifically "would never work".[9][10]
SDI research went ahead, although it did not achieve the hoped-for result. SDI research was cut back following the end of Reagan's presidency, and in 1995 it was reiterated in a presidential joint statement that "missile defense systems may be deployed... [that] will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and will not be tested to... [create] that capability." This was reaffirmed in 1997.
الدول التالية للاتحاد السوڤيتي توافق على استمرار سريان المعاهدة
Although the Soviet Union ceased to exist in December 1991, in the view of the U.S. Department of State, the treaty continued in force.[11] An additional memorandum of understanding was prepared in 1997, establishing Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine as successor states to the Soviet Union, for the purposes of the treaty.
انظر أيضاً
الهامش
- ^ Henry T. Nash (1 May 1975). Nuclear Weapons and International Behaviour. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 9028602658.
Each site would consist of 100 ABMs, or a total of 200 ABMs for each country
- ^ Alexander T.J. Lennon. (2002). Contemporary Nuclear Debates: Missile Defenses, Arms Control, and Arms Races in the Twenty-First Century. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0262621663.
Although Kosygin rejected this reasoning at Glassboro
- ^ "ABM treaty reduces US and USSR to one ABM site each". The Nuclear Information Project. FAS. Retrieved 27 May 2011.
- ^ أ ب Ivo H. Daalder (May 1987). "A tactical defence initiative for the Western Europe?". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 43: 37. Retrieved 8 February 2011.
- ^ Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-8157-3060-6.
- ^ "Replies by Yu. V. Andropov to Questions from a Correspondent of Pravda". Pravda. 27 March 1983. Cited in Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. p. 111. ISBN 978-0-8157-3060-6.
- ^ Peter R. Beckman et al., The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons In The Cold War And Beyond, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1992), 183.
- ^ B. Wayne Howell, "Reagan and Reykjavík: Arms Control, SDI, and the Argument From Human Rights Archived 3 أكتوبر 2011 at the Wayback Machine," Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2008, pp. 389–415
- ^ Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War, p. 95, 2008. ISBN 0313352410, ISBN 978-0313352416
- ^ Julian E. Zelizer (2010). Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism. Basic Books. pp. 350. ISBN 9780465015078.
- ^ "Fact sheet: Memorandum of understanding on succession". United States Department of State. 26 September 1997.
Although the ABM Treaty continues in force, it nevertheless has become necessary to reach agreement as to which New Independent States (NIS) would collectively assume the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Treaty.
وصلات خارجية
- Short description is different from Wikidata
- 1972 في الاتحاد السوڤيتي
- 1972 في الولايات المتحدة
- معاهدات الحد من التسلح
- معاهدات الحرب الباردة
- دفاع صاروخي
- تاريخ الولايات المتحدة (1991–الآن)
- معاهدات الاتحاد السوڤيتي-الولايات المتحدة
- حوكمة الأسلحة النووية
- معاهدات أبرمت في 1972
- معاهدات دخلت حيز التنفيذ 1972
- رئاسة ريتشارد نيكسون
- 1972 في السياسة
- معاهدات التكنولوجيا النووية