الجيش الثوري الوطني

(تم التحويل من الجيش الوطني الثوري)
الجيش الثوري الوطني
國民革命軍
Guómín Gémìng Jūn
Flag of the National Revolutionary Army
علم الجيش الثوري الوطني (المعروف بإسم جيش جمهورية الصين بعد دستور 1947)
نشطة1925–1947
البلدFlag of جمهورية الصين (1912–49) جمهورية الصين
الولاءEmblem of the Kuomintang.svg كومن‌تانگ (KMT)
النوعجيش
الدورMilitary ground force
الحجم4,300,000 (total regular)
الاشتباكاتالتجريدة الشمالية
النزاع السوڤيتي الصيني (1929)
المسيرة الطويلة
الحرب الصينية اليابانية الثانية
الحرب العالمية الثانية
النزاع الحدودي الصيني المنغولي
الحرب الأهلية الصينية
القادة
أبرز
القادة		تشيانگ كاي-شك
Zhang Xueliang
Sun Li-jen
Yen Hsi-shan
Feng Yuxiang
He Yingqin
Hu Kexian
Cen Chunxuan
وآخرون كثر
الجيش الثوري الوطني
الصينية التقليدية國民革命軍
الصينية المبسطة国民革命军

الجيش الثوري الوطني (إنگليزية: National Revolutionary Army؛ NRA)، أحياناً يُختصر إلى الجيش الثوري (革命軍) قبل 1928، وإلى الجيش الوطني (國軍) بعد 1928، كان الذراع العسكري للـكومن‌تانگ (KMT، أو الحزب الوطني الصيني) من 1925 وحتى 1947 في جمهورية الصين. كما أصبح الجيش النظامي لجمهورية الصين أثناء فترة الكومن‌تانگ في حكم الحزب التي بدأت في 1928. وقد تغير اسمه إلى القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الصين (中華民國國軍) بعد دستور 1947، الذي نص على السيطرة المدنية على العسكر.

أنشئ في الأصل بمعونة سوڤيتية كوسيلة للكومن‌تانگ لتوحيد الصين أثناء فترة أمراء الحرب، فخاض الجيش الثوري الوطني اشتباكات كبيرة في التجريدة الشمالية ضد أمراء الحرب الصينيين في جيش بـِيْ‌يانگ، في الحرب الصينية اليابانية الثانية (1937-1945) ضد الجيش الياباني الامبراطوري وفي الحرب الأهلية الصينية ضد جيش التحرير الشعبي.

أثناء الحرب الصينية اليابانية الثانية، the armed forces of the الحزب الشيوعي الصيني were nominally incorporated into the National Revolutionary Army (while retaining separate commands), but broke away to form the People's Liberation Army shortly after the end of the war. With the promulgation of the دستور جمهورية الصين في 1947 and the formal end of the KMT party-state, the الجيش الثوري الوطني تغير اسمه إلى القوات المسلحة لجمهورية الصين (中華民國國軍)، بتشكيل معظم قواته جيش جمهورية الصين، الذي انسحب إلى جزيرة تايوان في 1949.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

التاريخ

The opening ceremony of the Whampoa Military Academy, with Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek.
NRA troops against Sun Chuanfang's private army preparing to defend Shanghai.

The NRA was founded by the KMT in 1925 as the military force destined to unite China in the Northern Expedition. Organized with the help of the Comintern and guided under the doctrine of the Three Principles of the People, the distinction among party, state and army was often blurred. A large number of the Army's officers passed through the Whampoa Military Academy, and the first commandant, Chiang Kai-shek, became commander-in-chief of the Army in 1925 before launching the successful Northern Expedition. Other prominent commanders included Du Yuming and Chen Cheng. The end of the Northern Expedition in 1928 is often taken as the date when China's Warlord era ended, though smaller-scale warlord activity continued for years afterwards.

National Revolutionary Army soldiers marched into the British concessions in Hankou during the Northern Expedition.

In 1927, after the dissolution of the First United Front between the Nationalists and the Communists, the ruling KMT purged its leftist members and largely eliminated Soviet influence from its ranks. Chiang Kai-shek then turned to Germany, historically a great military power, for the reorganization and modernization of the National Revolutionary Army. The Weimar Republic sent advisers to China, but because of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles they could not serve in military capacities. Chiang initially requested famous generals such as Ludendorff and von Mackensen as advisers; the Weimar Republic government turned him down, however, fearing that they were too famous, would invite the ire of the Allies and that it would result in the loss of national prestige for such renowned figures to work, essentially, as mercenaries.


Nanjing decade

Immediately following the Northern Expedition, the National Revolutionary Army was bloated and required downsizing and demobilisation: Chiang himself stating that soldiers are like water, capable of both carrying the state, and sinking it. This was reflected in the enormous troop figures with 1,502,000 men under arms, of which only 224,000 came under Chiang's direct control; these, however, were the official figures as Chiang stated later he possessed over 500,000 and Feng Yuxiang who officially possessed 269,000 in reality had 600,000 thus the true figure would likely reach 2,000,000.[1]

During the Northern expedition the KMT formed also formed branch political councils: in theory, subordinate political organs that were under the Central Political councils in Nanjing; in reality these were autonomous political bodies with their own military forces. Feng Yuxiang controlled the Kaifeng council; Yan Xishan the Taiyuan council; whilst the Guangxi clique controlled two: the Wuhan and Beiping; under Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, respectively. Li Jishen, who was related to the Guangxi clique, loosely controlled the Guangzhou council; and a sixth council in Shenyang was under Zhang Xueliang.[2] Chiang was faced with two options one was to immediately centralise the other to gradually do so, in the spirit of the expedition itself which was to eradicate warlordism and regionalism Chiang chose to immediately centralise the branch councils under the guise of demobilisation systematically reducing the regional troop strength whilst centralising them and building up his own strength.[2] This was done in July 1928 with financial conferences calling for demobilisation and military commanders and political officials echoing the call for demobilisation. Chiang called for the reduction of the army to 65 divisions and gathered political support to begin actively reducing troops counts and centralising the army as well as abolishing the branch councils, this threatened the regional leaders and Li Zongren noted that it was intentionally designed to force the regional leaders into action so Chiang could eliminate them.[3]

Central Plains war

Phase 1

جنراليسيمو تشيانگ كاي-شك، القائد الأعلى للجيش الثوري الوطني، بزغ نجمه من التجريدة الشمالية كزعيم للصين.
الجيش الثوري الوطني أثناء الحرب العالمية الثانية

The Guangxi clique rebelled in February 1929 when it fired Lu Diping the governor of Hunan who switched sides and joined Chiang, the Guangxi forces invaded Hunan, however Chiang bribed elements of the army in Wuhan to defect and within 2 months the Guangxi clique was routed, in March the party expelled Bai Chongxi, Li Jishen and Li Zongren and promoted their juniors who sided with Chiang in order to sow dissent within the clique, they later re-grouped and attempted to retake Hunan and Guangdong but were repelled in both provinces.[4][5][6]

Also in May Feng Yuxiang entered the war he was too expelled from the party, once again Chiang bribed his enemy's allies and subordinates Han Fuju and Shi Yousan. Feng's armies were defeated and he fled to Shanxi and announced his retirement from politics, by July Chiang's forces had occupied Luoyang. Having defeated two of his largest enemies Chiang pushed further for demobilisation and announced it would be done by March 1930.[7] This move spurred Feng, Yan and the Guangxi clique to ally to face Chiang as Chiang had taken revenue sources from Yan.[8]

Phase 2

The anti-Chiang coalition had forces totalling 700,000 against Chiang's 300,000. Their plan was to seize Shandong and contain Chiang south of the Long-hai railway and the Beijing-wuhan railway then they would advance along the railway lines seizing Xuzhou and Wuhan whilst southern forces did the same to force a link-up.

The war involved over 1,000,000 of which 300,000 became casualties. Chiang's forces proved themselves capable even when outnumbered routing the southern forces by July, however in the north Chiang's forces were defeated and he himself narrowly avoided capture in June only when the northern forces stopped due to the defeat of the southern forces did the north stabilise. Chiang began negotiations for peace with Zhang as an intermediary however Feng and Yan believing themselves to be on the verge of victory refused. Chiang had utilised the lull in action to gather strength and begin counteroffensives along the railways north aided by the closure of fighting in Bengbu by September Chiang was again closing in on Luoyang and this along with bribes spurred Zhang Xueliang to side with Chiang ending the war.[9]

When Adolf Hitler became Germany's chancellor in 1933 and disavowed the Treaty, the anti-communist Nazi Party and the anti-communist KMT were soon engaged in close cooperation. With Germany training Chinese troops and expanding Chinese infrastructure, while China opened its markets and natural resources to Germany. Max Bauer was the first adviser to China.

The NRA during World War II

In 1934, Gen. Hans von Seeckt, acting as adviser to Chiang, proposed an "80 Division Plan" for reforming the entire Chinese army into 80 divisions of highly trained, well-equipped troops organised along German lines. The plan was never fully realised, as the eternally bickering warlords could not agree upon which divisions were to be merged and disbanded. Furthermore, since embezzlement and fraud were commonplace, especially in understrength divisions (the state of most of the divisions), reforming the military structure would threaten divisional commanders' "take". Therefore, by July 1937 only eight infantry divisions had completed reorganization and training. These were the 3rd, 6th, 9th, 14th, 36th, 87th, 88th, and the Training Division.

Another German general, Alexander von Falkenhausen, came to China in 1934 to help reform the army.[10] However, because of Nazi Germany's later cooperation with the Empire of Japan, he was later recalled in 1937.

Second Sino-Japanese war

A Chinese propaganda poster depicting the National Revolutionary Army.

For a time, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the National Revolutionary Army, forming the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army units, but this co-operation later fell apart. Women were also part of the army's corps during the war. In 1937 Soong Mei-ling encouraged women to support the Second Sino-Japanese War effort, by forming battalions, such as the Guangxi Women's Battalion.[11][12]

Troops in India and Burma during World War II included the Chinese Expeditionary Force (Burma), the Chinese Army in India called X Force, and Chinese Expeditionary Force in Yunnan, called Y Force.[13]

The US government repeatedly threatened to cut off aid to China during World War 2 unless they handed over total command of all Chinese military forces to the US. After considerable stalling, the arrangement only fell through due to a particularly insulting letter from the Americans to Chiang.[14] By the end of the war, US influence over the political, economic, and military affairs of China were greater than any foreign power in the last century, with American personnel appointed in every field, such as the Chief of Staff of the Chinese military, management of the Chinese War Production Board and Board of Transport, trainers of the secret police, and Chiang's personal advisor. Sir George Sansom, British envoy to the US, reported that many US military officers saw US monopoly on Far Eastern trade as a rightful reward for fighting the Pacific war,[15] a sentiment echoed by US elected officials.[16]

After the drafting and implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of China in 1947, the National Revolutionary Army was transformed into the ground service branch of the Republic of China Armed Forces – the Republic of China Army (ROCA).[17]

الرتب

المقالة الرئيسية: Military ranks of the Republic of China (1912–1949)

Commissioned officer ranks

The rank insignia of commissioned officers.

Rank group General officers Senior commissioned officers Junior commissioned officers
Early 1929[18] ROCA OF-09(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-08(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-07(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-06(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-05(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-04(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-03(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-02(Early 1929).png ROCA OF-01(Early 1929).png ROCA WO(Early 1929).png
1929-1936[18] ROCA OF-09(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-08(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-07(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-06(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-05(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-04(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-03(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-02(1929-1936).png ROCA OF-01(1929-1936).png ROCA WO(1929-1936).png
1936-1946[19][20] Tiwan-Army-OF-10 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-9 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-8 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-7 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-5 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-4 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-3 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-2 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-1b (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OF-1a (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-WO (1928).svg
Title 特級上將
Tèjí shàngjiàng 		一級上將
Yījí shàngjiàng 		二級上將
Èrjí shàngjiàng 		中將
Zhōngjiàng 		少將
Shàojiàng 		上校
Shàngxiào 		中校
Zhōngxiào 		少校
Shàoxiào 		上尉
Shàngwèi 		中尉
Zhōngwèi 		少尉
Shàowèi 		准尉
Zhǔnwèi


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other ranks

The rank insignia of non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.

Rank group Non-commissioned officers Soldiers
Early 1929[18] ROCA OR-06(Early 1929).png ROCA OR-05(Early 1929).png ROCA OR-04(Early 1929).png ROCA OR-03(Early 1929).png ROCA OR-02(Early 1929).png ROCA OR-01(Early 1929).png
1929-1936[18] ROCA OR-06(1929-1936).png ROCA OR-05(1929-1936).png ROCA OR-04(1929-1936).png ROCA OR-03(1929-1936).png ROCA OR-02(1929-1936).png ROCA OR-01(1929-1936).png
1936-1946[20] Tiwan-Army-OR-6 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OR-5 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OR-4 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OR-3 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OR-2 (1928).svg Tiwan-Army-OR-1 (1928).svg
Title 上士
Shàngshì 		中士
Zhōngshì 		下士
Xiàshì 		上等兵
Shàngděngbīng 		一等兵
Yīděngbīng 		二等兵
Èrděngbīng

الفرق التي ترعاها أمريكا

Y-Force

T.V. Soong at the behest of Chiang negotiated US sponsorship of 30 Chinese divisions which were to be designated assault divisions due to the fall of Burma. This plan was adopted concurrently with Y-Force which was the Chinese army in Burma.[21] The divisions of Y-Force were similar to the 1942 divisions’ organisation. With the addition of extra staff especially in communications as well as an anti-tank rifle squad with 2 anti-tank rifles, radios were issued as were bren guns with the number of mortars raised form 36 to 54 to accommodate the lack of heavy artillery. The demands of the Chinese Military Affairs Commission to add additional support staff and divisional artillery were all rejected by the Americans and the idea of a centralised Y-force with the 30 divisions being grouped together was never realised. General Chen Cheng commanded the largest contingent of 15 divisions, Long Yun commanded 5 and 9 under Chiang himself.[21] Prior to the Salween offensive each division was allotted 36 bazookas though actual numbers ran below requirements and rockets were in short supply.[22]

Long Yun the Warlord and Governor of Yunnan inspects the members of the Chinese expeditionary Force.
Y-Force Strength March 1943[21]
Army Old Strength New Strength Actual Strength Reinforcements

en route

Chinese expeditionary Force(Chen Cheng)
XI Group Army 107,200 124,300 55,550 49,000
XX Group Army 56,400 61,100 30,600 15,000
Total 163,600 185,400 86,100 64,000
Yunnan-Indochina Force(Long Yun)
I Group Army 20,400 20,400 15,650 4,650
IX Group Army 56,400 71,400 18,400 9,290
Total 66,800 91,800 34,050 13,940
Reserve Army(Chiang)
V Group Army 125,200 131,220 86,785 37,269
Grand Total 355,600 408,420 206,935 115,209

The Chinese army due to sustained combat was grossly under-strength and whilst Chiang promised over 110,000 additional reinforcements. Further reinforcements after this were not forthcoming due to ongoing combat. Nonetheless, Y-Force grew to over 300,000 men with rifles, mortars and machine guns in abundance.[22]

A Y-force division contained 10,790 officers and men with 4,174 rifles, 270 submachine guns, 270 light machine guns, 54 medium machine guns. 27 AT rifles, 36 bazookas, 81 60mm mortars and 30 82mm mortars this was a large improvement over the 1942 division especially in terms of equipment with some divisions additionally receiving Anti-tank companies with guns ranging from 20-47mm. The army troops of a Y-force army contained over 3,000 horses and mules and 16 trucks with 8,404 officers and men with 21 additional machine guns and an artillery battalion with 12 guns and an anti-tank battalion with 4 guns though due to supply limitations over The Hump artillery and anti-tank weaponry did not arrive in large quantities until late 1943 and early 1944.[23]

Chinese troops operating Stuart tanks in Burma a feat only possible due to the commitment of troops and material to the Burma theatre by the Western Allies and China.


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30 Division Force

General Stilwell envisioned a 90 division strong regular army the first 30 divisions being the aforementioned Y-Force which would re-open the Burma road which would allow for the formation of the next 30 divisions via direct supply delivery. The remaining 30 divisions would be garrison divisions with a reduced force the remainder of the Chinese army would be gradually demobilised or used to fill out the new forces and act as replacements to save resources and supplies. In July 1943 the US War Department agreed to equip the first 30 divisions and 10% of the second batch to facilitate its training which was to be named Z-Force. Stilwell wished to consolidate the existing forces in east China into 30 divisions per the plan but was rebuffed by the Chinese who wanted the lend lease to be used by existing forces. Stilwell persisted and proposed again his 90 division plan with an additional 1-2 armoured divisions with all forces to be ready assuming the opening of the Burma road by January 1945. However, after the Cairo conference the British and Americans did not agree to an amphibious landing in Burma to support an offensive by Y-Force so the plan was dropped as the Burma road would not be opened anytime soon as long as the Japanese remained there.[24]

US Sponsored armies and their condition by late 1945[24]
Army

(with 3 divisions)

Strength %

equipped

Combat

efficiency

Location
New 1st Army 43,231 100% Excellent Gaoling,Guangxi
2nd Army 23,545 100% Satisfactory Baoshan, Yunnan
5th Army 35,528 88% Satisfactory Kunming, Yunnan
New 6th Army 43,519 100% Excellent Zhijiang, Hubei
8th Army 34,942 93% Satisfactory Bose, Guangxi
13th Army 30,677 88% Satisfactory Lipu, Guangxi
18th Army 30,106 99% Very Satisfactory Yuanling, Hunan
53rd Army 34,465 30% Unknown Midu, Yunnan
54th Army 31,285 100% Satisfactory Wunming, Guangxi
71st Army 30,547 96% Very Satisfactory Liuzhou, Guangxi
73rd Army 28,963 100% Satisfactory Xinhua, Hunan
74th Army 32,166 100% Very satisfactory Shanshuwan, Sichuan
94th Army 37,531 79% Very Satisfactory Guilin, Guangxi
Total 436,505

الموردون الأجانب

انظر أيضاً

الهامش

  1. ^ Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 132–133. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  2. ^ أ ب Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  3. ^ Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 134–137. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  4. ^ Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 137. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  5. ^ Jowett, Philip S. (2017). The bitter peace: conflict in China 1928-37. Gloucester, UK: Amberley. pp. 49–52. ISBN 978-1-4456-5192-7.
  6. ^ Jowett, Philip S. (2017). The bitter peace: conflict in China 1928-37. Gloucester, UK: Amberley. p. 58. ISBN 978-1-4456-5192-7.
  7. ^ Jowett, Philip S. (2017). The bitter peace: conflict in China 1928-37. Gloucester, UK: Amberley. pp. 52–55. ISBN 978-1-4456-5192-7.
  8. ^ Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 138. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  9. ^ Van de Ven, Hans J. (2003). War and nationalism in China, 1925-1945. RoutledgeCurzon studies in the modern history of Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 139. ISBN 978-0-415-14571-8.
  10. ^ Liang, Hsi-Huey (1978). The Sino-German Connection: Alexander Von Falkenhausen Between China and Germany 1900-1941 (in الإنجليزية). Van Gorcum. ISBN 9789023215547.
  11. ^ Chung, Mary Keng Mun (2005). Chinese Women in Christian Ministry: An Intercultural Study (in الإنجليزية). Peter Lang. ISBN 978-0-8204-5198-5.
  12. ^ Women of China (in الإنجليزية). Foreign Language Press. 2001.
  13. ^ See for example Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, [1]United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater, United States Army, 1952
  14. ^ Taylor, Jay. 2009. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts ISBN 978-0-674-03338-2, pp. 277-292
  15. ^ Lanxin Xiang (1995). Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945-1950. M.E. Sharpe. pp. 23–24. ISBN 1563244608.
  16. ^ Michael L. Krenn (1998). Race and U.S. Foreign Policy from 1900 Through World War II. Taylor and Francis. p. 171-172, 347. ISBN 9780815329572.
  17. ^ "National Revolutionary Army Summary – China's Military in WWII". Totally History (in الإنجليزية الأمريكية). 2013-06-07. Retrieved 2018-05-20.
  18. ^ أ ب ت ث 吳尚融 (2018). 中國百年陸軍軍服1905~2018. Taiwan, ROC: 金剛出版事業有限公司. p. 154. ISBN 978-986-97216-1-5.
  19. ^ DI (15 June 2015). "World War 2 Allied Officers Rank Insignia". Daily Infographics. Archived from the original on 17 October 2017. Retrieved 6 May 2018.
  20. ^ أ ب Mollo 2001, p. 192.
  21. ^ أ ب ت Ness, Leland S.; Shih, Bin (2016). Kangzhan: guide to Chinese ground forces 1937-1945. Solihull, West Midlands, England: Helion & Company. pp. 160–165. ISBN 978-1-910294-42-0.
  22. ^ أ ب Ness, Leland S.; Shih, Bin (2016). Kangzhan: guide to Chinese ground forces 1937-1945. Solihull, West Midlands, England: Helion & Company. pp. 165–170. ISBN 978-1-910294-42-0.
  23. ^ Ness, Leland (2016). Kangzhan Guide to Chinese Ground Forces 1937-45. Helion. pp. 169–174. ISBN 9781912174461.
  24. ^ أ ب Ness, Leland (2016). Kangzhan Guide to Chinese Ground Forces 1937–45. Helion. pp. 175–186. ISBN 9781912174461.

وصلات خارجية

Zhongwen.svg هذه المقالة تحتوي على نصوص بالصينية.
بدون دعم الإظهار المناسب, فقد ترى علامات استفهام ومربعات أو رموز أخرى بدلاً من الحروف الصينية.

قالب:National Revolutionary Army

تمّ الاسترجاع من "https://www.marefa.org/w/index.php?title=الجيش_الثوري_الوطني&oldid=4024040"