معاهدة هاي-هيران
The Hay–Herrán Treaty was a treaty signed on January 22, 1903, between United States Secretary of State John M. Hay of the United States and Tomás Herrán of Colombia. Had it been ratified, it would have allowed the United States a renewable lease of 100 years on a six-mile-wide strip across the isthmus of Panama (then part of Colombia) for $10 million and an annual payment of $250,000, both payments being in gold coin.[1][2][3] It was ratified by the United States Senate on March 14, but it was not ratified by the Senate of Colombia, so it had no effect.
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خلفية
At the end of the first half of the 19th century , according to the Cuban internationalist Raúl de Cárdenas, 3 thanks to the successive acquisitions of Louisiana in 1803, Florida in 1819 and Texas in 1845, the United States remained owners of the entire northern coast of the Gulf. of Mexico , occupying Spain 's former privileged position in what would then be called the American Mediterranean . But the domain of the geographical region was shared with Great Britain , which was owner of the Bahamas , the Lesser Antilles and Jamaica , and on the mainland part of the Guianas and Belize and Mosquitos.
Despite there being no immediate reason for rivalry, the construction of a canal that would speed up transit between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans , an idea almost conceived since the discovery itself , was a company that would confront the two powers sooner or later.
For its part , New Granada , not considering the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 as a sufficient guarantee, harbored fear of England , due to the seizure of the Malvinas Islands from Argentina in 1770, and the most recent appropriation of the Mosquitia , carried out by Sir Gregor MacGregor, who in 1824 called it “Namville Neustrie”. Additionally, in 1825, the English took over the town of Bocas del Toro , establishing their sovereignty over part of what is now Panamanian soil and subsequently establishing factories in the port of San Juan del Norte and the Nicaraguan coast.
Due to the strategic importance of the Gulf of Darién , New Granada in 1822 and 1826 began to receive proposals to build an interoceanic canal through Panama, but none of them prospered due to the conviction of Bogotá , which considered that the route should be built with own resources and administered by local authorities. 5
Incidentally, in 1835 when the brig Beagle with a scientific expedition under the command of the English Captain Henslow, whose crew included the later famous Charles Darwin , arrived at the Pearl Archipelago , the Granadans, warned as they were against the English, sent a garrison to guard the islands, which meant that the Anglo-Saxons did not delay their visit.
In a resolution of March 3, 1835, the president of the United States was given the power to seek negotiations with Central America and New Granada in search of a route that would open Atlantic-Pacific transit, with a spirit of universal navigation on the part of all nations, stipulating reasonable tolls, to remunerate private corporations that wish to undertake the task of constructing the infrastructure necessary for such a task. It was in this way that Colonel Charles Beagle was commissioned by the president of the time, Andrew Jackson , to carry out studies of the Nicaragua route , but he finally ended up obtaining a concession, previously granted to Baron Charles de Thierry, to make a railway connection through the Darién route (isthmus of Panama), in negotiations with Bogotá. However, Mr. Beagle died before undertaking the project.
By similar resolution, in 1839, President Martin Van Buren appointed John L. Stephens, with a mission similar to that of Beagle, ultimately recommending the route through the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua as the optimal route for the canal. interoceanic, with a cost that was estimated at US$25,000,000 at that time: thus it was established that only the Nicaragua and Panama routes would make the project viable. 6 This determination, added to the California gold rush in the middle of the century, and the wave of emigrants looking for safe routes to reach the Pacific, gave rise to an everlasting rivalry between Panama and Nicaragua.
Given the facts indicative of a British expansionist policy in the area, and feeling powerless to neutralize it, when the American government invited New Granada to celebrate a Treaty of Peace, Navigation and Commerce, it considered it convenient. The Granada intention was to guarantee the sovereignty of the isthmus in perpetuity, making it safe from French predominance and British ambitions.
After unsuccessful efforts by American diplomacy, in 1846 the treaty was finally concluded, signed by the charge d'affaires in Bogotá, Benjamín A. Bidlack, and the secretary of foreign relations of New Granada, Manuel María Mallarino . This treaty expressed the intention to undertake the construction of a canal in the future, and its navigation with equal rights of way between Grenadian and American citizens, as well as guaranteeing that New Granada would be sovereign over its territory. 7 On June 10, 1848, when the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Bogotá was carried out in Washington , several powers protested, including Great Britain, which then claimed rights over Nicaragua.
Despite violating the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, by ignoring the recent occupation of Tigre Island by the British, the terminal point of a possible canal route and against the growing American popular indignation, with a conciliatory spirit, the general Taylor sought and finally agreed to a treaty with Great Britain, Clayton-Bulwer , ratified in July 1850, which would spark bitter controversy for decades to come; For many, the agreement only legitimized the existing status quo regarding British appropriations in Central America. 8
In May 1850, the construction of the railway across the isthmus of Panama began, by the " Panama Railroad Company " consortium, exclusively with New Granada, 9 stipulating a period of operations by the corporation of forty and nine years from the date of completion of the work, which would conclude in January 1855. This railway would be the precursor of the canal, by opening the stretch of virgin forest necessary to connect the two oceans. 10
In his work, The Panama Railway and its History , Professor Ernesto Castillero Pimental asserted:
الحرب
مقالة مفصلة: قناة نيكاراگوا
If the Americans decided to build the canal through Nicaragua, the French would lose their investment, close to 250 million dollars. On January 26, 1896, the president of the New Canal Company, Maurice Hautin, had called on the services of William Nelson Cromwell , a skilled and versatile New York lawyer, who had been general counsel of the Panama Railroad Company since 1893, and who maintained an important influence in the upper echelons of Washington, with the aim of convincing the US to buy the rights of the French company, which was going through economic difficulties. Cromwell informed him that the US government was convinced that building a canal through Panama was a chimerical undertaking and its realization was impossible.
In early 1898, with a conflagration between the United States and Spain already imminent , the US sent the battleship Oregon to join the Atlantic fleet. Starting from San Francisco and circumnavigating Cape Horn , to reach her objective, the battleship would spend two months reaching her destination, traveling 13,500 nautical miles , to participate in the bombardment of Santiago de Cuba .
When on December 2, 1898, Cromwell traveled to Washington, he found that politicians and businessmen had already decided to build the Nicaragua canal and even found decrees stipulating the creation of the Maritime Canal Co. , a private company, to build the canal through that route. Senator John Tyler Morgan, of Louisiana, championed the project in this regard. 20
Although Cromwell had requested and held a conference with President McKinley , expressing his interests, contrary to his advice and as a result of the Oregon experience , on December 7, 1898, President William McKinley spoke in a message to Congress about of how imperative the control of transit between east and west was for the expansion of commercial and continental power, reaffirming Senator Morgan's project. 21
Meeting with curt rejection from Senator Morgan, Cromwell turned to his Republican Party influences , to whom he had made significant campaign donations, lambasting them for allowing the canal construction projects to be led by Democrats .
In a meeting with the director of the Republican Party Mark Hanna, who at that time did not support the canal through the isthmus of Panama, protecting the interests of the Railway Company that saw strong competition in that company, Cromwell offered him a donation of sixty thousand dollars. by the Compagnie Nouvelle , to which Mr. Hanna, without further hesitation, agreed.
Cromwell's maneuvers were denounced by Senator Morgan both in the Senate and in the press. But Cromwell got his revenge by influencing a bill that his friend William P. Hepburn would pass for approval in the House of Representatives at the end of February, which had been careful not to mention a preferential route, while at the same time A shadow of doubt was cast over the project with the Maritime Canal Co. , 22 stripping Morgan and the Democrats of credit.
Morgan counterattacked, introducing his own initiative, resulting in a tie in Congress. Cromwell suggested that in order to resolve the problem, a commission be appointed to evaluate the most appropriate route for the construction of the canal. To the astonishment of public opinion and supporters of the Nicaragua Canal , the Republicans adopted Cromwell's suggestion and withheld the budget that year until their bill was approved, leaving Morgan and the Democrats no other option but to accept his ideas. designs. 20
In this way, in March 1899, Congress enacted a law so that once again the necessary economic and feasibility studies would be carried out in order to determine which of the isthmuses, Nicaragua or Panama, would be more favorable for the construction of the canal, taking into account that at that point it was already expected that the New French Company would not have sufficient funds to complete the work. For this purpose, the corresponding powers were granted to the President to appoint a commission and carry out the provisions of the law. 23 One million dollars from the Treasury reserve were budgeted for this work. 24 However, before the commission was formed, there were already several bills in progress, which gave broad powers to the executive to build the canal through Nicaragua .
It is at this time that the discussion on the inconvenience of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England came into force again , since said treaty, while still in force, conferred equal rights and authority for any of the routes that eventually housed the interoceanic canal to both nations. .
In April 1900, the French made arrangements to negotiate another extension, deferring the deadline for the completion of the canal until October 31, 1910, a deadline that was granted by Colombian President Manuel Antonio Sanclemente، according to Legislative Decree No. 721 of April of 1900, in exchange for $1,000,000, without the consent of Congress. The New French Canal Company actually had no other intentions than to keep the concession in force in the hope of selling it to the US. 25
However, in the negotiations of the Herrán-Hay treaty , this agreement was rejected by Colombia and the date of the previous extension, October 31, 1904, was claimed as the only one in force, from which all the rights and properties of the channel would return to the hands of the South American country. 26
John Hay , the US Secretary of State at the time, would sign a treaty with the British ambassador Lord Julian Pauncefote on February 5, 1900, in order to supersede the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Theodore Roosevelt , who was the governor of New York, would address Hay in a cordial letter, criticizing two particular points of the treaty: the first, the prohibition of fortifying the canal and the second, the invitation made to foreign powers to guarantee the canal, which in his opinion would tend to invalidate the Monroe Doctrine .
Submitted for ratification before the Senate, it was rejected with amendments that reflected Roosevelt's objections, and which in turn were rejected by the British government. Faced with this situation, Hay became angry and resigned from his position. However, McKinley, in a harsh letter, did not accept his resignation.
In this way, Hay began working on another treatise, leaving the incident behind him. Meanwhile Roosevelt had become president, and the new treaty, known as the Second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, was signed on November 18, 1901, ratified by the Senate by 72 votes in favor vs. 6 against and accepted by the British government: the way for the construction of the canal, under absolute American control, was thus clear. 27
Meanwhile, on May 26, 1901, a rumor began to circulate in Paris that 16 American businessmen had signed an agreement to speculate in the shares of the Compagnie Nouvelle , and that they planned to surreptitiously acquire the shares of the company's subscribers, along throughout the country, assuming that for this purpose they would only require 5 million dollars, but that they could resell them to the US for more than 40.
Hutin sent Eugene Oppenheim as an emissary to investigate the matter and he learned of Cromwell's donation to Senator Hanna, on behalf of the French company, without his consent. For this reason, on July 1, 1901, Hutin would send a letter to Cromwell announcing his dismissal as representative of the Compagnie Nouvelle . 20 Cromwell's dismissal would have immediate effects.
The evaluation commission, which had taken office on June 15, 1899, under the direction of Admiral John G. Walker, 28 taking into account the last extension until 1910 for the completion of the work, which Colombia had granted to the New Canal Company, the unacceptable sum of $109,141,500 that it had demanded for its assets 29 and considering a direct arrangement with such company unrealizable, would make it known, in report 30 of November 30, 1901, that:
The most practicable and feasible route for an isthmic canal that is under the control, management and ownership of the United States is the one known as the Nicaragua route . 31 The Walker commission had valued the assets of Compagnie Nouvelle as follows:
البركان
Philippe Bunau-Varilla، a naturally ambitious French soldier with engineering studies , had dedicated his life to the foundations of the Panama Canal. In a controversial subcontracting with Compagnie Universalle, he managed to amass a fortune. When Compagnie Universal went bankrupt he was accused of fraud and ordered to buy $400,000 in Compagnie Nouvelle shares.
He, along with his brother Maurice, owned 11,000 shares, which would mean that if the US bought the Compagnie Nouvelle concession, the Bunau-Varilla would increase their fortune significantly. Since 1900 he had traveled to New York, promoting the Panama Canal route , and even met with John Tylor Morgan, at the latter's home in Washington, in 1901, where they would have a heated dispute that would transcend the press.
After the Walker Commission recommended the Nicaragua option on November 30 , on December 1 Hay signed protocols with the ministers of Nicaragua and Costa Rica to negotiate the canal treaties, as soon as the president was authorized by Congress to acquire the routes that crossed their territories. 35 Since Cromwell was no longer involved in lobbying, all initiatives depended on Bunau-Varilla.
When Bunau Varilla returned to Paris he launched a strong tirade against the company's then president, Maurice Hutin, and the board, causing a scandal that ended in his dismissal, being replaced by a mutual friend of Cromwelll and Bunau-Varilla, Maurice Bo, president. from the Crédit Lyonnaise bank. Two days later, on January 4, 1902, the new board would send a cable to Washington reducing the demand for the sale of the concession and its assets to $40,000,000.
On January 14, when JT Morgan was about to present his bill, he was surprisingly interrupted by Senator Hanna, who stated that Roosevelt , who had recently taken a position after the McKinley assassination, had convened the Walker commission and that he agreed With this, Morgan would have to wait for the president to approve the report. 20
In that week of Monday, January 14, 1902, President Roosevelt asked the Walker Commission to reconsider its decision, in motion to Senator Morison in light of the change in conditions brought about at the last minute by Compagnie Nouvelle's offer to sell its assets for $40 million. Roosevelt required a unanimous decision, and made it clear that he expected the commission to accept the Canal Company's offer. Although Noble, Pasco, and Professor Hauft were initially reluctant, they eventually agreed.
At the same time, the Senate Interoceanic Canals Committee, appointing six members to study the report, regarding the legal aspects involved in the transfer of the property of the New Company, considered that its title was flawed and that it had no power to be transferred. 36
It was finally decided that the Senate Interoceanic Canal Committee would not issue its verdict until all members of the Isthmian Canal Commission appeared to testify. This delay would allow negotiations between the Company, the US and the Republic of Colombia to achieve conciliation on the title issue. 37
The Walker Commission would report on January 18, 1902 that "in view of changing conditions, the Panama route will be the most feasible and practicable route."
It is not clear why Roosevelt decided on the Panama route, but it was the most important decision at the inauguration of his government.
After a seven-month suspension on January 27, the new management of Compaigne Nouvelle renewed William N. Cromwell's advisory services, making it explicit that no “donations or promises could be made to anyone that could compromise the company.” 39 His first strategy was to induce Senator Hanna to delay the presentation in the Senate of the Hepburn bill that had passed the House on January 9.
Based on the Isthmus Commission's supplemental report, Senator John C. Spooner , at Roosevelt 's request , added an amendment to the Hepburn bill, on January 28, to acquire in perpetuity control over a 6-mile strip of the Republic of Colombia , taking into account "the acquisition of the fees, privileges, franchises, concessions, right of transit, unfinished work, machinery and properties of the New Company of the Panama Canal of France for 40 million, and the construction of the canal through the isthmus of Panama, but if the president were unable to obtain for the United States valid titles of possession of the New Panama Canal Company and control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, within a reasonable time and "under reasonable terms then the president could reconsider the Nicaragua canal option." 40
1902 was an unusual year for volcanic activity on the planet. 41 On May 14, a cable arrived from New Orleans announcing that a violent earthquake had shaken the beaches of Lake Managua , adjacent to Nicaragua , and that the Momotombo volcano had erupted, destroying docks in the town of Momotombo, at the Railway Terminal that led to from the lake to Corinth , in the Pacific.
On May 20, Pelée erupted for a second time, obliterating what remained of St.Pierre , and on Saint Vincent Island, south of Martinique , another volcano became active. 43
To clarify these facts, on June 3, and at Morgan's request, the Minister of Nicaragua, Luis Correa, gave him a cable from President José Santos Zelaya that said:
THE NEWS PUBLISHED ABOUT RECENT ERUPTIONS OF VOLCANOES AND EARTHQUAKES IN NICARAGUA ARE COMPLETELY FALSE. 43 In the introductory letter, the minister added that Nicaragua had not had episodes of volcanic eruptions since 1835 when Conseguina released emissions of gas and ash but without lava. 43 Although it is impossible to determine whether Correa actually received the president's cable or was responsible for the information he sent to Morgan, Momotombo had indeed erupted. 43 44
Bunau-Varilla immediately notified all senators that Nicaragua could suffer the same fate. He knew that the Nicaraguan government had released a print run of postage stamps showing the imposing Momotombo expelling lava. The Frenchman bought a good quantity of these stamps, from the distributor in New York, and placed them in the senators' compartments with the note: " Official testimony of volcanic activity in Nicaragua ", in the discussion sessions of Spooner's amendment, 45 during which Senator Hanna, who had not forgotten an earlier French promise of $250,000 for the Republican Party campaign , stood erect brandishing one of the stamps, asking his colleagues if they would be so delusional as to build a canal in the shadow of that volcano . 44
On June 19, 1902, Spooner's amendment passed by 42 votes in favor vs. 34 against. Senator Morgan introduced a substitute appeal to authorize the selection of the Nicaragua route, which was defeated 41:23. Spooner's decree passed 67:6. The House was not satisfied with the Spooner decree, but a meeting was called and reported on June 25, advising the House to ratify the decree. She did so by approving the decree, by 260:8. President Roosevelt signed the decree on June 30, 1902, which became law: The Spooner Act. 46 In the next step, the United States would seek a definitive agreement with the Republic of Colombia .
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المفوضية
For much of the time while the Panama route was being negotiated with the US, Colombia was experiencing one of its most devastating civil wars, later known as the Thousand Day War . Bogotá was still a city isolated from the rest of the world. In the entire country there were no more than 700 km of railway lines and to get to Bogotá from Buenaventura or Barranquilla required two weeks to a month of hazardous journeys. " Due to its isolation, the echoes of the outside world that reached there were weakened by distance ," Bunau-Varilla would write.
The vice president, José Manuel Marroquín had led a Coup d'état against his presidential companion, Manuel Antonio Sanclemente , in an episode known as the cuartelazo , and was seen as an inflexible despot from the stands of Washington.
In order to finance the war, the government had requested multiple loans from foreign countries and was bankrupt. The only hope was that the canal would be built along the Panamanian route, and that the trade and prosperity that the company would bring to the country would provide sufficient funds to remedy the fiscal deficit. However, when starting negotiations, Colombia was not prepared to deal with Washington or to stop the inexorable lobbying of Wall Street figures.
The talks between Colombia and the US were surrounded by a tense and stressful atmosphere. At the end of the negotiations, Roosevelt , being a rude man, referred to Marroquín as the pithecanthrope and even insulted the Colombians by treating them as despicable little creatures , among other insults.
إدارة الدكتور كارلوس مارتينز سيلڤا
During the studies of the Walker commission , Cromwell came to know that according to article 21 of the Salgar-Wyse contract with Colombia, the Compagnie Nouvelle was disqualified from transferring its rights to a foreign country, which led him to consider it a priority to overcome this obstacle so that such rights could be transferred.
During this period there was no representation of Colombia in Washington, all business being handled by the consul general, Mr. Arturo de Brigard from New York . Through Brigard, in an interview held in December 1900, Marroquín was asked to send a minister with the necessary powers to resolve the difficulty.
On the 23rd of the same month, Marroquín telegraphed, confirming the sending of Dr. Carlos Martínez Silva , then Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the end of January 1901, to take charge of the matter.
Martínez Silva, upon his arrival on March 2, 1901, contacted Cromwell, and through a series of interviews with him and his team he explained the Colombian position according to which opinion was against the transfer of the Nueva Compañía, but the administration would consider the possibility on the condition that the terms of the negotiation were sufficiently beneficial for Colombia. 50
According to instructions given by the Colombian government, Martínez Silva should submit a report to the administration, in order to have prior special authorization from the government, in any delicate decision he should make.
Martínez Silva considered that if the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was approved , the negotiations would be futile, since since Colombia was not willing to give up its sovereignty, the US would rule out the option of the isthmus of Panama and would negotiate the Nicaragua route .
Another issue that came up was Colombia 's threat to repudiate the extension of the concession until 1910 that had been made to the Canal company. This extension had been made in the absence of Colombia 's best internationalist lawyer , Dr. Nicolás Esguerra , and signed by Rafael Reyes 's nephew , Clímaco Calderón Reyes , then finance minister, in the Sanclemente government . 50
On April 29, 1901, Martínez Silva suspended the prohibition that the Salgar-Wyse contract stipulated regarding the impossibility of transferring the rights of the Compagnie Nouvelle to any foreign country, in negotiations with the president of the company, with the condition that the terms of the negotiations and treaties with the US were satisfactory for Colombia. 50
However, these efforts were in vain, since the Walker commission, in its first report, decided on the Nicaragua canal , given the unacceptable price that Compagnie Nouvelle sent for the transfer of its assets. 50
When the Compagnie Nouvelle lowered the price to $40,000,000, at which the Walker commission had estimated its assets, and when it was preparing to submit its second report, on January 8, 1902, Martínez Silva wrote to the government, recommending that Colombia should demand from the canal company $2,000,000, in addition to the $1,000,000 they had paid for the 6-year extension, if the project on the isthmus of Panama was chosen. 50
Martínez Silva was accused by his government of having exceeded his power to authorize negotiations between the canal company and the United States, and he was removed from office. 50
In a letter sent to Marroquín by Martínez Silva, on March 11, 1902, other factors of Colombia's internal politics are noted that influenced the decision, as shown in this section:
You tell me that the opinion among "the men who effectively and unconditionally support your government" is not currently favorable to me, thereby clearly giving me to understand that this is another reason that has influenced your mind to remove me from the position you held. I have occupied There are three charges that that group makes against me, and that you point out to me: that I am a political friend of Santiago Samper; having decidedly opposed as a member of the Government the intervention in Venezuela and the purchase of ships, and having shown myself too favorable to Uribe Uribe . 51 Martínez Silva died shortly after his return to Colombia , in Tunja , after having served a prison sentence in Gachalá , for signing a protest against the execution of liberals, sparking rumors that he had been a victim of the hatred generated by his devotion to the cause of the channel.
إدارة خوسيه ڤيسنته كونشا
- مقالة مفصلة: خوسيه ڤيسنته كونشا
On February 28, 1902, Colombia had stated, through its consul in Paris , that it was not willing to allow the title of the Canal Company to be transferred.
Colombia intended to charge the company 50 to 60 million francs for giving its approval, or to cancel the extension until 1910 or, if the previous plans failed, to wait until 1910, to expropriate the company's assets. 53
Replacing Martínez Silva, José Vicente Concha , his political rival, who served as minister of war in the Marroquín government , and who would arrive in New York on February 26, 1902, was appointed.
There being no type of proposal pending between the United States and Colombia at that time , the negotiations for the transfer of the title had stalled. With the excuse of being awaiting instructions from Colombia , Concha evaded for a time endorsing her credentials in Washington .
After trying in vain to get Concha to take the reins of the negotiations without further delay, Cromwell traveled to New York and convinced him that the Nicaragua project would be adopted if Colombia did not neutralize the devastating effects of the Paris declaration.
On March 7, 1902, Concha consented to the issuance of a communiqué which clarified that the notification of February 28 did not imply opposition to the transfer of title, as long as Colombia and the United States reached a satisfactory agreement on regarding their rights to the channel. 53
Finally, Concha presented credentials on March 8, 1902. Cromwell then dedicated himself day and night to drafting a treaty with Concha, based on the draft that Martínez Silva had prepared, known as the memorandum .
As of March 27, 1902, Concha's best proposal was for $7,500,000 in cash, annuities of $600,000 after 15 years of completion of the works, the limitation of US authority over the area and that the contract be fixed term. Minister Concha had arrived with instructions to demand $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 in cash and annuities of $1,000,000. 53
After subsequent negotiations, it was agreed that the annual pecuniary remuneration would be decided by the Peace Court of The Hague , and that the term of the contract would be for one hundred years, extendable.
On March 29, the draft of what would later be called the Hay-Concha treaty was ready, which was presented for evaluation by Concha on the 31st of the same month. In a communication dated April 1, 1902 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the fears that Concha harbored are perceived:
The first thing that comes to mind in this regard, and especially given the current political situation of the isthmus, is the imminent danger of a secession movement occurring in that region of the Republic, either spontaneously or due to indirect suggestions of interests. foreigners, which would be a source of incalculable evils for the Republic. With the doors of the national territory closed in hostilities to the United States, in retaliation they would denounce, as the press has already proposed, the treaty of 1846 and once the commitments of that pact were broken, they would watch impassively the events that took place in Panama, to then occupy the territory in the first interruption of the railway service or to welcome any tendency on the separatist path, which would lead to an injury to Colombian sovereignty of much greater consequences than any limitation to which the republic is subject in the use of a certain area of its territory. 51 After the negotiation of some amendments, on April 23, Secretary Hay notified Concha that he was ready to sign the treaty, as soon as Congress authorized the president to finalize the agreement and the Department of Justice concluded the investigation of the title of the channel company.
Although the Hay-Concha treaty helped pass the Spooner Act, it had been viewed with suspicion by several senators who demanded additional amendments, relating to the ability of the US to maintain judicial courts in the area in addition to a police force, as well as the control of the laying of pipes, sewers and sewage. They also demanded that the clause referring to the expropriation of the canal company be withdrawn, and absolute control in perpetuity, instead of a lease over the area. 54
On July 28, Secretary Hay sent the additional congressional amendments to Concha, who in turn communicated them to his government, urging the latter to reject them. Contrary to what Concha expected, on August 9, Marroquín ordered her to accept the proposal, but to demand a cash payment of $10,000,000 and $600,000 annually, over 14 years. 54
On August 13, he received a similar statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, confirming that the negotiations could not be interrupted, but that the treaty would have to be approved by Congress and that Colombia would make it a requirement to recover the nominal value of the 50,000 shares it owned. in the channel company as a necessary condition. 55
In September 1902, the United States charge d'affaires in Bogotá , Charles Burdett Hart , received a visit from Carlos Liévano , representing the Liberal Revolutionary Party, in which he requested the intervention of the United States to end the war, in favor of of the liberals. One of his arguments was that if this happened, the country, mostly liberal, would be willing to continue negotiating the canal treaty. Hart was in favor of the proposal.
At that time, the liberals had defeated Marroquín 's troops in practically all of the national territory except in Panama , where the victory of approximately 7,000 men of the liberal army against 3,000 of the government army was only a matter of time. 56
Three days later, Liébano returned to Hart's office, who told him " It's all over." There is no revolution anymore . When Mr. Liébano questioned the reason, Hart responded: " You know that we have a canal to build ." 57
Marroquín 's son , Lorenzo Marroquín , in the company of Arístides Fernández , had already negotiated a US intervention pact to end the war on behalf of the conservative party in power, pledging that the government would reach an agreement satisfactory to the United States. in the canal treaty. 57 58
Concha, who was oblivious to the reasons for the American intervention, received a cable from Marroquín on September 25, ordering him not to discuss the issue of the occupation. 57 The minister firmly believed that the 1846 agreement had been violated, since the US sending its marines to Panama had not only disarmed the revolutionary troops, but also prevented the transfer and movement of official troops. He also saw in this situation a sign of a probable annexation of Panama to the United States. 57
It was impossible for Concha to continue in her position and after a copious exchange of communications with the Colombian government, on October 3 Concha wrote " I am resigning from the legation for the fourth time." Tell the secretary to take charge. ». 59 On October 7 he received a response: « His resignation is unpatriotic and inadmissible. » 59
Concha tried to resume negotiations and focus on the issue of sovereignty. However, after some exchanges on the matter with Hay , and having submitted his amendments to the treaty and obtained a revision in which the US insisted on maintaining judicial and military privileges over the isthmus, he began to dislike all American negotiators, and this, added to his displeasure with the government he represented, and the conviction he professed not to negotiate as long as the occupation of the isthmus by the United States continued, led him to irrevocably resign on November 28, 1902. 59
Concha suffered a physical and emotional breakdown upon his resignation and was reported to have had to be shipped in New York on a steamship back to Colombia constrained in a straitjacket .
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إدارة د. توماس هيران
The new Chargé d'affaires , Dr. Tomás Herrán , a career diplomat who had served as Secretary General of the Legation since its restoration in Washington , was the son of General Pedro Alcántara Herrán who in the past had championed the ratification of the treaty . Mallarino-Bidlack .
Marroquín would grant him his plenipotentiary powers in a statement dated December 11, 1902, in which he continued to press for payment of the $10,000,000 as compensation and the annuity of $600,000, or the best advantage he could negotiate, and asked Herrán sign the treaty, stating that the US was not willing to increase the offer, and stipulating that the treaty should be ratified by the Colombian congress . 62
In a series of grueling conferences that Herrán held with Secretary Hay and Senators Hanna and Spooner before the end of the year, he obtained the following alternative offers:
Compensation of $7,000,000 with annuities of $100,000 at age fourteen. Compensation of $10,000,000 with annuities of $10,000 at age fourteen. Herrán sent the offers to the Colombian government, but it was reluctant to accept them and delayed the response.
In communications with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Paúl, Herrán expressed his concern about the separatist feelings in Panama but saw the possibility of remedying them, of achieving an adequate treaty. He also expressed his fear that Roosevelt, upon observing Colombia's resistance to accepting these terms, with his impetuous temperament, could appropriate Panama , having as justification the Universal Service of Public Interest character of the canal. 63
On December 31, Mr. Herrán would respond to a cordial invitation to act from Secretary Hay , advocating for compensation of $10,000,000, and proposing, given the great pecuniary difference, between what was proposed by the United States and what was required. by the government of Colombia , to defer the negotiation of the annuity, until a later contract, taking into account that there would be several years in between, until the payment began to be executed. 64
Soon Mr. Herrán's talent as a negotiator began to bear fruit, and on January 3, 1903, Secretary Hay agreed to Herrán's proposal, suggesting that he sign the treaty stipulating compensation of $10,000,000, increasing the annuity to $100,000, and leaving the door open for subsequent negotiations on the annuity, once the canal was completed, if circumstances justified the increase in said rent .
However, an event clouded the picture that same day: the US Minister in Bogotá , Mr. Hart, notified his government that Colombia planned to claim additional compensation from the Compagnie Nouvelle , before signing the treaty. As a result, Herrán was informed that the negotiations should be closed before March 4 and that the president, although clearly favoring the Panama route, could reconsider the Nicaragua route if an agreement with Colombia was not reached soon . 66
Although Herrán had been educated in the US and spoke fluent English , and although Secretary Hay and Cromwell were pleased with the new delegate, Herrán began to express his distrust of Cromwell and the Compagnie Nouvelle, due to the frictions that opposing interests were beginning to generate. Recognizing Cromwell as a former ally of Colombia in the sale of the Panama Canal project to the US, he also warned of the intrusion of Bunau-Varilla , in sending cables and correspondence to people in the Colombian government. 67
In a cable sent by Marroquín on January 10, defined as a final instruction , and received by Herrán on the 16th, he expressed that he understood that the amendments left by Concha had been accepted by the United States , and he asked Herrán to negotiate greater monetary increases and a decrease in the term of the annuity's execution. He also instructed Herrán that if he saw it impossible to negotiate greater benefits and that if the business could be ruined over time, he should sign the treaty anyway. 68
In a letter from Herrán to Paúl, dated January 22, 1903, the Colombian representative clarified to his government that the Concha amendments sent by him to Hay did not even have a receipt date, so the negotiations had been suspended; He added that in conference with President Roosevelt , he told him that he would sign the treaty if necessary, but that he would record his disagreement on the stipulated value of the annuity. 69
On January 22, Hay sent Herrán an ultimatum informing him that the reasonable time contemplated by the Spooner statute had expired and that President Roosevelt had approved increasing the annuity to $250,000 at 9 years, and that he was not authorized to consider or discuss no additional change. 70
That same day, at dusk, the Herrán-Hay treaty was signed at the house of Secretary Hay , in Lafayette Square . Cromwell, being the only one present, in addition to the signatories, kept the pen with which it was signed, as a souvenir of the goal achieved. 71
Months later, due to the rejection by the Colombian Congress of the treaty, and the constant grievances to which he would be subjected by his government, Herrán fell into a severe state of depression . When he left Washington for New York with his family, he also suffered from a worrying physical condition. He died on August 30, 1904 at Loomis Sanitarium, Liberty, New York .
نص المعاهدة
The treaty is divided into 28 articles without supradivisions, enjoying a prior and unilateral annex composed of 8 articles. The introduction contextualizes the contracting parties in time and space, making clear the fundamental purpose of the article: to ensure the construction of a canal for ships, which puts the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in communication . In this sense, the treaty defines itself as bilateral, binding and of sovereign signature as it is given between duly accredited plenipotentiary entities . 73
Structure and content of the articles
Articles 1 to 5 establish the transfer of obligations by the Colombian government to an ad hoc company , which must acquire the construction concession for legal payment, respecting the public shares previously acquired. 74 An extraordinary transfer for one century of the exclusive exploitation rights of the canal is made to the United States , 75 a country that is responsible for the maintenance and administration and reserves the right to expand or build, as well as to extend the concession unilaterally by time equivalent to that originally agreed. 76 The treaty establishes that the United States must adhere to respect for Colombian sovereignty . 77 Said articles provide a legal context under which both parties agree.
Hereinafter, from articles 6 to 12, the local conditions that are guaranteed depending on the correct course of the concession are established. The Colombian government strips itself of territorial sovereignty by accepting the abstention of leasing to third parties key geographical points that could hinder the exploitation of the canal, 78 as well as allowing the local exploitation of natural resources in an unrestricted manner due to the cost of free profit by the Colombian natives, 79 as well as the US obligation to compensate for the damages caused by the works related to the canal. 80 The Colombian government undertakes not to hinder the transit and settlement of foreigners who enter the country as part of the team related to the canal.
The commercial conditions between both parties are also established from articles 12 to 19. U.S. imports are allowed free of customs payments as long as they are for consumption near the canal. 81 In addition, Colombia allows the United States to provide protection to all commercial channels related to the canal, using the necessary legal means. 82 The dispossession of sovereignty includes the establishment of US courts to settle conflicts in the area, as well as the formation of a mixed court that would judge civil and similar cases . 82 The possibility of creating laws based on the needs of the area is left open. 82 The right to expropriate property for reasons of public interest is vindicated as a consequence of unappealable compensation . 83 In addition, the United States is allowed to use all Colombian port terminals for the protection and disembarkation of its ships with the purpose of benefiting or benefiting from the canal. 84 The responsibility for coercion in the interests of compliance with the treaty rests entirely with the United States. 85
As a consequence of the international benefit of the canal, the rest of the articles establish the conditions under which third States will be governed. Colombia's first commitment is to unilaterally denounce any agreement with a third State that contravenes the treaty signed below; 86 Any claim that arises due to breach of agreement as a result of the execution of this agreement will be presented and resolved by the Colombian government without affecting the United States. 87 It is established that the Colombian government must militarily protect the canal, but that if it is not effective in said defense, the United States may use force in Colombian territory to ensure common interests. 88
The final articles establish deadlines, amounts and special conditions that enable the viable execution of the signed agreements. The procedure for ratification and deposit of the treaty is established , as well as its entry into force. 89
Annexed to the articles is an internal US authorization for the negotiation and acquisition of the agreement. 90 Said document simply contributes to the legitimation of the treaty as an international legal document.
رفض المعاهدة
On August 5, 1903 at 10 in the morning, the new United States ambassador in Colombia, Mr. Arthur Matthias Beaupré , reported the rejection of the treaty, informing Secretary Hay of the objections that the Colombian congress had presented and that Are detailed below.
The Herrán-Hay treaty was officially abolished on September 2, 1903, when the law was issued that approved its rejection. 92
At a dinner in Panama , in 1907, during an official visit by the United States Senator Duncan E. McKinlay, he had a conversation with the Minister of Government of Panama Tomás Arias , and asked him his opinion of the reasons why the Herrán-Hay treaty had been rejected after it had been tentatively agreed to by the Colombian authorities. Minister Arias' explanation revolved around four reasons why the Herrán-Hay treaty was rejected during its discussion in the Colombian Senate.
- First, German influence was strong in Colombia , and German merchants and diplomats were openly opposed to the extension of American influence under the west coast of South America, particularly in the Colombian Republic. The German merchants, seeing the collapse of the French Canal Company almost complete, hoped that the German Company could buy the remnants of the French company and bring the canal to a successful conclusion, realizing how much this stage would mean in the path of German aggrandizement.
- The second influence, according to Minister Arias, was that of the management of the old transcontinental railroad of the United States . When the popular clamor to obtain the Isthmian Canal had removed all obstruction in Washington, D.C. , it moved its theater of operations to Bogotá , and the influence and money of the railroad were probably used to induce some of the senators to vote against ratification of the treaty.
- The third influence was that of patriotism . Some of the Colombian senators were reluctant to transfer any portion of Colombian soil to a foreign power, especially considering that the Colombian constitution contained a clause that made a traitor of any Colombian who became involved in the alienation of any part of the country. Colombian territory to another country. 93
- The fourth and most important influence was the fact that the French Canal Company had failed to make any commitment to comply with the terms of its contract with the Colombian government. Not only had it failed to complete the canal within the specified time, but in obtaining an extension of that time, it had failed to maintain the terms under which the extension had been secured. Therefore the Colombian government could very appropriately seek its expropriation , which could be achieved following due process of law in just under ten months.
Many of the Colombian senators adopted the position that it would be legal and more convenient to declare the expropriation of the French Company, and to assume control of the canal pursuant to such expropriation in the manner provided for by the franchise. The Republic of Colombia would then be in a position to sell the same to the United States government for forty million dollars, and since it had then secured ten million dollars for the area and its rental in perpetuity for a considerable annuity, the financial condition of the country could improve substantially. As the finances of the Republic of Colombia were at that time in a desperately depleted condition, this prospect of its rehabilitation must have had a powerful effect on many of the senators.
These four circumstantial reasons undoubtedly caused the Colombian Senate, whose opposition to the treaty was led by former president Miguel Antonio Caro , to reject the ratification of the Herrán-Hay treaty.
الأعقاب
It has been considered by later observers that this happened mainly because Herrán had negotiated the treaty with little government or legislative oversight. It has also been mentioned that many of the politicians and congressmen found the amount offered to fall short, considering that the United States was willing to pay $40 million for the New Panama Canal Company and its construction equipment and excavations.[4][5]
The United States government was not willing to renegotiate the treaty with Colombia or alter the amounts involved and soon gave its support, both political and military, to a planned uprising in Panama, which led to its independence and to the eventual construction of the Panama Canal.
See also
- Spooner Act
- Clayton–Bulwer Treaty
- Hay–Pauncefote Treaty
- Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty
- Separation of Panama from Colombia
References
- ^ "Hay-Herrán Treaty: Colombia Misses its Chance".
- ^ "Educate Yourself - Kitty Hawk, Part I". Archived from the original on 2005-04-27. Retrieved 2004-12-13.
- ^ "Carlos Guevara Mann-The Panama Canal: A Historical Background". Archived from the original on 2005-01-09. Retrieved 2004-12-13.
- ^ Theodore Roosevelt :: The Panama Canal Britannica Student Encyclopaedia
- ^ "The Panama Canal". Archived from the original on 2004-09-20. Retrieved 2004-09-28.