توجيه حنبعل

رئيس أركان الجيش الإسرائيلي بني گانتس (يمين) في تدريب حيث تمارس القوات سيناريو اختطاف جندي. في كلمته أمام منتدى عمليات الجيش الإسرائيلي، قال گانتس إن بروتوكولات الجيش الإسرائيلي لا تسمح بقتل جندي من أجل منع اختطافه.[1]

توجيه حنبعل أو إجراء هانيبال أو بروتوكول هانيبال (بالعبرية: נוהל חניבעל‎، إنگليزية: Hannibal Directive)، هو إجراء أو بروتوكول مثير للجدل يستخدمه الجيش الإسرائيلي لمنع قوات العدو من أسر الجنود الإسرائيليين.

طُرح عام 1986، بعد عدد من عمليات اختطاف جنود الجيش الإسرائيلي في لبنان وما تلا ذلك من عمليات تبادل للأسرى مثيرة للجدل. لم يُنشر النص الكامل للتوجيه مطلقًا، وحتى عام 2003 منعت الرقابة العسكرية الإسرائيلية أي مناقشة للموضوع في الصحافة. تم تغيير التوجيه عدة مرات. وفي وقت من الأوقات كانت الصيغة هي أن "عملية الاختطاف يجب أن تتوقف بكل الوسائل، حتى لو كان ذلك على حساب ضرب قواتنا وإلحاق الأذى بها".[2]

ويبدو أن توجيه حنبعل كان موجوداً في بعض الأحيان بنسختين مختلفتين، نسخة مكتوبة شديدة السرية، لا يمكن الوصول إليها إلا للمستوى الأعلى من الجيش الإسرائيلي، ونسخة "قانون شفهي" واحدة لقادة الفرق والمستويات الأدنى. وفي النسخ الأخيرة، غالبًا ما يتم تفسير عبارة "بكل الوسائل" حرفيًا، كما هو الحال في "من الأفضل أن يموت جندي من الجيش الإسرائيلي بدلاً من أن يُختطف". عام 2011، صرح رئيس أركان الجيش الإسرائيلي بني گانتس أن التوجيه لا يسمح بقتل جنود الجيش الإسرائيلي.[3]

ولم يمنع توجيه حنبعل أسر جندي إسرائيلي واحد..[4] من بين 11 إسرائيليًا شاركوا في حوادث حنبعل السبعة التي أُبلغ عنها، نجا جندي واحد فقط (جلعاد شاليط). وفي حالته، فإن توجيه حنبعل جاء متأخرًا جدًا بحيث لا يكون له أي تأثير على سبب الأحداث. ومع ذلك، هناك فقط حالة واحدة حيث تم التأكيد رسميًا على أن القوات الإسرائيلية مسؤولة بشكل مباشر عن مقتل إسرائيلي.

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خلفية

Israel has with several notable exceptions adhered to the principle of not negotiating with terrorists and this especially in hostage situations. This policy led to some notable successes, such as Operation Entebbe, but also to tragic loss of human life, as in the Maalot Massacre. In cases where Israeli soldiers were captured and no military solution was found, Israel was forced to negotiate with the captors about an exchange of prisoners. Large parts of Israeli public opinion would not accept simply abandoning captured soldiers to their fate.

Already in 1970, the Palestinian movement Fatah managed to sneak over the Lebanese border and abduct a security guard in the northern settlement of Metulla and secure a swap of the guard for a senior member in Fatah, jailed in Israel. In 1979 Israel agreed to swap an Israeli POW in Palestinian hands for 76 convicted militants in Israeli jails.

After the 1982 Lebanon War Palestinian forces were holding nine IDF soldiers as POWs. Six were held by Fatah (the main faction of the PLO) and three by the pro-Syrian PFLP-GC. In 1983, Israel agreed to free 4,700 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners, including several high ranking PLO officers, against the six Fatah prisoners. The following year Israel accepted to free another 1,150 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. Many of them were allowed to remain in Israeli controlled territory.


التوجيه

According to Haaretz reporter Leibovich-Dar, the background to the formulation of the directive was the capture of two Israeli soldiers during a Hezbollah ambush in South Lebanon in June 1986. Both soldiers presumably died during the attack, and their bodies were returned to Israel in an exchange with Hezbollah in 1996. The authors of the order were the three top officers of the IDF Northern Command, Major General Yossi Peled, the command's operations officer, Colonel Gabi Ashkenazi, and its intelligence officer, Colonel Yaakov Amidror. The order was top secret, and its mere existence was denied by Israeli military authorities.

On August 1, 2014, the New York Times reported that Hamas had captured an IDF officer and that the IDF had answered with an assault that killed scores of Palestinians. The "Hannibal Directive" was not mentioned in the article. But the paper was contacted by the Israeli military censor and informed that any material related to the missing officer had to be submitted for prior review before publication. The paper had not been subjected to this level of scrutiny for more than six years.[5][6]

The exact wording of the directive was not known, though Leibovich-Dar claimed that it had been updated several times over the years.[7][8] The Jerusalem Post Journalist Anshel Pfeffer described the order in 2006 as the "rumored" standard procedure in the eventuality of a kidnap attempt: "soldiers are told, though never officially" the content of this order.[9]

Maariv quoted a version of the directive apparently applicable to 2014:

"A. During a kidnapping, the main task becomes to rescue our soldiers from the abductors, even at the cost of harming or injuring our soldiers.

B. If the abductors and the kidnapped are identified and the calls are not heeded, a firearm must be fired in order to bring the kidnappers to the ground, or arrest them.

D.(sic) If the vehicle or the hijackers do not stop, they should be fired at individually, intentionally, in order to hit the hijackers, even if it means harming our soldiers. (This section was accompanied by an asterisk comment emphasizing: "In any case, everything should be done to stop the vehicle and not allow it to escape").[4]

Apparently, the Hannibal directive existed in several versions at that time. It had been amended by the IDF General Staff in October 2013, but neither the corresponding orders at the IDF Southern Command, nor the one at the Gaza Division had been similarly updated by July 2014. The three different, simultaneously current, versions of the directive could therefore be interpreted in many different ways, especially on the sensitive question of the value of a soldier's life.[10]

Although Israeli officials insist that the directive's name was a random computer-generated designation, many observers do not find this convincing. The historic Carthaginian general Hannibal is said to have preferred suicide by poison, rather than being taken prisoner by his Roman enemies.[7][11][12]

According to statements by several Israeli officials, the aim of the directive is to prevent the capture of an IDF soldier by enemy forces, even by risking the soldier's life or the lives of scores of non-Israeli civilians. Israeli spokespersons claim that IDF forces are forbidden to attempt to kill a captured soldier, rather than having him captured. Many testimonies from IDF soldiers and other sources contradict this claim and suggest that the IDF in practice adheres to the principle that a dead soldier is better than a captive soldier.[7][13]

According to the directive, once it has been declared by a field officer, Israeli forces are to open fire on enemy forces carrying away an IDF prisoner. Vehicles suspected of removing such a prisoner from the battlefield may thus be attacked, even at the risk of harming, or even killing, the abductee himself. According to some interpretations, this includes even firing missiles from attack helicopters or firing tank shells at suspected escaping vehicles.[7]

Amos Harel of Haaretz wrote in November 2011 that the Hannibal directive was suspended for a time "due to opposition from the public and reservist soldiers" but was revised and reinstated by IDF Chief-of-Staff Benny Gantz after the abduction of Gilad Shalit in June 2006. The revised order stated that IDF commanders may take whatever action is necessary, even at the risk of endangering the life of an abducted soldier, to foil an abduction, but it does not allow them to kill an abducted Israeli soldier.[1] The new directive gave local field commanders the right to invoke Hannibal and take action, without waiting for superior officers' confirmation.[11]

Former head of Israeli military intelligence (1974–1978) Shlomo Gazit criticised the fact that a low level officer ("a corporal") could invoke the Hannibal Directive, with such potentially far reaching consequences. The invokation of the Hannibal directive in the 2006 Hezbollah cross-border raid had far-reaching consequences. An IDF tank sent in pursuit of the abductors was blown to pieces, killing its crew. Attempts to rescue the bodies of the tank crew led to further IDF losses. By the time the Israeli government convened to decide how to respond to the attack, Israel - according to Gazit - "was already at war".[14]

The Hannibal Directive was officially cancelled in 2016,[15] but a new directive was introduced in its place. Very little is known about its present content or even if it is still called the Hannibal Directive.[بحاجة لمصدر]

الجدل داخل الجيش

Dr. Avner Shiftan, an army physician with the rank of major, came across the Hannibal directive while on reserve duty in South Lebanon in 1999. In army briefings he "became aware of a procedure ordering soldiers to kill any IDF soldier if he should be taken captive by Hezbollah. This procedure struck me as being illegal and not consistent with the moral code of the IDF. I understood that it was not a local procedure but originated in the General Staff, and had the feeling that a direct approach to the army authorities would be of no avail, but would end in a cover-up."[16]

He contacted Asa Kasher, the Israeli philosopher noted for his authorship of Israel Defense Forces' Code of Conduct, who "found it difficult to believe that such an order exists" since this "is wrong ethically, legally and morally". He doubted that "there is anyone in the army" believing that 'better a dead soldier than an abducted soldier'. Haaretz article about Dr. Shiftan's experience was the first to be published in an Israeli newspaper.[16]

In contrast to the view of Kasher, the IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz said in an interview with Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth in 1999: "In certain senses, with all the pain that saying this entails, an abducted soldier, in contrast to a soldier who has been killed, is a national problem." Asked whether he was referring to cases like Ron Arad (an Air Force navigator captured in 1986) and Nachshon Wachsman (an abducted soldier killed in 1994 in a failed rescue attempt), he replied "definitely, and not only".[16]

According to Prof. Emanuel Gross, from the Faculty of Law at the University of Haifa, "Orders like that have to go through the filter of the Military Advocate General's Office, and if they were not involved that is very grave", he said. "The reason is that an order that knowingly permits the death of soldiers to be brought about, even if the intentions were different, carries a black flag and is a flagrantly illegal order that undermines the most central values of our social norms".[7]

Harel writes that a kind of "Oral Law" has developed inside IDF, which is supported by many commanders, even at brigade and division level. It goes further than the official order, including the use of tank shells or air strikes. "A dangerous, unofficial interpretation of the protocol has been created," a senior officer told Haaretz. "Intentionally targeting a vehicle in order to kill the abductee is a completely illegal command. The army's senior command must make this clear to officers."[1]

In anticipation of the Gaza War in 2009, Lt. Col. Shuki Ribak, the commander of the Golani Brigade's 51st battalion instructed his soldiers to avoid kidnapping at any cost and even made clear that he expected his soldiers to commit suicide rather than being abducted:

[N]o soldier in Battalion 51 will be kidnapped at any price. At any price. Under any condition. Even if it means that he blows himself with his own grenade together with those trying to capture him. Also even if it means that now his unit has to fire a barrage at the car that they are trying to take him away in.[17][18]

After a recording of Ribak's instructions was distributed by an anonymous source, the IDF reiterated its denial of having a policy of intentionally killing captured soldiers.[17]

حوادث بسبب التوجيه

مزارع شبعا (2000)

The Hannibal Directive was invoked in October 2000 after the Hezbollah capture of three Israeli soldiers in the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms area. An Israeli border patrol was attacked by a Hezbollah squad with rockets and automatic fire. St.-Sgt. Adi Avitan, St.-Sgt. Benyamin Avraham and St.-Sgt. Omar Sawaid were captured and brought over the ceasefire line into Lebanon by their captors. When the abduction was discovered, the Northern Command ordered a "Hannibal situation". Israeli attack helicopters fired at 26 moving vehicles in the area since they assumed that the abducted soldiers were transported in one of them.[7]

معبر كرم أبو سالم (2006)

Tank gunner Cpl. Gilad Shalit was captured by Hamas in a cross-border raid from Gaza 25 June 2006. Two IDF soldiers were killed in the attack and another two were wounded. Shalit was held for five years, before being exchanged for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, which was the highest number released for a single Israeli prisoner. According to the Israeli commission of inquiry, headed by Giora Eiland, the Hannibal directive was declared more than an hour after the capture. By that time, Shalit and his captors were already well inside the Gaza strip.[19] The declaration of Hannibal therefore had few practical consequences.

عيتا الشعب (2006)

On 12 July 2006, two Israeli soldiers, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were captured by Hezbollah in an ambush, in which three other soldiers were killed. The Hannibal directive was invoked and a force consisting of tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers was sent across the border to capture a Hezbollah post and block the exit routes out of the town of Ayta ash-Sha’b. A Merkava II main battle tank however ran over a powerful explosive charge and was totally destroyed and its four crewmen killed. The rescue mission was therefore aborted. An eighth IDF soldier was killed trying to retrieve the bodies of the tank crew.[20][21][22] The Hannibal directive triggered instant aerial surveillance and airstrikes inside Lebanon to limit Hezbollah's ability to move the soldiers it had seized. "If we had found them, we would have hit them, even if it meant killing the soldiers," a senior Israeli official said.[23] The bodies of the two soldiers were returned in an exchange with Hezbollah in July 2008.

معبر إيرز (2009)

In 2009 Israeli civilian Yakir Ben-Melech was shot dead by Israeli security guards while trying to enter the Gaza Strip from Israel, by jumping the fence at the Erez crossing. In the Israeli press the man was described as a mentally disturbed Israeli citizen, who wanted to contact Hamas, so as to secure the release of Israeli captive Gilad Shalit. Officially, Ben-Melech was mistakenly identified as a potential terrorist.[24]

According to a report by Israeli radio the Hannibal procedure was declared and Ben-Melech was shot to death when he refused to stop. Chief of Staff of the Southern Command, Brig.-Gen. Zvika Fogel commented: "We can't afford now any soul mate of Gilad Shalit" Apparently, Ben-Melech was killed, not by IDF soldiers, but by members of a private security firm, responsible for security at the Erez gate.[25][26]


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غزة (2008–09)

During the 2008–2009 Gaza war, an unidentified Israeli soldier was shot and injured by a Hamas fighter during a search of a house in one of the neighbourhoods of Gaza. The Hannibal directive was declared. The wounded soldiers' comrades evacuated the house due to fears that it was booby-trapped. According to testimony by soldiers who took part in the incident the house was then shelled to prevent the wounded soldier from being captured alive by Hamas. According to the IDF spokesman, however, the soldier was already dead, killed by terrorist gun fire.[27]

رفح (2014)

During Israel's offensive military operation launched in 2014, the third major offensive launched by Israel in Gaza since 2008, IDF Givati Brigade Lieutenant Hadar Goldin was captured by Hamas soldiers after a brief skirmish on August 1. Despite announcing a 72-hour ceasefire agreement earlier that same day, Israel reportedly initiated the Hannibal Directive in an onslaught later dubbed "Black Friday."[28][29][30] The IDF carried out a relentless air and ground attack on residential areas of Rafah in order to carry out the Hannibal Directive and attempt to foil the capture of Lt. Goldin.[31][30] A 2015 joint report by Amnesty International and Forensic Architecture found that Israel's indiscriminate violence against all human life amounted to war crimes.[31] That report, along with the United Nations' investigation,[32][33] details the massive Israeli bombardment that killed between 135 and 200 Palestinian civilians, including 75 children, in the three hours following the suspected capture of the one Israeli soldier.[30][34][35][36] Israel's large-scale military onslaught during the declared ceasefire was reported by Haaretz to be the "most devastating" execution of the Hannibal Directive to date.[37]

In December 2014, audio recordings from the IDF's communication system were obtained by Ynet.[38] This evidence, in addition to the July 2015 release of full transcripts from the IDF's communication system, reveal the initiation of the Hannibal Directive.[39][40] However, an IDF investigation denied that the "Hannibal Procedure" was implemented, despite admitting to using the phrase on IDF field radios. The IDF investigation concluded that 41 people were killed, 12 of them Hamas combatants.[41] Asa Kasher, a winner of the Israel Prize and the author of the IDF's ethical code, contradicted the IDF's report while speaking at a conference of the Tzohar Zionist rabbinical organization. Kasher stated that a soldier had been killed during the summer of 2014 by his comrades due to a mistaken understanding of the directive, and Kasher intimated that the soldier was Lt. Goldin.[42]

Testimonies from IDF soldiers involved in the attack provide further evidence against the IDF's official story.[43] An Israeli army infantry officer described the events of August 1 to Israeli NGO Breaking the Silence: "The minute 'Hannibal Directive' is declared on the radio, there are consequences. There's a fire procedure called the 'Hannibal fire procedure' – you fire at every suspicious place that merges with a central route. You don't spare any means."[44] He reported that the initial burst of fire lasted three hours.[44] An artillery soldier said his battery was "firing at a maximum fire rate" right into inhabited areas.[34][45] According to the Givati Brigade inquiry, more than 2,000 bombs, missiles and shells were fired in Rafah on 1 August 2014, including 1,000 in the three hours following the capture.[35][46]

حي الشجاعية (2014)

During the Battle of Shuja'iyya, on July 20, 2014, Hamas fired an anti-tank missile at an IDF armored personnel carrier carrying 7 soldiers, including St.-Sgt. Oron Shaul.[47] Hamas rapidly claimed to have captured an IDF soldier named Aron Shaul, backing up its claim with the soldier's "photo ID and credentials".[48][49][50] The IDF later confirmed that the body of Oron Shaul had not been identified among the dead found inside the vehicle.[51][52][53][54] It is unclear if Shaul was captured alive or dead or whether the Hannibal directive was invoked or not.[55]

The second case concerned St.-Sgt. Guy Levy who was killed on July 25. According to the IDF, Levy was killed by an anti-tank missile.[56] Apparently, his body could not be found and the Hannibal directive was reportedly invoked in this incidence.[11]

ردود الفعل

No mother would want her son to be killed rather than be taken prisoner…You prefer to wait until he returns, even if it goes on for very many years.

— Pnina Feldman, mother of Zvi Feldman, missing since the battle of Sultan Yakub in Lebanon, in June 1982[8]

The nightmare we went through for 10 years is indescribable, but despite that, I would not agree to have the buddies of an abducted soldier try to save him even at the price of killing him. As long as there is life there is hope. I am also positive that the soldiers would refuse to obey the order and would not kill an Israeli soldier. What about the effect of the order on the soldiers' morale? A soldier who is taken prisoner has to know that everything will be done to rescue him without killing him.

— Mordechai Fink, father of Yossi Fink, whose abduction in 1986 brought about the formulation of the Hannibal Directive.[8]

انظر أيضاً

المصادر

  1. ^ أ ب ت Harel, Amos. After Shalit, some IDF officers see a dead soldier as better than abducted, Haaretz. 2011
  2. ^ Weizman, Eyal (2017). Forensic Architecture, VIOLENCE AT THE THRESHOLD OF DETECTABILITY. New York: Zone Books. ISBN 9781935408864., page 176.
  3. ^ Amos Harel (2011). "Haaretz, Chief of Staff to Military Commanders: Hannibal Directive Does Not Permit Killing of Soldiers to Prevent Abduction".
  4. ^ أ ب Noam Amir (28 June 2016). "הרמטכ"ל איזנקוט: נוהל חניבעל שמופעל לאחר אירוע חטיפה ייכתב מחדש (Chief of Staff Eizenkot: The Hannibal procedure used after a kidnapping incident will be rewritten)". Maariv. Retrieved 26 January 2022. Hebrew text: "א. בזמן מחטף הופכת המשימה העיקרית חילוץ חיילינו מידי החוטפים גם במחיר של פגיעה או פציעת חיילינו. ב. במידה ויזוהו החוטפים והחטופים ולא נענו לקריאות לעצור, יש לבצע ירי נק"ל (נשק קל), על מנת להוריד את החוטפים לקרקע, או לעצור אותם.ד. אם לא עצר הרכב או החוטפים, יש לירות לעברם ירי נשק קל בבודדת, במכוון, על מנת לפגוע בחוטפים גם אם המשמעות פגיעה בחיילינו (סעיף זה לווה בהערת כוכבית שהדגישה: "בכל מקרה ייעשה הכל על מנת לעצור הרכב ולא לאפשר בריחתו").
  5. ^ Jodi Rudoren and Isabel Kershner (1 August 2014). "Gaza Fighting Intensifies as Cease-Fire Falls Apart". New York Times. Retrieved 16 January 2022.
  6. ^ Margaret Sullivan (1 August 2014). "Times Foreign Editor Responds on Israeli Censorship". New York Times. Retrieved 16 January 2022.
  7. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح Sara Leibovich-Dar (2003-05-21). "The Hannibal Procedure". Haaretz. Retrieved 2011-10-20.
  8. ^ أ ب ت Sara Leibovich-Dar (2003-05-21). "Continuation of The Hannibal Procedure". Haaretz. Retrieved 2011-10-20.
  9. ^ Anshel Pfeffer (2006-06-25). "Comment: The Entebbe Syndrome". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 2011-10-20.
  10. ^ State Comptroller and Ombudsman, Justice (Ret.) Joseph Chaim Shapira (March 14, 2018), Operation "Protective Edge" - IDF Activity from the Perspective of International Law, Particularly with Regard to Mechanisms of Examination and Oversight of Civilian and Military Echelons, p.9
  11. ^ أ ب ت Ruth Margalit (August 6, 2014). "Hadar Goldin and the Hannibal Directive". The New Yorker. Retrieved August 9, 2014.
  12. ^ Titus Livius (Livy) (1936). The History of Rome, Book XXIX, Chapter 51. Harvard University Press.
  13. ^ Yossi Yehoshua (14 January 2015). "Hannibal Directive: Soldiers were following clear orders". ynetnews. Retrieved 20 September 2021.
  14. ^ Benny Brunner (7 October 2016). "The Hannibal Directive". Al Jazeera English. Retrieved 25 May 2021.
  15. ^ Kershner, Isabel (28 June 2016). "Israeli Military Revokes Use of Maximum Force to Foil Captures". The New York Times.
  16. ^ أ ب ت Aviv Lavie (8 May 2003). "Better dead than abducted". Haaretz. Archived from the original on 9 August 2014.
  17. ^ أ ب Anshel Pfeffer (2011-10-18). "IDF warns soldiers of kidnappings ahead of Gilad Shalit's release". Haaretz. Retrieved 2011-10-20.
  18. ^ "The IDF Hannibal Protocol - IDF Commander Briefing Troops". Israel Television Channel 2 News. 16 October 2011. Retrieved Aug 25, 2012.
  19. ^ Hanan Greenberg (2006-07-10). "דו"ח איילנד: זמן רב חלף עד להכרזה על חטיפה". Yedioth Aharonoth. Retrieved 2011-10-30.
  20. ^ Eitan Baron (25 July 2006). "Angels of death knocking at my door". Haaretz. Retrieved 2011-10-20.
  21. ^ Harel, Amos and Avi Issacharoff, 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p.12
  22. ^ Amos Harel (2006-07-13). "Hezbollah kills 8 soldiers, kidnaps two in offensive on northern border". Haaretz. Retrieved 2011-11-10.
  23. ^ Scott Wilson (21 October 2006). "Israeli War Plan Had No Exit Strategy". Washington Post. Retrieved 10 November 2020.
  24. ^ "Man shot on Gaza border was mental patient". Yediot Achronot. 12 July 2009. Retrieved 2011-11-20.
  25. ^ Meron Rapoport and Kobi Peterzil (8 December 2009). "ידיד נפש, אב הרחמן: כך הרגו את יקיר בן מלך". Haoketz.org. Retrieved 2011-10-30.
  26. ^ Blumenthal, Max, THE 51 DAY WAR, Ruin and Resistance in Gaza, p.97.
  27. ^ Amir Bohbot (2009-01-26). "בית בעזה ובו גופת חייל הופגז - למנוע חטיפתה". Maariv (NRG). Retrieved 2011-10-30.
  28. ^ Jack Moore, IB Times Hadar Goldin and 'Hannibal Directive': Israel's Nightmare Dilemma to Stop Soldier Becoming Hamas Pawn, International Business Times, August 1, 2014; Quote: Following the capture of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier Hadar Goldin, reports are circulating that the Israeli military may invoke the covert 'Hannibal Directive' to prevent the Second Lieutenant being used as critical leverage in the ongoing Gaza conflict.
  29. ^ "Israel 'committed war crimes' in Gaza, Amnesty says". The Independent (in الإنجليزية). 2015-07-29. Archived from the original on 2022-05-09. Retrieved 2022-01-16.
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  33. ^ "OHCHR | UN Gaza Inquiry finds credible allegations of war crimes committed in 2014 by both Israel and Palestinian armed groups". www.ohchr.org. Retrieved 2022-01-16.
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  35. ^ أ ب "'Black Friday' Report: Carnage in Rafah during 2014 Israel/Gaza conflict". blackfriday.amnesty.org. Retrieved 2022-01-16.
  36. ^ Zitun, Yoav (2015-01-08). "Defense Minister Ya'alon objects to probe into 'Black Friday'". Ynetnews (in الإنجليزية). Retrieved 2022-01-16.
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  38. ^ Zitun, Yoav (2014-12-31). "Hannibal Directive: Exclusive tapes reveal details of IDF's Black Friday". Ynetnews (in الإنجليزية). Retrieved 2022-01-16.
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وصلات خارجية

  • The IDF Hannibal Protocol Golani Battalion 51 commander briefing his troops on the eve of their entry into Gaza during Operation Cast Lead. Video report broadcast on Israel Television Channel 2 News, 16 October 2011.
  • The Hannibal Directive, documentary by Benny Brunner, al-Jazeera English. 7 October 2016.
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