هيلده واگه

هيلده واگه

هيلده هنريكسن واگه Hilde Henriksen Waage ‏(ولدت 18 أغسطس 1959 في درامن) مؤرخة نرويجية.

حصلت واگه على درجة Cand.philol. في جامعة أوسلو في 1987 ودرجة Dr.philos. في 1997، وكليهما في التاريخ. وقد اصبحت أستاذة في جامعة أوسلو في 2007. وقبل ذلك، عملت واگه في معهد أبحاث السلام بأوسلو (PRIO)، أساساً كباحثة ولكن أيضاً كقائمة بأعمال المدير (سبتمبر 1992 – أبريل 1993) ونائبة المدير (1996–2005).

Waage has produced foundational contributions to Norwegian scholarship on Norway's role in the Oslo process of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the early to mid-1990s. She has also been critical of the doctoral thesis of former Norwegian State Secretary Jan Egeland, who was intimately involved with the Oslo negotiations, and has used the Oslo process to demonstrate what she calls "the limits of third-party mediation by a small state in highly asymmetrical conflicts," in contradiction to Egeland's thesis.

جزء من عملية أوسلو تضمن مفاوضات القناة الخلفية الشهيرة، والتي تمت وساطتها في النرويج. وفي 2001، كـُلـِّفت واگه من قِبل وزارة الشئون الخارجية النرويجية (MFA) لإجراء دراسة شاملة لتلك القناة الخلفية. In order to carry out the research, she was granted privileged access to all relevant, still-classified files in the ministry’s archives. The MFA had been at the heart of the Oslo process, but when Waage set to work at the archives she was surprised to discover "not a single scrap of paper for the entire period from January to September 1993—precisely the period of the backchannel talks." Such documentation does exist, and has been quoted by Israeli accounts of the Oslo process, but attempts to uncover it have failed, and significant amounts of documentation held by, inter alia, former Foreign Minister يوهان يورگن هولست has been refused access to. Waage and others speculate that such documentation has been kept hidden for party-political reasons, to avoid upsetting Israeli and US sensitivities about Israel's stance أثناء عملية أوسلو، and for the vested interests of the Norwegian officials involved: وتصف واگه النرويج تحت قيادة تري رود-لارسن وزوجته منى يول، يان إگلاند ويوهان يورگن هولست بأنها "الصبي الساعي (الفراش) لإسرائيل."

Waage divides her country's role at Oslo into two phases. In the first, "the Norwegians played only the role of a very modest facilitator"; however, during the second, from May 1993 after the Israelis upgraded the status of the Oslo talks:

Norway was . . . also an active mediator. . . . But its mediation role did not involve being on equal terms with each of the involved parties. . . . No evidence has been found showing or even suggesting that the Norwegians argued in the same way towards the Israelis as they did towards the Palestinians. . . . There appears to have been a striking lack of even-handedness on the part of the Norwegians in terms of attempts to persuade the Israeli actors to see the Palestinian point of view or revealing to the PLO where the Palestinians might have had their best negotiating chances. . . . النتيجة المتحققة في 1993، اتفاقية أوسلو، لم تكن اتفاقية سلام عادية. In essence, it was more of a timetable, a point of departure with many vaguely formulated intentions. PLO leader Arafat's willingness to accept the Oslo Accord, with all its shortcomings and compromises, was clearly a result of his fear of being permanently marginalized.^:165–6

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 مؤلفات مختارة

• Heian-Engdal, Marte; Jensehaugen, Jørgen; —— (2013). "Finishing the Enterprise: Israel's Admission to the United Nations". The International History Review. 35 (3): 465–485. doi:10.1080/07075332.2013.795493.
• Jensehaugen, Jørgen; ——; Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2012). "Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 23 (2): 280–303. doi:10.1080/09592296.2012.679478.
• Jensehaugen, Jørgen; —— (2012). "Coercive Diplomacy: Israel, Transjordan and the UN—a Triangular Drama Revisited". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 39 (1): 79–100. doi:10.1080/13530194.2012.659445.
• —— (2008). "Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing Files" (PDF). Journal of Palestine Studies. 38 (1): 54–65. doi:10.1525/jps.2008.38.1.54.
• —— (2007). "The 'Minnow' and the 'Whale': Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (2): 157–176. doi:10.1080/13530190701427917. JSTOR 20455504.
• —— (2005). "Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Strong State and a Weak Belligerent" (PDF). Journal of Palestine Studies. 34 (4): 6–24. doi:10.1525/jps.2005.34.4.6.
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2005), Regime Stability in the Middle East, Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, ISBN 82-7288-226-4 
• —— (2004). Peacemaking is a Risky Business: Norway's Role in the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1993–96. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo. ISBN 978-8-272-88219-7.
• Waage, Hilde Henriksen (2000), "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East, Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/fredsarbeid/hhw_2000.pdf 
• —— (2000). "How Norway Became One of Israel's Best Friends". Journal of Peace Research. 37 (2): 189–211. doi:10.1177/0022343300037002005. JSTOR 424920.

• (1996): Norge -Israels beste venn. Norsk Midtøsten-politikk 1949-1956. Universitetsforlaget. (Norwegian) (p. 30-45: Yanuv)